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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici Curiae, The Utah Taxpayers Association and The Utah
Manufacturers Association, appearing through their attorneys Kent
W. Winterholler and Maxwell A. Miller of and for Parsons Behle &
Latimer, respectfully submit their Brief in support of Newspaper
Agency Corporation ("NAC"), that the decision of The Utah State Tax
Commission (the "Commission"), wherein the Commission denied NAC a
sales and use tax exemption under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-12-104(15)

(Supp. 1994), should be reversed.

The Utah

Taxpayers Association is a statewide association of businesses and
other taxpayers in Utah with approximately 2,000 members. The Utah
Manufacturers

Association

is

a

statewide

association

of

manufacturers and related businesses employing more than 84,000
employees

out

of

approximately

115,000

workers

employed

in

manufacturing industries in Utah.
STATEMENT OF COURT'S JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this Petition for
Review of a final decision of the Commission under Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16 (1993) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (e) (ii) (Supp.
1994) .
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The only issue presented for review which this brief will
address is:

Did the Commission err when it concluded that NAC's

purchase of machinery and equipment for use in NAC's Regent Street
131996

printing facility, a manufacturing operation, did not qualify for
exemption from sales and use tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12104(15) (Supp. 1994)?
The language in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), upon whose
meaning a resolution of the above-stated issue turns is: What
constitutes a "new or expanding operation" and what is a "normal
operating replacement"?
has not been granted

Amici Curiae submit that the Commission
discretion

to define

the

term

"normal

operating replacement" and has abused its discretion in defining
"new or expanding operations."

Because the Commission does not

have the discretion to define "normal operating replacements," the
standard of review of the Commission's decision respecting this
issue is correction of error under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1) (b)
(Supp. 1994) .
Because Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) directs the Commission
to define by rule "new or expanding operations," the standard of
review is the reasonableness of the Commission's interpretation and
application of those terms.

The Commission's interpretation and

application of law will be reversed if the court determines the
Commission's action is unreasonable, constituting an abuse of
discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (h) (ii) (1993), Zissi v.
State Tax Comm'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992) and Albertsons.

131996
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Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570 (Utah App.
1993) -1
The Commission's interpretation of Rule R865-19-85S to require
satisfaction of a "new products" test for exemption eligibility,
when no such test is contemplated under the statute or required by
the rule, raises an issue of law which should be reviewed for
correctness. No deference should be granted the Commission by the
court.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(b) (Supp. 1994).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

1.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (Supp. 1994) . This statute is

reproduced in full in Addendum I.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15)

(Supp. 1994).

This

statute is reproduced in full in Addendum I.
3.

Rule 865-19-85S of the Utah Administrative Code.

This

rule is reproduced in full in Addendum I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Amici Curiae believes the statement of the case contained in
NAC's Brief adequately states the nature of the case, the course of
proceedings and disposition of this case before the Commission.
Amici Curiae also believes the Statement of Facts contained in
NAC'S Brief is appropriate.

Amici Curiae will not restate these

matters in this brief, relying upon NAC's Statement of the Case.

\A11 cases cited in this brief are reproduced,
convenience of the court, in Addendum II.
131996
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for the

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Commission erred in its NAC decision and in Eaton-Kenway
Inc. v. The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission,
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 940126, by applying its definition of
a "normal operating replacement," as contained in Rule 865-19-85S,
to include all machinery and equipment which replaces existing
machinery and equipment if the replacements produce one of the same
products as the existing machinery.

These holdings graft a test

onto the Commission's rule which is not justified by the statute.
This "new product" requirement is an incorrect and unreasonable
action requiring reversal.
The effect of the Commission's NAC decision is to favor new,
i.e., not currently existing, manufacturing operations over now
existing, but expanding, manufacturing operations. The policy this
action advances is devastating to Amici Curiae's membership and is
contrary

to the legislature's

intent

in explicitly

including

"expanding [manufacturing] operations" in the exemption language.
The

Commission's

manufacturing

exclusion

operations

of

the

to whom

entire

the

set

statutory

of

expanding

exemption

is

available should be reversed as a violation of legislative intent
and an usurpation of legislative authority.
The Commission has not been given discretion under Utah Code
Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra, the exemption statute, to define the
term "normal operating replacements," but may only determine an
131996
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"increase

[in]

plant

production

or

capacity."

Therefore,

Commission Rule R865-19-85S, which defines a "normal operating
replacement" to include any "machinery or equipment which replaces
existing machinery and equipment of a similar nature . . ." is
beyond the Commission's authority and is erroneous.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION'S ADOPTION OP A NEW PRODUCT REQUIREMENT IS NOT
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE STATUTE AND RULE 85S.
In this case, and in the Eaton-Kenway decision, supra. the

Commission has interpreted its own rule and applied a new products
test.

In its NAC decision, the Commission held:

NAC's new offset presses and auxiliary equipment were
placed in a plant that had previously consisted of an
offset press and two letter presses. While the new
offset presses and supporting equipment offer superior
quality and greater capacity than the old letter presses,
the basic purpose and actual use of both types of presses
is the same: they produce daily newspapers.
The
Commission therefore concludes that NAC's new machinery
and equipment is similar in nature to its old equipment
and fails to meet the third alternative test of Rule
R85S.A.3. for "new or expanding operation."
Commission Decision ("Decision" hereafter), [emphasis added] p. 14.
The Commission has ruled that if new machinery and equipment
produces any of the same products as replaced machinery and
equipment, it is a "normal operating replacement" no matter what
other products the new machinery produces and no matter what
additional functions the replacement machinery performs.

In this

ruling the Commission has focused its attention on a single aspect

131996
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of a manufacturing operation, does the new machinery produce the
same product as the old machinery and equipment?

The Commission

deliberately ignores any changes in the process, character or
nature of the operation. The Commission also ignores any new
product capability, and any increased capacity, productivity or
cost savings which the new machinery generates.
No new product test is contained in Rule 85S, or in Utah Code
Ann. § 59-12-104(15) , supra. Requiring NAC and other manufacturers
to produce an entirely different product line in order to qualify
as a "new or expanding operation" rewrites the statutory exemption
by adding a requirement which the legislature did not include in
the statute.

This is an usurpation of legislative authority and

the Commission should be reversed.2
The absurdity of this new, or different, product test is
easily seen if the test is applied to a field other than printing.

2

The Utah Supreme Court in Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit
Division of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993)
overturned an earlier version of Rule 85S promulgated by the
Commission which imposed a requirement that a business produce a
new product in order to qualify as a manufacturer for purposes of
the Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra. exemption. In this
case, the Commission has once again attempted to impose a new, or
different, product requirement by interpreting Rule 85S to exclude
those businesses which produce the same product with replacement
machinery and equipment.
Under this ruling the replacement
machinery producing the same product is a "normal operating
replacement"
not
qualifying
for
the
"new or
expanding
[manufacturing] operation" exemption.
The legislature never
included, nor intended, this requirement as a part of the
exemption.
131996
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Under this test if a telecommunications company replaces its copper
electronic voice and data transmission land lines with an orbiting
satellite electronic voice and data transmission

system, the

satellite, and the land-based receiving stations, would be "normal
operating replacements" for the replaced copper wire transmission
lines. The new system and the old both perform the same function,
electronic voice and data transmission.
same end product, transmitted

Both systems produce the

information.

Even though the

technology which the new equipment employs is radically different,
has a capacity thousands of times greater than the replaced copper
wire, and is hundreds of times cheaper to employ and operate, the
Commission would view the new system as a
replacement."
excluded

"normal operating

This cannot be what the legislature meant when it

from a

"new or expanding

"normal operating replacements."

[manufacturing] operation"

The Commission's decision is

incorrect and unreasonable and should be overturned.
II.

THE COMMISSION'S RULE AND DECISION DISCRIMINATES AGAINST
EXISTING UTAH MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS, THIS IS CONTRARY TO
THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT IN ENACTING THE EXEMPTION.
Rule 85S enunciates three tests under which a manufacturing

operation can qualify for the sales and use tax exemption of Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra.

The Commission's decision

states:
The Commission has specific statutory authority to define
the term "new or expanding operation." The Commission's

131996
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definition is found in Rule R865-19-85S.A.3., which
limits "new or expanding" operations to those which are:
(1) substantially different in nature, character, or
purpose from prior activities;
(2)

begun in a new physical plant location in Utah; or

(3) increase production or capacity, subject to the
Commission's
definition
of
"normal
operating
replacements." If NAC satisfies any one of the foregoing
conditions, it meets the requirement of a "new or
expanding operation."
Decision, pp. 10-11.
The first two criteria, i.e. (1) "substantially different in
nature, character or purpose from prior activities" and, (2) "begun
in a new physical plant location in Utah," are the Commission's
attempt to define a "new" manufacturing operation.
criteria,

The third

(3) "increase production or capacity," is an effort to

define what the statute means by an "expanding" manufacturing
operation.
In this case the Commission initially determined that NAC did
not meet the first test for a "new" operation.

The Commission

held:
Rule R85S.A.3.'s first criterion is that the machinery
and equipment be used
in activities
that are
substantially different in nature, character, or purpose
from prior activities. NAC points to the improvement in
newspaper quality that results from its new equipment.
NAC also points to the equipment's ability to produce
special advertising formats such as "gatefold" and
"spadia." NAC further points to its ability, resulting
from the new machinery and equipment, to compete for
"preprint" and "contract" printing jobs.

131996
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In the Commission's view, the foregoing activities are
not substantially different from NAC's prior activities.
Rather, they represent the incremental movement of the
newspaper industry into an era where newspapers are of
higher quality. The Commission finds NAC's activities
along these lines to be evolutionary in nature and not
substantially different from prior activities.
Decision, p. 11.
Even though NAC's new offset printing facility gave it the
ability to manufacture products it was unable to produce with its
old letter press machinery, the Commission held that the new
operation

was

not

substantially

different

from

NAC's

old

facilities, i.e. was not a "new" manufacturing operation.3

3

Amici Curiae do not agree with the Commission's conclusion
on this point. NAC's new Regent Street facility is "substantially"
different from its old plant. The new facility enables NAC to
deliver products which could not be produced in the old plant, i.e.
spadia and gatefolds. Furthermore, the new plant placed NAC in a
new line of business it was unable to enter with the old
manufacturing plant, i.e. contract printing.

131996
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The Commission also ruled that NAC was not a "new" operation
because its new printing facility was located in the same building
shell

its

old

letter

press

printing

plant

occupied.4

The

Commission then determined NAC did not qualify as an "expanding"
operation

because

the

end

product

of

both

the

old

and

new

facilities were the same, i.e. daily newspapers, even though the
new offset printing facility differed from the old letter press
printing plant in the following ways:
(1)

The

new

plant

employed

new,

modernized

technology.

Decision, p. 4.
(2)

The new plant produced newspapers of much higher quality

than were produced in the old facility.
(3)

Decision, p. 14.

The new plant was at least 20%, and at times 66%, more

productive than was the old plant.

4

Decision, p. 4.

This holding is an excellent example of how the Commission
has unreasonably limited the exemption for a "new [manufacturing]
operation."
NAC's Regent Street printing plant was completely
redone, the only resemblance between the old and new plant was that
a portion of the new plant was in the same building shell as was
the old plant. To hold, as the Commission did, that this was not
a "new [manufacturing] operation" because it utilized the same
building shell as the old plant for a portion of the new activities
is an unreasonably narrow and restrictive definition of what a "new
[manufacturing] operation" is under the statute.
Amici Curiae
agree with NAC that the Commission's requirement that a new plant
must be in a new physical location in order to qualify as a "new
[manufacturing] operation" is contrary to the plain meaning of the
statute. This requirement subverts the legislature's intent when
it stated in the statute that "new [manufacturing] operations"
qualify for a sales tax exemption.
131996
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(4)

The new plant enabled NAC to produce products that could

not be produced

in NAC's

old

letter press printing

spadia, gatefolds, and printed color inserts.
(5)

facility,

Decision, pp. 3-4.

The new plant enabled NAC to enter a new line of business

it was unable to compete in with its old facilities, contract
printing.

Decision, p. 4.

Despite these findings of fact, the Commission held that NAC
was not eligible for an exemption for machinery and equipment to be
used in an "expanding" manufacturing operation because the new
machinery produced one product which the replaced machinery also
produced, daily newspapers.
The effect of the Commission's interpretation of Rule 85S in
its NAC decision is that a manufacturer replacing its existing
facilities with new machinery and equipment will never qualify for
the exemption if the new equipment performs a single
of

a

multitude

performed.

of

functions,

which

the

old

function, out

equipment

also

The exemption has been eliminated for any existing Utah

manufacturer

seeking

to

upgrade

or

modernize

(expand)

its

manufacturing operations.
This is not what the Utah Legislature intended in enacting the
exemption.

The exemption is to be available to both new and

expanding manufacturing
operations.

operations, not just new manufacturing

In the 19 85 Utah Senate debate respecting H.B. 103,

the originally enacted exemption which is now codified at Utah Code
131996
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Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (Supp. 1994), Senator Sandberg expressed his
concern

that

the

exemption

was

not

fair

to

existing

Utah

businesses. Dave Adams', from the Governor's office, response was
that the exemption in the bill was good for those businesses that
wanted to expand.5
The Commission's use of Rule 85S to deny the sales and use tax
exemption of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra to NAC is also
bad public policy.

One purpose of the exemption is to encourage

investment in manufacturing operations by businesses considering
new operations in Utah.

An equal, and concurrent, purpose is to

encourage investment by existing Utah businesses, such as NAC, that
are considering expanding their manufacturing operations in Utah.
The effect of Rule 85S, and the Commission's interpretation of the
rule in its NAC decision, is to deny the exemption to existing Utah
manufacturers.

The Commission has eliminated the "expanding"

operations language from the statute in its NAC and Eaton-Kenway,
supra, decisions. This is improper and an abuse of the discretion
granted the Commission in the statute.
Amici Curiae's membership is composed almost entirely of
existing Utah manufacturers and businesses.
message to Amici's membership is ominous:

5

The Commission's

If you modernize and

A copy of relevant portions from a transcript of the Utah
Senate debate respecting H. B. 103, February 26, 1985, is
reproduced in the Appendix.
131996
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upgrade your manufacturing plants to compete in the new global
economy, don't expect any help in Utah.

Even though the Utah

Legislature has enacted a statute to encourage investment by Utah
companies in "expanding" operations by granting a sales and use tax
exemption, in Rule 85S and in the NAC and Eaton-Kenway decisions
the Commission has eliminated the exemption for an "expanding"
manufacturing operation.
The court should not allow the Commission to rewrite and
restrict this exemption in this fashion.
about

the

availability

manufacturing

of

operation

is

the
the

exemption

The policy
for an

Legislature's

decision

"expanding"

alone.

The

Legislature has already made that policy decision in favor of
extending the exemption to a manufacturer such as NAC in this case.
The Commission's decision is incorrect, improper, and unreasonable
and it should be reversed.

III. THE COMMISSION'S RULE AND ITS DECISION IN THIS CASE VIOLATE
CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
The sales and use tax exemption denied by the Commission to
NAC states in pertinent part:
(15) sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased
or leased by a manufacturer for use in new or expanding
operations (excluding normal operating replacements,
which includes replacement machinery and equipment even
though they may increase plant production or capacity, as
determined by the Commission) in any manufacturing
facility in Utah.

131996
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(a) manufacturing facility means an establishment
described in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the 1987 Standard
Industrial Classification Manual, of the federal
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management
and Budget.
(b) for purposes of this subsection, the commission shall
by
rule
define
"new
or
expanding
operations"
and
"establishment."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (Supp. 1994).
The

Commission

has

attempted

to

implement

promulgating Rule 865-19-85S ("Rule 85S").

this

rule

by

That rule defines "new

or expanding operations" as follows:
3.
"New or expanding operations" means manufacturing,
processing, or assembling activities which:
(a) are
substantially
different
in
character, or purpose from prior activities;
(b)
Utah; or

nature,

are begun in a new physical plant location in

(c) increase production or capacity. This definition is
subject
to limitations
dealing with normal
operating
replacements.
The Commission then defines "normal operating replacements" in
Rule 85S, stating:
6.
"Normal operating replacements" means machinery or
equipment which replaces existing machinery or equipment
of a similar nature, even if the use results in increased
plant production or capacity.
Apparently,

the

Commission

has

interpreted

the

statutory

language "excluding normal operating replacements, which includes
replacement machinery and equipment even though they may increase
plant production or capacity, as determined by the commission," as
131996
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granting the Commission the authority to define "normal operating
replacements."

However,

the

actual

authority

granted

the

Commission in the statute is the more limited power to determine
the

circumstances

under

which more

productive

machinery

and

equipment is, or is not, a "normal operating replacement." This is
not the broad authority to define a "normal operating replacement"
as machinery and equipment of a "similar nature," as the Commission
is attempting in Rule 85S. Grammatically, the statutory language
"as determined

by

the

commission" modifies

"increased

plant

production or capacity," not "normal operating replacement."
In Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation Public Service
Commission of Utah. 626 P.2d 450 (Utah 1981) the Utah Supreme Court
approved this "last antecedent" rule of statutory construction.6
In sustaining the interpretation by the Public Service Commission

6

See 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.33 (4th ed.
rev. 1984) ("Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no
contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.")
See, also Webster's Legal Secretaries Handbook 258 (1981) ("In
order to achieve maximum clarity and to avoid the possibility that
the reader will misinterpret what he reads, one should place a
modifying clause as close as possible to the word or words it
modifies.") See, also Jensen v. City and County of Denver. 806
P.2d 381, 385 (Colo. 1991); Taylor v. Perdition Minerals Group.
Ltd. . 244 Kan. 126; 766 P.2d 805, 810 (1988);
Harris Trust &
Savings Bank v. Mack. 49 111. App.3d 349; 364 N.E.2d 349, 354
(1977).
Since the Legislature uses words "advisedly," Savage
Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 811 P.2d 664, 670
(Utah 1991) , it must also be assumed, given a possibility of
different constructions, that the grammatically correct usage was
intended.
131996
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of a statutory exemption from regulation of an armored car company,
the court stated:
The words of the statutory provision and the statutory
policy embodied therein assist in ascertaining that
meaning. Resort to principles of statutory construction
provide some guidance in the endeavor. In reaching its
conclusion, the Commission relied on the "last
antecedent" rule of statutory construction. The rule
provides in general terms that when there is a modifier
following a series of nouns, the modifier will apply only
to the immediately prior antecedent, which in this case
has the effect of excluding armored vehicles from
regulation.
Id., at p. 451
As an example of how the last antecedent rule of statutory
construction

operates, Amici

following sentence:

suggests

an

examination

of

the

"Indonesia, Venezuela, Mexico and Canada,

which also has gas reserves, are countries with significant oil
production."

The modifying phrase "which also has gas reserves"

applies only to the noun "Canada" in this sentence, not to all the
other nouns which precede the phases, i.e., Indonesia, Venezuela,
and Mexico.

Similarly, the statutory language "as determined by

the Commission" does not modify "normal operating replacements" as
the Commission seems to believe.
In this case the Commission has adopted a rule defining the
statutory term "normal operating replacement" to mean replacement
machinery and equipment which is "of a similar nature." This is an
effort by the Commission to exercise authority which the statute
does not grant.
131996

A proper reading of the statute permits the
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Commission to determine what an "increase [in] plant production and
capacity," is, but not to define "a normal operating replacement"
as any machinery and equipment

"of a similar nature, " as the

Commission has attempted in Rule 85S.
CONCLUSION
The Commission has improperly construed Rule 85S to require
replacement machinery and equipment to produce a new, or different,
product in order to qualify for the sales and use tax exemption of
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra. The Commission's action in
applying rule 85S in this case, and in Eaton-Kenway, supra. has
effectively rewritten the statute to eliminate the exemption for an
"expanding operation."

Contrary

to legislative

intent, this

discriminates against existing Utah manufacturers. The Commission
has also incorrectly read the language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12104(15), supra, in promulgating Rule 85S.

The statute does not

grant the Commission the authority to define "normal operating
replacement" as any machinery and equipment which is "of a similar
nature" to existing machinery and equipment.

The Commission's

actions are incorrect, are unreasonable, and are an usurpation of
legislative authority.

131996

The Commission should be reversed.
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Addenda

Addendum 1

59-1-504

GENERAL TAXATION POLICIES

REVENUE AND TAXATION

History: C. 1953,59-1-602.5, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 248, ft 1.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 248

became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

59-1-504. Time determination final.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Judicial review.
A petitioner's time limit for filing for judicial
review of a final tax commission order is prescribed by i 63-46b-14(3) and not this section,

which governs petitions for redetermination of
deficiencies before the commission and not petitions for judicial review. Dusty's, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 868 (Utah 1992).

59-1-505. Deposit of amount due prerequisite to appeal.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
l b the extent that this section precludes
reasonable access to judicial review, it violates
the open courts provision, Art. I, Sec. 11, of the
Utah Constitution and is unconstitutional as

applied; however, the statutory requirement is
not unconstitutional in all cases. For example,
when a taxpayer is able to meet the requirement, the deposit must be paid. Jensen v. State
Tax Comm'n, 836 P.2d 966 (Utah 1992).

PART 6
JUDICIAL REVIEW
59-1-601. District c o u r t jurisdiction.
(1) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 63-46b-15, beginning
July 1,1994, the district court shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo
all decisions by the commission resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an original, independent
proceeding, and does not mean a trial de novo on the record.
(3) In any appeal taken after July 1, 1994, from a formal hearing to the
district court pursuant to this section, the commission shall certify a record of
its proceedings to the district court which record shall be reviewed and
considered by the district court. A district court may not, unless the parties
otherwise agree in writing, hear witnesses that were not called to testify or
consider exhibits that were not presented to the commission at the formal
hearing. If the parties do not agree, and a district court determines that
additional witnesses should be heard or additional exhibits considered in the
interest of justice, the district court shall remand the case to the commission
for that purpose. This subsection supercedes Section 63-46b-16 pertaining to
judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1963, 69-24-1, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 80, I 20; renumbered by L. 1987,
ch. 8, | 36; 1987, ch. 161, ft 215; 1992, ch.
127,1 2; 1993, ch. 248, f 2.

Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendmerit, effective May 3, 1993, rewrote the former
provisions of this section as Subsection (1) and
added Subsections (2) and (3).

69 1-610

— Venue — County as party in
59-1-602. Right to appeal—
interest.
(1) (a) Any aggrieved party appearing before the commission or county
whose tax revenues are affected by the decision may at that party's option
petition for judicial review in the district court pursuant to this section, or
in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section
63-46b-16.
(b) Judicial review of formal or informal adjudicative proceedings in the
district is in the district court located in the county of residence or
principal place of business of the affected taxpayer or, in the case of a
taxpayer whose taxes are assessed on a statewide basis, to the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County.
(2) A county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision being reviewed
shall be allowed to be a party in interest in the proceeding before the court.
History: C. 1953, 59-24-2, e n a c t e d by L.
1977, ch. 80,ft 21; 1983, ch. 278, ft 2; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 3, ft 37; 1987, ch. 161,
ft 216; 1992, ch. 127, ft 3; 1993, ch. 248, ft 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-

ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "at that
party's option" in Subsection UXa), added the
language beginning "in the district court" at the
end of that subsection, and inserted "formal or"
and "in the district" in Subsection (1Kb).

59-1-610. S t a n d a r d of review of appellate court.
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the
commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall:
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of
fact, applying a substantial evidence standard on review; and
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law,
applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of
discretion contained in a statute at issue before the appellate court.
(2) This section supercedes Section 63-46b-16 pertaining to judicial review
of formal adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 59-1-610, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 248, ft 4.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 248

became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
Cited
Applicability of section.
This section applied to case begun before its
enactment, because standard of review is procedural, not substantive. Board of Equalization
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n ex rel. Benchmark,
Inc., 226 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1993).

Cited in Miller Welding Supply, Inc. v Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep 8 (Ct.
App. 1993); OSI Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1993);
Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 225 Utah
Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1993); Harper Invs , Inc.
v. Auditing Div., 231 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (Utah
1994); Matrix Funding Corp. v. Auditing Div.,
231 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App 1994).

59-12-104
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taxes. B J Titan Serve, v. SUte Tax Comm'n,
842 P.2d 822 (UUh 1992).
Purchaser.
The focus of Subsection (IXa) is on the purchaser, rather than the item purchased. Thorup
Bros. Constr. v. Auditing Div. of UUh State Tax
Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (1993).
A contractor is not liable for sales taxes on
property that it did not purchase or own.
Thorup Bros. Constr. v. Auditing Div. of Utah
SUte Tax Comm'n, 221 UUh Adv. Rep. 39
(1993).
Electrical contractor could not be assessed a
use tax on materials purchased by owners that
were tax-exempt entities. Arco Elec. v. UUh
State lax Comm'n, 222 UUh Adv. Rep. 11
(1993), following Thorup Brothers Constr, Inc.
v. Auditing Division of the UUh State Tax
Comm'n, 221 UUh Adv. Rep. 39 (1993).
Repair* and renovations.
The tax commission erred when it included
the cost of milling and drilling raw logs incurred by a railroad in assessing a use tax on
railroad ties brought insUU for use. The basis
for calculating the use tax in such a case is the
amount paid for the raw logs when purchased
plus the amount paid for services that fall into
one of the specified categories of taxable services set forth in this section. The commission
erroneously concluded that the milling and
drilling procedures were "repairs or renovations" within the meaning of Subsection (lXg).
Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 876
(UUh 1992).
Sale of goods to subsidiary.
A seller was liable under Subsection (IXa) for
sales of goods to another corporation despite
the fact that the Department of Transportation
found the two corporations to be a single entity
for the purposes of the Davis Bacon Act. One

agency's determination is not necessarily binding on the deliberations of another agency, and
federal labor law criteria are irrelevant to a
determination of sUU taxability. Hales Sand A
Gravel, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 887 (UUh
1992).
Transfer of vehicles.
Transfer of vehicles subject to sales tax. See
B.J.-TiUn Servs. v. SUU Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d
822 (UUh 1992).
Transportation cosU as part of sales price.
Transportation charges are taxable under
Subsection (IXa) as part of the sales price of
personal property if they are incurred before
the transfer of title. When a sales contract
requires delivery at destination, title passes at
destination and the transportation cosU are
therefore subject to taxation unless the parties
explicitly agree otherwise. Hales Sand &
Gravel foe % Auditing Div., 842 P2d 887 (UUh
1992).
—"Small-batch" charge*.
"Small-batch" charges added by a concrete
seller to concrete batches that were too small to
absorb the cosU of delivery were taxable under
Subsection (IXa) as a transportation charge
added to the sales price. Hales Sand & Gravel,
Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992).
Water softeners.
The sale of water softeners, sold pursuant to
sales and insUllation contracU, are sales of
improvemenU to real esUU, and not sales of
Ungible personal property subject to sales tax.
Superior Soft Water Co. v. UUh SUte Tax
Comm'n, 843 P.2d 525 (UUh Ct. App. 1992).
Cited in Matrix Funding Corp. v. Auditing
Div, 231 UUh Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).

59-12-104. Exemptions.
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by this
chapter:
(1) sales of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and special fuel subject to a Utah
state excise tax under Title 59, Chapter 13, Motor and Special Fuel Tax
Act;
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its political subdivisions,
except sales of construction materials however, construction materials
purchased by the state, its institutions, or its political subdivisions which
are installed or converted to real property by employees of the state, its
institutions, or its political subdivisions are exempt;
(3) sales of food, beverage, and dairy products from vending machines
in which the proceeds of each sale do not exceed $1 if the vendor or
operator of the vending machine reports an amount equal to 150% of the
cost of items as goods consumed;
168

(4) sales of food, beverage, dairy products, similar confections, and
related services to commercial airline carriers for in-flight consumption;
(5) sales of parts and equipment installed in aircraft operated by
common carriers in interstate or foreign commerce;
(6) sales of commercials, motion picture films, prerecorded audio program tapes or records, and prerecorded video tapes by a producer,
distributor, or studio to a motion picture exhibitor, distributor, or commercial television or radio broadcaster;
(7) sales made through coin-operated laundry machines that are:
(a) located in multiple dwelling units;
(b) used exclusively for the benefit of tenants; and
(c) not available for use by the general public;
(8) sales made to or by religious or charitable institutions in the conduct
of their regular religious or charitable functions and activities, if the
requirements of Section 59-12-104.1 are fulfilled;
(9) sales of vehicles of a type required to be registered under the motor
vehicle laws of this state which are made to bona fide nonresidents of this
state and are not afterwards registered or used in this state except as
necessary to transport them to the borders of this state;
(10) sales of medicine;
(11) sales or use of property, materials, or services used in the construction of or incorporated in pollution control facilities allowed by Sections
19-2-123 through 19-2-127;
(12) sales or use of property which the state is prohibited from taxing
under the Constitution or laws of the United States or under the laws of
this state;
(13) sales of meals served by:
(a) public elementary and secondary schools;
(b) churches, charitable institutions, and institutions of higher
education, if the meals are not available to the general public; and
(c) inpatient meals provided at medical or nursing facilities;
(14) isolated or occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in
business, except the sale of vehicles or vessels required to be titled or
registered under the laws of this state;
(15) sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased or leased by
a manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding normal
operating replacements, which includes replacement machinery and
equipment even though they may increase plant production or capacity, as
determined by the commission) in any manufacturing facility in Utah;
(a) manufacturing facility means an establishment described in
SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification
Manual, of the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of
Management and Budget;
(b) for purposes of this subsection, the commission shall by rule
define "new or expanding operations" and "establishment";
(c) by October 1, 1991, and every five years thereafter, the commission shall review this exemption and make recommendations to the
Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee concerning whether the
exemption should be continued, modified, or repealed. In its report to
the Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee, the tax commission
review shall include at least:
159
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(i) the cost of the exemption;
(ii) the purpose and effectiveness of the exemption; and
(iii) the benefits of the exemption to the state;
(16) sales of tooling, special tooling, support equipment, and special test
equipment used or consumed exclusively in the performance of any
aerospace or electronics industry contract with the United States government or any subcontract under that contract, but only if, under the terms
of that contract or subcontract, title to the tooling and equipment is vested
in the United States government as evidenced by a government identification tag placed on the tooling and equipment or by listing on a
government-approved property record if a tag is impractical;
(17) intrastate movements of freight by common carriers;
(18) sales of newspapers or newspaper subscriptions;
(19) tangible personal property, other than money, traded in as full or
part payment of the purchase price, except that for purposes of calculating
sales or use tax upon vehicles not sold by a vehicle dealer, trade-ins are
limited to other vehicles only, and the tax is bated upon the then existing
fair market value of the vehicle being sold and the vehicle being traded in,
as determined by the commission;
(20) sprays and insecticides used to control insects, diseases, and weeds
for commercial production of fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and animal
products;
(21) sales of tangible personal property used or consumed primarily and
directly in farming operations, including sales of irrigation equipment and
supplies used for agricultural production purposes, whether or not they
become part of real estate and whether or not installed by farmer,
contractor, or subcontractor, but not sales of:
(a) machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies used in a manner t h a t is incidental to farming, such as hand tools with a unit
purchase price not in excess of $100, and maintenance and janitorial
equipment and supplies;
(b) tangible personal property used in any activities other than
farming, such as office equipment and supplies, equipment and
supplies used in sales or distribution of farm products, in research, or
in transportation; or
(c) any vehicle required to be registered by the laws of this state,
without regard to the use to which the vehicle is put;
(22) seasonal sales of crops, seedling plants, or garden, farm, or other
agricultural produce if sold by the producer;
(23) purchases of food made with food stamps;
(24) sales of nonreturnable containers, nonreturnable labels, nonreturnable bags, nonreturnable shipping cases, and nonreturnable casings
to a manufacturer, processor, wholesaler, or retailer for use in packaging
tangible personal property to be sold by that manufacturer, processor,
wholesaler, or retailer;
(25) property stored in the state for resale;
(26) property brought into the state by a nonresident for his or her own
personal use or enjoyment while within the state, except property purchased for use in Utah by a nonresident living and working in Utah at the
time of purchase;
160
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(27) property purchased for resale in this state, in the regular course of
business, either in its original form or as an ingredient or component part
of a manufactured or compounded product;
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax was paid to some other
state, or one of its subdivisions, except that the state shall be paid any
difference between the tax paid and the tax imposed by this part and Part
2, and no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was greater than the tax
imposed by this part and Part 2;
(29) any sale of a service described in Subsections 59-12-103(l)(b), (c),
and (d) to a person for use in compounding a service taxable under the
subsections;
(30) purchases of food made under the WIC program of the United
States Department of Agriculture;
(31) sales or leases made before June 30, 1996, of rolls, rollers, refractory brick, electric motors, and other replacement parts used in the
furnaces, mills, and ovens of a steel mill described in SIC Code 3312 of the
1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of the federal Executive
Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget;
(32) sales of boats of a type required to be registered under Title 73,
Chapter 18, State Boating Act, boat trailers, and outboard motors which
are made to bona fide nonresidents of this state and are not thereafter
registered or used in this state except as necessary to transport them to
the borders of this state;
(33) sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state that
is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated pursuant to
contract into and becomes a part of real property located outside of this
state, except to the extent that the other state or political entity imposes
a sales, use, gross receipts, or other similar transaction excise tax on it
against which the other state or political entity allows a credit for taxes
imposed by this chapter;
(34) sales of aircraft manufactured in Utah if sold for delivery and use
outside Utah where a sales or use tax is not imposed, even if the title is
passed in Utah;
(35) until July 1, 1999, amounts paid for purchase of telephone service
for purposes of providing telephone service; and
(36) fares charged to persons transported directly by a public transit
district created under the authority of Title 17A, Chapter 2, Part 10.
History: L. 1988, ch. 68, § 8; 1988 (2nd 1989, ch. 169, ft 1; 1989, ch. 247, ft 1; 1990,
B.8.), ch. 20, ft 1; 1989, ch. 108, ft 1; C. 1943, ch. 22, ft 2; 1990, ch. 36, ft 1; 1991, ch. 5, ft 57;
80-15-6; 1946, ch. 110, ft 1; 1967, ch. 126, ft 1; 1991. ch. 111. ft 1; 1991, ch. 112, ft 216; 1992,
1967, ch. 127, ft 1; 1966, ch. 128, ft 1; 1967, ch. 66,ft3; 1992, ch. 298, ft 2; 1993, ch. 166,
ch. 162. ft 1; 1969. ch. 187. ft 3; 1969 (1st ft 1; 1993, ch. 296, ft 1; 1994, ch. 49, ft 1;1994,
8.8.), ch. 14, ft 3; 1973, ch. 42, ft 9; 1973, ch. ch. 156, ft 1; 1994, ch. 213, ft 1; 1994, ch. 217,
164, ft 1; 1976. ch. 179.ft2; 1976. ch. 28, ft 1; ft 2; 1994, ch. 226, ft 2; 1994, ch. 248,ft1.
1979, ch. 196, ft 1; 1981, ch. 288, ft 1; 1981,
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendch. 289, ft 2; 1982. ch. 70. ft 1; 1988. ch. 264. ment by ch. 166, effective May 3, 1993, substift 1; 1988. ch. 281. ft 1; lffe3 (1st 8.S.). ch. 6. tuted "sales of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and
ft 2; 1984, ch. 59, ft 1; 1984, ch. 60, ft 1; 1986, special fuel" for "sales of motor fuels and special
ch. 80, ft 3; 1986, ch. 9, ft 1; 1986, ch. 55, ft 6; fuels" in Subsection (1)
1986, ch. 99, ft 1; 1986, ch. 134, ft 1; 1986, ch.
The 1993 amendment by ch. 296, effective
168, ft 1; C. 1963,59-15-6; renumbered by L. May 3, 1993, substituted "1996" for "1994" in
1987, ch. 6, ft 26; 1987, ch. 51, ft 1; 1987 (1st Subsection (31).
8.S.), ch. 10,ftft1, 2; 1988, ch. 58, ft 1; 1988,
The 1994 amendment by ch. 49, effective Ma>
ch.66.ft 2; 1988. ch. 69, ft 1; 1989, ch. 89, ft 1; 2, 1994, rewrote Subsection (24), which for
161

6H-12-1U4

REVENUE AND TAXATION

merly read: "any container, label, shipping
case, or, in the case of meat or meat products,
any casing."
The 1994 amendment by ch 248, effective
May 2, 1994, in Subsection (31), deleted "after
July 1, 1987, and" after "leases made" and "but
only if the steel mill was a nonproducing Utah
facility purchased and reopened for the production of steel" at the end.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 156, effective
July 1, 1994, substituted "160%" for "120%" in
Subsection (3).
The 1994 amendment by ch. 213, effective
July 1, 1994, redesignated the subsections under Subsection (16); substituted "by common
carriers" for "and express or street railway
fares" in Subsection (17); and added Subsection

(36), making a related stylistic change.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 217, effective
July 1, 1994, deleted "coin-operated dry cleaning machines, or coin-operated car washes" in
the introductory language of Subsection (7);
added Subsections (7Xa) through (7Xc); subdivided Subsection (15); and made related stylistic changes.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 226, effective
July 1, 1994, inserted the language following
the first occurrence of "political subdivisions" in
Subsection (2) and deleted "and, after July 1,
1993" after "activities" in Subsection (8).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Subsection (8). Niederhauser Ornamental &
Metal Works Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv.
Rep. 43 (Ct. App. 1993).

Charitable institution.
—Activities.
—Purchase by subcontractor.
"Consumption."
Intrastate movement of freight.
Isolated or occasional sale.
"Manufacturer."
Medicine.
New or expanding operations.
Real property.
Registered vehicle.
—Sale to nonresident.
Sale in sister state.
Sale to state.
Sprays to control disease.
Cited.

"Consumption."
Steel manufacturers who lance pipes, stirring lances, and mill rolls primarily for their
use as equipment and only incidentally for
their use as ingredients in the manufacturing
process are liable for sales and use taxes on the
items. Nucor Corp. v. Utah S t a t e Tax Comm'n,
832 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992).
Intrastate m o v e m e n t of freight.
Subsection (17), providing for a sales tax
exemption for intrastate movements of freight,
is limited to common carriers and does not
provide an exemption for intrastate delivery
made by the seller in its own trucks. Hales
Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d
887 (Utah 1992).

Charitable institution.
—Activities.
Church industry auxiliary, chartered as a
non-profit corporation, which ran, among other
things, a transient shelter, a vocational education program, a retirement center, and a day
care center, charging nominal fees to defray
costs, lost its sales-tax-exempt status by severing from its religious institution, since the
auxiliary's remaining common membership
and weekly spiritual practices did not convert
the auxiliary from a business organization into
a religious institution. SEMECO Indus., Inc. v.
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849
P.2d 1167 (Utah 1993).
— P u r c h a s e by subcontractor.
The fact that the amount of the tax might be
passed along to the general contractor and then
on to the church owning the buildings in which
the general contrator was installing products
did not bring a subcontractor's purchase of
materials used in making the products under

Isolated or o c c a s i o n a l s a l e .
The "isolated or occasional sales" exemption
applied to the trade-in of used computer equipment by a customer to a retailer of computer
systems and thus the retailer's own use of the
equipment was exempt from the use tax.
Knowledge Data Sys. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
"Manufacturer."
Subsection (16) does not authorize the State
Tax Commission to define the term "manufacturer" to restrict the manufacturing sales tax
exemption set forth therein; a rule of the Commission limiting the availability of the exemption was invalid. Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit
Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d
1304 (Utah 1993).
Medicine.
Sales tax on sales of oxygen concentrators to
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medically dependent individuals was erroneous
because oxygen concentrators fall under "any
oxygen ... prescribed by a physician" in $ 5912-102(4XaXiii). Miller Welding Supply, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 8
(Ct. App. 1993).
N e w o r e x p a n d i n g operations.
The commission erroneously interpreted SIC
Code 3652, incorporated by reference in Subsection (16), when it determined that activities
of video tape producer in expanding its manufacturing capacities did not fall within the
scope of the federal definition. Bonneville Int'l
Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv.
Rep. 62 (Ct. App. 1993).
Real property.
Where, under its sales contracts, an Illinois
corporation fabricated, erected, and installed
on its customers' real property large tanks t h a t
were not readily removable, and it was not
intended t h a t they be moveable or removed,
then the installed tanks, once attached, were
real property and the corporation was a real
property contractor, not a manufacturer, and
was not eligible for the exemption for materials
used in manufacturing. Chicago Bridge & Iron
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P2d 303 (1992).
Where an Illinois corporation's customers intended to purchase fully assembled tanks permanently installed on real estate, whether that
real estate was located in Utah or another state
was not relevant as to the corporation's status
as a real property contractor. Chicago Bridge &
Iron Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303
(1992).
Registered vehicle.
—Sale to nonresident.
While taxpayer's legal residence created a
legitimate source of dispute, because he maintained a registered vehicle with Utah designated as home state and allowed a vehicle to be
kept or used by a Utah resident, the State Tax
Commission reasonably found that the taxpayer had resident status for sales tax purposes

-12-1U4.1

and thus was disqualified from claiming the
nonresident exemption. Putvin v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 837 P.2d 689 (Utah Ct. App
1992).
S a l e in s i s t e r state.
Taxes t h a t come due first take priority over
taxes paid first. Therefore, petitioner was liable
for the Utah tax first because the sales to
petitioner in Utah of materials used in making
the finished products occurred long before petitioner sold finished products in Nevada.
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co.
v. Tax Comm'n, 219 U t a h Adv Rep 43 (Ct. App.
1993).
Sale to state.
Payment for goods by a state warrant does
not alone make it a sale to the state or its
institutions or political subdivisions to exempt
it from sales tax. Rocky Mt. Energy v. Utah Tax
Comm'n, 862 P 2 d 284 (Utah 1993).
Contractor was not liable for sales tax for
materials purchased by and used on behalf of a
school district because the purchaser within
the meaning of $ 59-12-103( 1X1) was the school
district. Since the school district was exempt
from sales taxes as a subdivision or institution
of the state, the fact that the school district had
a nonexempt party incorporate the purchased
property into its realty did not change the
character of the transaction. Brown Plumbing
& Heating Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 224 Utah
Adv Rep 12 (1993).
Sprays to control disease.
Spraying liquid nitrogen on meat patties to
prevent microorganisms that cause disease fits
within the plain meaning of Subsection (20),
and reference to other rules of statutory construction to determine the proper meaning of
this subsection is unnecessary OSI Indus , Inc.
v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv Rep
34 (Ct. App 1993).
C i t e d in Thorup Bros Constr v Auditing
Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv
Rep 39(1993)

59-12-104.1. Exemptions for religious or charitable institutions.
(1) Sales made by religious or charitable institutions or organizations are
exempt from the sales and use tax imposed by this chapter if the sale is made
in the conduct of the institution's or organization's regular religious or
charitable functions or activities.
(2) (a) Sales made to a religious or charitable institution or organization are
exempt from the sales and use tax imposed by this chapter if the sale is
made in the conduct of the institution's or organization's regular religious
or charitable functions and activities.
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services that become part of a pollution control facility until the facility is certified, and invoices and
records should be retained to show the amount of tax
paid Upon verification of the amount of tax paid for
pollution control facilities and verification that a certificate has been obtained, the Tax Commission will
refund the taxes puid on these purchases.
1. Claims for refund of tax paid prior to certification must be filed within 180 days after certification
of a facility. Refund claims filed within this time period will have interest added at the rate prescribed in
Section 59 1-402 from the date of the overpayment.
2. If claims for refund are not filed within 180 days
after certification of a facility, it is assumed the delay
was for investment purposes, and interest shall be
added at the rate prescribed in Section 59-1-402 however, Interest will not begin to accrue until 30 days
after receipt of the refund request.
B. After the facility is certified, qualifying purchases should be made without paying tax by providing an exemption certificate to the vendor.
1. If sales tax is paid on qualifying purchases for
certified pollution control facilities, it will be deemed
that the overpayment was made for the purpose of
investment. Accordingly, interest, at the rate prescribed in Section 59-1-402, will not begin to accrue
until 30 days after receipt of the refund request.
C. In the event part of the pollution control facility
is constructed under a real property contract by someone other than the owner, the owner should obtain a
statement from the contractor certifying the amount
of Utah sales and use tax paid by the contractor and
the location of the vendors to whom tax was paid, and
the owner will then be entitled to a refund of the tax
paid and included in the contract.
I) The owner shall apply to the Tax Commission
for a refund using forms furnished by the Tax Commission The claim for refund must contain sufficient
information to support the amount claimed for credit
and show that the tax has in fact been paid
E The owner shall retain records to support the
claim that the project is qualified for the exemption.
R865-10-84S. Sales and Use Tax Exemption For
Construction, Expansion, or Modernization of
Mineral Facilities Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 59-12-104.
A. Effective July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1989
except as otherwise provided in this rule, sales and
leases to any person of materials, machinery, equipment, and services used for a project involving new
construction, expansion, or modernization of any
mine, mill, reduction works, smelter, refinery (excluding oil and gas refineries), synthetic-fuel processing und upgrading plant, rolling milt, coal-washing
plant, or melting facility are exempt from sales and
use taxes in Utah. The exemption applies only to
projects; construction of which is commenced after
July 1, 1984; and to sales and leases which are subject to sales or use tax and which in the aggregate
exceed $500,000 during any tax year.
For the purpose of this rule, construction commenced after July 1, 1984 may be evidenced by contracts signed or executed after the date the governor
signed Senate Bill No 22 of the 1984 Budget Session
of the Utah legislature (February 16, 1984) but under which construction was not commenced prior to
July 1. 1984 In the absence of s signed contract,
there is a rebuttable presumption that the project
does not qualify
B For purposes of Utah Code Ann. Section
59 12 104

69Q

1. "Person" means any individual, firm, co-partner,
ship, joint venture, corporation, estate or trust, or any
group or combination acting as a unit.
2. 'Tax year" means July 1 through June 30.
3. "New construction" means:
a construction of a new mineral facility; or
b. any alteration to the real property of an existing
mineral facility other than normal repairs and main.
te nance.
4. "Expansion" means an increase in production or
capacity as a result of the project.
5. "Modernization," except as provided in paragraph D(l) of this rule, means a change or contrast in
character or quality resulting from the introduction
of improved techniques, methods, or products — ineluding changes necessary to meet health, environmental, or safety standards.
6. "Mineral facility" means any mine, mill, reduction works, smelter, refinery (except oil and gas refineries), synthetic-fuel processing and upgrading plant,
rolling mill, coal-washing plant, or melting facility in
Utah; including ancillary facilities necessary for and
used primarily in the operation of the mineral facility.
7. "Project" means any iinaarUiing involving new
construction, expansion, or inopafnjsation of a mineral facility.
8. "Owner" means any person who owns or operates
a mineral facility in Utah.
9. "Prime contractor" means any contractor dealing
directly with the owner of a mineral facility and designated by the owner as a prime contractor.
10. "Normal operating replacements" means supplies, equipment, and tools which replace existing
items of a similar nature and which do not enhance
the productive capacity of a mineral facility beyond
that normally associated with new equipment as compared with old.
C. The first $500,000 of the aggregated taxable
sales or leases subject to either sales or use tax which
are made to any person for use in a project in a tax
year will be taxed. For purposes of assigning sales
and leases to the appropriate tax year, the date of
delivery to the person or to a common carrier for delivery to the person is determinative.
0. The exemption shall not apply to, and the
$500,000 base shall not include:
1. sales and leases of pollution control facilities
which qualify for sales and use tax exemption under
Utah law;
2. sales and leases of normal operating replacements and supplies not used in a project;
3. sales and leases subject to another state's sales or
use tax, except the amount subject to use taxes in
Utah as a result of a lower tax rate in another stats;
4. construction equipment and fungible tools or
supplies sold or leased to a contractor, subcontractor,
or individual acting in a similar capacity, which i*
not entirely consumed or physically incorporated into
a project. This provision does not preclude exemption
for sales and leases made to the owner for use in or oo
a project;
5. leases of construction equipment for nonexclusive use on a project will not be eligible for sales and
use tax exemption except to the extent of any lease
period during which the equipment is used exclusively on the project.
E. A person may seek a declaratory judgment according to Tax Commission Rule R861-1-5A to determine that the project is a new construction, expansion, or modernization project Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Section 69-12-104 if denied, the Commission
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may grant a rehearing to reconsider the request for a
declaratory judgment under the provisions of Rule
R861-1-5A
f. Upon application, the Tax Commission shall is8ue the project a sales tax exemption number or numbers to be used by the owner of the project, or by any
prime contractor designated by the owner, in purchasing tangible personal property for use in the
project If the purchaser is unable to differentiate tangible personal property being bought for exempt use
in the project from other property at the time of purchase, all purchases shall be taxed. Each quarter, the
owner and the prime contractor^) shall file sales and
ii§e tax returns which disclose the total cost of tangible personal property purchased for purposes that do
not qualify for exemption under the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. Section 5912-104, including the
1600,000 minimum annual amount. This return must
be filed in accordance with the provisions set forth in
Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12 107
G. For any tangible personal property entirely consumed or physically incorporated into a project by a
person other than the owner or his designated prime
contractor, pr in the case of sales or use taxes paid by
the owner or his prime contractor under conditions
set forth in paragraph F of this rule, exemption shall
be claimed in the following manner:
1. The owner must prepare a schedule showing the
amount of sales and use taxes paid by him or his
prime contractor on the purchases actually consumed
or incorporated into a project, and to this amount
shall add the amount of sales and use taxes paid by
subcontractors. This schedule must disclose:
a. the items used;
b. the county of purchase, if bought within the state
of Utah; and
c. the taxes paid.
2. The owner shall apply to the Tax Commission for
« refund using forma furnished by the Tax Commission. The claim for refund must contain sufficient
records and information to:
a. determine the county in which the sale was originally made;
b. support the amount claimed for credit and show
that tax has in fact been paid on the first $500,000
•ubject to Utah tax each year.
3. The owner shall retain records to support the
claim that the project is qualified for the exemption
under paragraph A of this rule.
Refunds not paid and mailed within thirty (30)
days after receipt by the Tax Commission will have
interest added at the rate prescribed in Utah Code
Ann. Section 69-1-402.
8866-10-858. Machinery and Equipment Exemption For Use in Certain Manufacturing Facilities Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section
M-12-104.
A. Definitions:
1 "Machinery" means electronic or mechanical machines incorporated into a manufacturing or assembling process from the initial stage where actual pro
c
**sing begins through the completion of the finished
*nd product, including final processing, finishing or
Packaging of articles which are sold as tangible pergonal property.
Automated material handling and storage machiner
> is included in this definition when such machin
erv
is part of the integrated continuous production
c
>cle.
2 "Equipment" means any independent device sept a t e from any machinery but essential to an inte-
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grated or continuous manufacturing or assembly process or any suhunit comprising a component of any
machinery or auxiliary thereof, including such items
as dies, jigs, patterns, molds, and similar items used
in manufacturing, processing, or assembling Qualifying equipment also include** devices necessary to
the control or operation of machinery and equipment
qualifying under this rule even though not located in
the specific manufacturing area
3. "New or expanding operations" means manufacturing, processing, or assembling activities which:
a) are substantially different in nature, character,
or purpose from prior activities;
b) are begun in a new physical plant location in
Utah; or
c) increase production or capacity This definition is
subject to limitations deuling with normal operating
replacements.
4. "Manufacturer" means a person who:
a) functions within the activities included in SIC
code classification 2000-3999,
b) produces a new, reconditioned, or remanufactured product, article, substance, or commodity from
raw, semi-finished, or used material; and
c) in the normal course of business produces products which are sold as tangible personal property.
5. "Establishment" means an economic unit of operations that is generally at a single physical location
in Utah where qualifying manufacturing activities
are performed. Where distinct and separate economic
activities are performed at a single physical location,
each activity should be treated as a separate establishment.
6. "Normal operating replacements" means ma
chinery or equipment which replaces existing machinery or equipment of a similar nature, even if the
use results in increased plant production or capacity.
(a) If new machinery or equipment is purchased or
leaned which has the same or similar purpose as machinery or equipment retired from service within 12
months before or after the purchase date, such machinery or equipment is considered as replacement
and is not exempt.
b) If existing machinery or equipment is kept for
back-up or infrequent use; new, similar machinery or
equipment purchased would be considered as replacement and is not exempt.
7. "Improvement" is defined in Utah ('ode Ann.
Section 59 2 102(3)
B. Application of Exemption:
1 The machinery and equipment exemption applies only to tangible personal property. It does not
apply to real property or to tangible personal property which is purchased and becomes an improvement to real property. The exemption does not apply
to charges for labor to repair, renovate, or clean machinery or equipment.
2. Machinery or equipment used for an activity
which is not pari of the manufacturing process, such
as research and development; refrigerated or other
storage of raw materials, component parts, or the finished product; or shipping the finished product is not
exempt.
3. Machinery or equipment with a useful economic
and/or accounting life of less than three years is not
eligible for the exemption.
4 Machinery or equipment purchased or leased for
use in activities which may qualify it for exemption,
as well as in other activities, will not lose the exemption if the use in nonqualifying activities is determined to be de minimis. Nonqualifying activities are
activitiea such as maintenance or production of tangi-
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ble personal property that is not sold in arms length fiscal year that the vendor no longer elects to nU
transactions
remit sales taxes on a monthly basis, or to remit * L !
5 Sales of manufactured tangible personal prop
taxes by EFT, respectively
^* l
erty may be at retail as defined in rule R865 19 27S
2 Vendors who elect to file and remit sales taxes
or at wholesale as defined in rule R865 19 29S but a monthly basis, or to remit sales taxes by Epf *
they must be arms length sales for the exemption to subject to the same requirements and penalties
qualify An arms length sale is defined as a transac
mandatory
filers
*
tion that occurs in an open market, between unre
3 Vendors who elect to file and remit sales taxai
lated parties and neither party is under duress to buy
a monthly basis are not entitled to reimbursement*?
or sell
the cost of collecting and remitting sales taxes on »
6 The manufacturer shall retain records to support monthly basis
the claim that the machinery and equipment are
F Vendors who are not mandatory filers may ^
qualified for exemption under the provisions of this quest mandatory filer designation if they expect fe
rule
incur a $50,000 tax liability for the current calendar
7 A person may seek a declaratory judgment ac
year and the business they operate
cording to Tax Commission Rule R861 1 5A to deter
1 has had no prior history in Utah,
mine whether any particular purchase or lease qua))
2 is a new business that was formed within tat
fies for this particular exemption If denied, the Tax previous calendar year,
Commission may grant a hearing to reconsider the
3 was formed within the previous calendar year as
request for a declaratory judgment under the provi
the result of a merger, or
sions of Rule R861 1 13A
4 expects a significant increase in its operation*
8 Exemption will be allowed for any qualified pur
G A vendor who reqtlests mandatory filer designachase or lease if delivery to the buyer or to a carrier tion under F shall A *jsd remit sales taxes oo I
for shipment to the buyer or lessee, takes place on or monthly basis, comajltoajf Mttb the first month of a
after July 1, 1985
calendar quarter, TOfjHVwTf* treated aB a manC Vendors are required to obtain a tax exemption datory filer until thw month ItfWwing the month fai
certificate upon which the purchaser certifies that the which that vendor's galea tax liability totals $60,000
use of the machinery or equipment qualifies for ex
1 Upon designation aa a mandatory filer, the Tanemption under Utah Code Ann Title 69, Chapter 12
dor shall be entitled to reimbursement for the coat ef
D The effective date of this rule is July 1, 1991
collecting and remitting sales taxes
2 The mandatory filer designation shall remain in
R065-19-868. Monthly Payment of Sale* Taxes effect for the remainder of the fiscal year
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann Section 59-12-106.
H Vendors who are mandatory filers may request
A Definitions
deletion of their mandatory filer designation tf they
1 For purposes of the monthly filing and the elec
do not expect to accumulate a $60,000 sales tax liabiltronic remittance of sales taxes, the term "tax liabil
ity for the current calendar year
ity for the previous year" means the tax liability for
1 The request must be accompanied by documentathe previous calendar year
tion clearly evidencing that the business that led U
2 "Fiscal year" means the year commencing on the $50,000 tax liability for the previous year will no*
July 1 and ending the following June 30
recur
3 "Mandatory filer" means a vendor who meets the
2 The request must be made prior to the com*
threshold requirements for monthly filing and remit
mencement of a fiscal year
tance of sales taxes or for electronic funds transfer
3 If a vendor's request is approved and the vendor
(EFT) remittance of sales taxes
does accumulate a $50,000 sales tax liability, a simi
4 "Cash equivalent" means either
lar request by that vendor the following year shall be
a) cash,
denied
b) wire transfer, or
I No reimbursement is allowed for the monthly
c) cashier's check drawn on the bank in which the filing and remittance of waste tire fees or transient
Tax Commission deposits sales tax receipts
room, resort communities, tourism recreation, cul
B The determination that a vendor is a mandatory tural, and convention facilities taxes
filer shall be made by the Tax Commission at the end
J Only mandatory filers who file and remit on •
of each calendar year and shall be effective for the timely basis and in the required manner, are entitles
fiscal year
to reimbursement for the cost of collecting and remitC A vendor who meets the qualifications for a ting sales taxes
mandatory filer but does not receive notification from
K Vendors who are required to remit sales tax by
the Tax Commission to that effect, is not excused
EFT may, following approval by the Tax Commission,
from the requirements of monthly filing and remit
remit a cash equivalent in lieu of the EFT
tance or EFT remittance
1 Approval for remittance by cash equivalent shall
D Mandatory filers shall also file and remit any be limited to those vendors who are able to establwb
waste tire fees and transient room, resort communi
that remittance by EFT would cause a hardship ta
ties, and tourism recreation, cultural, and conven
their organization
tion facilities taxes to the commission on a monthly
2 Requests for approval shall be directed to th«
basis or by EFT respectively
Deputy Executive Director of the Tax Commission
E Vendors who are not mandatory filers may elect
3 Vendors who receive approval to remit their
to file and remit their sales taxes to the commission sales taxes by cash equivalent shall ensure that the
on a monthly basis or remit sales taxes by EFT or cash equivalent is received at the Tax Commission*
both
main office no later than three working days prior U>
1 The election to file and remit sales taxes on a the due date of the sales tax
monthly basis or to remit sal »s taxes by EFT is effec
L Vendors who are required to remit sales taxes by
tive for the immediate fiscal year and every fiscal
EFT but remit these taxes by some means other than
year thereafter unless the Tax Commission receives EFT or a Tax Commission approved cash equivalent,
written notification prior to the commencement of a
are not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of col

and remitting sales taxes and are subject to
**U Prior to remittance of sales taxes by EFT, a
shall complete an EFT agreement with the
Commission The EFT Agreement shall indicate
J** « E F T payments shall be made in one of the
fallowing manners
1 Except as provided in M 2 , vendors shall remit
' jjjpT payment by an ACH-debit transaction
Iwtough the National Automated Clearing House As
rJSstion (NACHA) system CCD application
j If an organization's bylaws prohibit third party
w<f fa its bank account or extenuating circum
Ounces exist, a vendor may remit its EFT payment
kv an ACH credit with tax payment addendum trans
action through the NACHA system CCD Plus appli
attion
N In unusual circumstances, a particular EFT pay
pent may be accomplished in a manner other than
that specified in Subsection M Use of any manner of
remittance other than that specified in Subsection M
anwt he approved by the Tax Commission prior to its
149-678. Government-Owned Tooling and
Equipment Exemption Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Section 60-12-104.
A As used in Utah Code Ann Section 69-12-104(6),
aad for the purpoae of this rule
1 Tooling^ means jigs, dies, fixtures, molds, pat
tarns, taps, gauges, teat equipment, other equipment,
and other similar manufacturing aids generally
available aa stock items
2 "Special Tooling" means jigs, dies, fixtures,
molds, patterns, taps, gauges, other equipment and
BMUiufacturing aids, and all components of these
items that are of such a specialized nature that with
tut substantial modification or alteration their use is
United to the development or production of particular
supplies or parts thereof or performing particular ser
vices
3 "Support equipment" means implements or de
vices that are required to inspect, test, service, adjust,
calibrate, appraise, transport, safeguard, record,
g*uge, measure, repair, overhaul, assemble, disas
•atnble, handle, store, actuate or otherwise maintain
the intended functional operation status of an aero
•pace electronic system
4 "Special test equipment" means either single or
multipurpose integrated test units engineered, de
«fned, fabricated, or modified to accomplish special
Purpose testing in performing a contract These test
"*• umta may pe electrical, electronic, hydraulic,
P°*umatic, or mechanical Or they may be items or
"•enibliea of equipment that are mechanically, elec
trically, or electronically interconnected so as to beC0
°M a new functional entity, causing the individual
•tern or items to become interdependent and essential
*n Performing special purpose testing in the develop
m
*nt or production of peculiar supplies or services
B
The effective date of this rule is July 1, 1986
^•So-lB-aaS Requirement to Report Certain
Sales Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section
NM2-106
p Every retailer is required to report on its Utah
"*'•* ftnd use tax return all exempt sales of farm ma
chinery, equipment, and supplies The total amount
JjPorted applies to transactions exempt under Utah
~°d« Ann Section 59 12 104(22) and should not in
J^ude sales that are exempt under other provisions of
*•*• law such as sales to church operated farms, sales
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to non Utah farmers when delivery is made outside
Utah, sales for resale etc
B Every licensed or registered consumer must report on its sales and use tax return the total amount
of purchases and leases of materials, machinery,
equipment, and services used in a qualified Utah
mineral facility expansion or modernization project
Refer to Utah Code Ann Section 59 12 104(15) and
Rule R865 19 84S for information regarding this ex
emption
C Every licensed or registered manufacturer must
report on its sales and use tax return the total pur
chases or leases of machinery and equipment for use
in new or expanding Utah manufacturing facilities
Refer to Utah Code Ann Section 59 12 104(16) and
Rule R865 19 85S for information regarding this ex
emption
D If the retailer or the purchaser fails to report the
amount of the exempt sales or purchases in the appropriate section provided on the sales and use tax re
turns for each reporting period, the Tax Commission
shall disallow the exemptions granted under Utah
Code Ann Section 59 12 104(15), (16), and (22)
E Requirements and provisions of this rule apply
to all purchases and/or sales made on or after July 1,
1986
R866-19-90S Telephone Service Defined Pursuant to Utah Code Ann Section 69-12-103
A Telephone service" means the transmission for
hire of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, messages, data, or other information of any nature by
wire, radio, light waves, or other electromagnetic
means, and includes the following
1 Nonrecurring telephone service charges are telephone service charges which are ordinarily charged
to subscribers only once or only under exceptional
circumstances
a Nonrecurring telephone service charges include,
but are not limited to charges for initially establish
ing telephone service, changing the type of telephone
service being provided, changing the types of fea
tures, options, or enhancements being provided in
connection with a particular type of telephone ser
vice, disconnecting the subscriber s telephone service,
disconnecting a feature or features being provided
with a subscriber's telephone service, analyzing or
repairing the cause of malfunctions in a subscriber's
telecommunications equipment apparatus or system,
and installing on a subscriber H preruses telecommu
nication equipment or apparatus which does not be
come a fixture of real property
b Nonrecurring telephone service charges exclude,
but not by way of limitation charges for subscriber's
premises telecommunications equipment or appara
tua which becomes a fixture of real property, such aa
the installation of inside wire, subscriber deposits,
interest, late charges, contributions in aid of construction, land development fees, payments in lieu of
land development fees and special plant construction
and facilities relocation charges
c Nonrecurring services involving real property
transactions shall be taxed in accordance with rule
R865 19 58S
2 Subscriber line charges, regardless of how they
may be referred to in the future for telephone service
that were referred to or created by the Federal Com
munication Commission in FCC Docket Number
78 72, are telephone service
B 'Telephone corporation" means any corporation
owning, controlling, operating or managing any telephone service for the shared use with or resale to any
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8. [Mrs. Morgan's) attorneys' fees in
the amount of $67,567.35 are reasonable.
The Court finds that this was a complicated estate and presented difficult legal
and factual issues under the best of circumstances. The task of locating and
valuating the assets of the marital estate
[was] complicated and made more difficult by [Dr. Morgans] failure to cooperate, thereby necessitating extensive formal discovery.
In the instant case, the evidence was
sufficient to support the trial court's findings that Mrs. Morgan has a need for attorney fees, that Dr. Morgan has the ability to
pay those fees, and that such fees were
reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding
attorney fees to Mrs. Morgan.5
CONCLUSION
Dr. Morgan's objection to the trial
court's amended findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the distribution
of the parties' stocks is moot. Further, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in
valuing and distributing the parties' property, nor in awarding alimony and attorney
fees to Mrs. Morgan. Accordingly, we affirm.
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.

ALBERTSONS, INC., an Idaho
corporation, Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY, and Gayle Fullerton.
Respondents.
No. 920530-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 18, 1993.
Employer appealed final decision of
Board of Review of Utah Industrial Commission awarding unemployment compensation benefits to claimant. The Court of
Appeals, Billings, P.J., held that substantial
evidence supported finding that claimant
did not willfully destroy employer's property, and board reasonably concluded that
claimant was not discharged for just cause.
Affirmed.
1. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=»788
Social Security and Public Welfare
<*=65L1
Decision of Board of Review of Utah
Industrial Commission awarding unemployment compensation benefits would be reviewed for reasonableness. U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i).
2. Social Security and Public Welfare
«=>562.5
Employer bears burden of proving just
cause for termination of claimant of unemployment benefits.
U.C.A.1953, 35-45(b)(1).
3. Social Security and Public Welfare
«=562.5
Employer claiming employee seeking
unemployment benefits was discharged for
"just cause" must show culpability, knowl-

5. While the trial court did not abuse its discrc
lion in awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Morgan,
the record reflects, and Mrs. Morgan concedes,
that the trial court miscalculated the amount of
fees to be awarded. In the prior appeal, we
determined that the trial court improperly
awarded $11.617 44 in costs to Mrs. Morgan.

See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah
App 1990). Subtracting the disallowed costs
from $75,000 (the combined amount initially
awarded by the trial court), the correct amount
of attorney fees is $63,382.56, not $67,567.35 as
calculated by the trial court on remand.

edge and control; the failure to establish
any one of the three factors is fatal to
employer's claim of just cause. U.C.A.
1953, 35-4-5(b)(l).
I. Social Security and Public Welfare
<3=>584.6
Substantial evidence supported finding
of administrative law judge, adopted by
Board of Review of Utah Industrial Commission, that damage to employer's equipment was an accident and claimant of employment benefits did not willfully destroy
employer's property, and Board's determination that claimant's conduct did not give
rise to level of culpability required to deny
unemployment benefits was reasonable.
U.C.A.1953, 35-4-5(b)(l), 63-46b-16(4),
(4Xd), (4)(h)(i).
5. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=»791
Court grants great deference to agency's findings, and will uphold them if they
are supported by substantial evidence when
they are viewed in light of whole record
before court.
6. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=791
"Substantial evidence" in support of
an agency's findings is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support conclusion.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
7. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=>791
In applying substantial evidence test in
reviewing agency decision, court will review whole record and consider both evidence that supports agency's findings and
evidence that fairly detracts from them.
8. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=>786
Social Security and Public Welfare
«=»663
Court reviewing decision of Board of
Review of Utah Industrial Commission will
defer to Board's assessment of conflicting
evidence. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-5(b)(l), 6346b-16(4), (4)(d).

John S. Chindlund, Robert G. Wing, and
Roger J. McConkie, Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, Salt l^ake City, for petitioner.
K. Allan Zabel and Emma R. Thomas, Sp.
Asst. Attys. Gen., Dept. of Employment
Sec, Salt Lake City, for respondents.
Before BILLINGS, P.J., GARFP and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Albertsons, Inc. (Albertsons),
appeals the final decision of the Board of
Review of the Utah Industrial Commission
(Board) awarding unemployment compensation benefits to the claimant, Gayle Fullerton (Fullerton). In affirming the decision
of the Administrative Law Judge (AIJ), a
majority of the Board concluded Fullerton
was not discharged from his employment
for "just cause" under Utah ("ode Ann.
§ 35-4-5(b)(l) (Supp.1992). We affirm.
FACTS
On April 3, 1992, Albertsons discharged
Fullerton, an eleven year employee, claiming he damaged an Albertsons forklift.
The incident resulting in Fullerton's termination occurred on April 2, 1992, and in
volved changing a 1500 pound forklift battery. To change a battery, the battery
must first be pushed out of the forklift
onto a rack system with rollers. A new
battery is then moved onto the forklift with
rollers and held in place by a heavy metal
plate. This process takes two people.
Fullerton and Earl Ellis (Ellis), the maintenance worker assisting Fullerton with
the battery change, describe the incident at
issue differently. Fullerton claims he accidentally damaged the forklift. According
to Fullerton, he slipped while standing on
the oily rollers and as he fell the metal
plate he was holding in his hand inadvertently hit the forklift twice before he re
gained his balance. Fullerton maintains he
did not break the plastic cover to the fork
lift battery, he claims it was broken before
he went into the battery area.
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Conversely. Ellis claims the damage done
to the forklift was intentional. Ellis testified he personally saw Fullerton beat on
the forklift resulting in damage to the battery cover. According to Ellis, Fullerton
had trouble putting the retaining plate on
the forklift and "started beating on the
machine." Ellis reported to Albertsons
that Fullerton1 purposely damaged the battery cover. However, Fullerton claims Ellis's testimony is inaccurate because Ellis
could not see his feet from where he was
standing and thus could not see whether he
slipped.
Albertsons's company policy allows for
the immediate dismissal of an employee
who willfully damages company property.
Fullerton was aware of the policy, having
signed a company policy sheet on April 8,
1991, which set forth among other causes
of dismissal the "[unauthorized . . . damage to company . . . property."

more credible to the Administrative Liw
Judge. . . .
The employer did not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
claimant's actions rose to the level of
culpability, knowledge and control to impose a disqualification. The claimant's
testimony is accepted that the damage
done on April 2, 1992 was accidental.
In reaching this determination, the ALJ
gave Fullerton's past reprimands no
weight. The ALJ found Albertsons violated its union agreement by considering past
reprimands when deciding to dismiss Fullerton, since both incidents occurred more
than two years earlier, well outside the
time limitation for consideration under the
union contract.

The ALJ awarded benefits to Fullerton.
Acknowledging the conflict in testimony,
the ALJ found the damage done to the
Albertsons forklift was accidental. The
ALJ stated:
While their [Fullerton's and Ellis's] testimony is different, the claimant seems

Albertsons appealed the decision of the
ALJ to the Board. On July 27, 1992. the
Board, with one dissent, adopted the findings of the ALJ and affirmed the decision
of the ALJ that Albertsons did not have
just cause within the meaning of section
35-4-5(b)(l) for discharging Fullerton.
The Board found:
In affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the Board of Review
notes that the employer is correct in its
argument that this case hinges on balancing the respective credibility of Mr.
Ellis and the claimant.
The ALJ, who
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of both witnesses, made a specific finding that the claimant "seems more
credible to the Administrative Law
Judge." The Board of Review only reviews written transcripts and documents
associated with the Administrative I^aw
Judge hearing and does not have the
opportunity to observe witnesses. The
Board must, therefore, rely on the impressions of the ALJ on matters of credibility derived from observing the de-

I. Prior to the April 2. 1992 incident, Fullerton
received two warning notices from Albertsons.
In April of 1989, Fullerton, while talking to
another employee about a business matter, for
got he had not lowered the forks on his forklift.
When he drove away the forks caught an object
which resulted in the forklift tipping over. Full
crton was placed on suspension without pay
from April 20. 1989 to April 25. 1989.

The second warning was in January of 1990
when Fullerton kicked and damaged a door
while "horsing around" with members of his
crew on Super Bowl Sunday. For this infrac
tion Fullerton received two weeks suspension
without pay.
Importantly, Albertsons has a union contract
which provides that warnings will not remain in
effect for more than one vear.

As a result of this incident, Fullerton's
supervisor dismissed Fullerton on April 3,
1992, finding Fullerton willfully broke the
plastic battery cover. The supervisor
based his decision on Ellis's report and
Fullerton's past record of similar reprimands.1
Fullerton applied for unemployment insurance compensation after his discharge
from employment at Albertsons. The Utah
Department of Employment Security denied benefits. Fullerton objected to the
ruling and a hearing was held before an
ALJ on June 1, 1992.

meanor of the witness. Since the Administrative Law Judge found the claimant to be more believable than the employer witness and since the ALJ's finding of fact that the claimant accidentally
slipped and inadvertently broke the battery plate is supported by substantial
evidence in the record, the Board affirms
that finding and affirms the Administrative Law Judges decision that the employer did not have just cause within the
meaning of the Utah Employment Security Act for discharging the claimant.
(Emphasis added).
On appeal, Albertsons claims Fullerton
was terminated for just cause because he
willfully destroyed company property, and
knew, or should have known, his actions
could result in his termination. In so
claiming, Albertsons essentially challenges
the Board's finding the incident was accidental.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
These proceedings were commenced after January 1, 1988, therefore our review is
governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). See Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-0.5 to -22 (1989 & Supp.1992).
Judicial review of agency action under
UAPA is controlled by Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16 (1989).
HI Because this appeal involves the application or interpretation of an agencyspecific statute we must determine whether review is under section 63~46b-16(4)(d)
or section 63-46b-16(4Mh)<i).' See SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. Auditing Div., 849 P.2d
1167, 1173 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting); King v. Industrial Comm 'n, 850
P.2d 1281, 1285-1286 (Utah App.1993). If
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-5(b)(l) (Supp.1992)
2. Section 63-46b-l6(4) provides in part:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial re
view has been substantially prejudiced by any
of the following:
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted
or applied the law;

contains a legislative grant of discretion to
the Board, we review under section 6346b-16(4)(h)(i) for reasonableness. However, if it contains no grant of discretion, we
review under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for
correction of error. Morton Int'l, Inc. v.
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 (Utah
1991); King, 850 P.2d at 1285-1286. See
also SEMECO, 849 P.2d at 1173 (Durham.
J., dissenting).
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) provides a claimant
is ineligible for unemployment benefits if
the individual is "discharged for just cause
. . . if so found by the commission." Utah
Code Ann. § 35-4-5(b)(l) (Supp.1992). This
explicit grant of discretion to the Industrial
Commission to apply the statute requires
we review the Board's action under section
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for reasonableness. See
Morton, 814 P.2d at 589; King, 850 P.2d at
1291. See also Bhatia v. Department of
Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 577 (Utah
App.1992); Gibson v. Department of Employment Sec, 840 P.2d 780, 783 (Utah
App.1992); Wagstaff v. Department
of
Employment Sec, 826 P.2d 1069, 1072
(Utah App.1992); Department
of Air
Force v. Sunder, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah
App. 1991).
JUST CAUSE TERMINATION
[2,3] In this appeal we must decide
whether the Board reasonably concluded
Fullerton was not discharged for just cause
and is therefore entitled to unemployment
benefits. Albertsons bears the burden of
proving just cause for Fullerton's termination. See Utah Code Admin.P. R562-5b103; Bhatia, 834 P.2d at 577. To establish
just cause, Albertsons must show Fullerton's conduct involved three factors: I) culpability, 2) knowledge and 3) control. See
Utah Code Admin.P. R562-5b-102.3 Ac
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute; .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989).
3. Counsel for Albertsons erroneously cites to
Utah Code Admin.P. R475-5b-l02 (1991) for the
factors which establish just cause. The Admin
istrativc Code has been renumbered in the 1992
version and Utah Code Admin.P. R562-Sb-102
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eludes a discharged employee from receiv
cord Bhntta v Department of Employ
ing unemployment compensation bene
ment Sec 834 P 2d 574 577 (Utah App
fits ' Gibion 840 P 2d at 783 (quoting
1992) Nelson v Department of Employ
ment Sec, 801 P 2d 158 161 (Utah App
Logan Regional Hosp v Board of Review,
1990) * The failure to establish any one of 723 P2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986))
the three factors is fatal to
[the em
In resolving the conflicting testimony,
ployer s] claim of just cause" Depart
the A U found "the claimant seems more
ment of Air Force v Department oj Em
credible to the Administrative Law Judge,"
ployment Set, 786 P 2d 1361, 1364 (Utah
thus "[tjhe claimant's testimony is accepted
App 1990) cert dented sub nom US v
that the damage done on April 2, 1992 was
Industrial Comm'n, 795 P 2d 1138 (Utah
accidental"
1990) (citing Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc v
In affirming the decision of the ALJ, the
Board of Review, 775 P 2d 439, 442-43
(Utah App 1989)) In the instant case we Board adopted the ALJ's Findings of Fact
need not reach the issues of knowledge and and Conclusions of Law The Board stat
control as we uphold the Board's determi
ed
nation that Fullerton's conduct was not cul
The Board must, therefore, rely on the
pable
impressions of the ALJ on matters of
credibility derived from observing the de
Culpability
meanor of the witnesses Since the Ad
[4| Rule R562-5b-102(lMa) provides
mimstrative Law Judge found the claim
guidance to the Board in determining
ant to be more believable than the em
whether an employee s conduct was suffi
ployer witness
the Board affirms
ciently culpable to deny benefits In defin
that finding
ing culpability, these regulations provide
[5-71 Albertsons necessarily challenges
[tjhe wrongness of the conduct must be the Board's finding that Fullerton did not
considered in the context of the particu
intentionally beat on an Albertsons forklift
lar employment and how it affects the
in their effort to demonstrate Fullerton's
employer's rights If the conduct was an
conduct was culpable In seeking to over
isolated incident of poor judgment and
turn the Board's factual findings Albert
there is no expectation that the conduct
sons bears a heavy burden "[TJhis court
will be continued or repeated, potential
grants great deference to an agency's find
harm may not be shown and therefore it
ings, and will uphold them if they are 'supts not necessary to discharge the employ
ported by substantial evidence when
ee
viewed in light of the whole record before
Utah Code Admin P R562-5b-102(1 Ma)
the court' " Department of Air Force v
See Gibson v Department of Employ
Swtder, 824 P 2d 448, 451 (Utah App 1991)
ment Sec, 840 P 2d 780, 783-84 (Utah App
(quoting Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-16(4)(g)
1992), Nelson v Department of Employ
(1989)) '"Substantial evidence is "such
ment Sec, 801 P 2d 158, 161-62 (Utah App
1990), Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc v Board relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a con
of Review, 775 P 2d 439, 443 (Utah App
elusion " ' " Grace Drilling Co v Board
1989)
In Gibson, this court called for a liberal of Review, 776 P 2d 63, 68 (Utah App 1989)
construction of the Employment Security (quoting Idaho State Ins Fund v Hum
Act to assist those attached to the work cutt, 715 P2d 927, 930 (Idaho 1985) (quot
v
Federal
Maritime
force, stating " 'mere inefficiency or failure ing Consolo
Comm'n, 383 U S 607 620 86 S Ct 1018,
of good performance as the result of inabil
1026, 16 L Ed 2d 131 (1966))) 'In applying
ity or incapacity, inadvertences, isolated in
the substantial evidence test, we review the
stances of ordinary negligence, or good
faith errors in judgment or decisions do not 'whole record' before the court and consid
er both evidence that supports the Board s
constitute culpable conduct which pre
(1992) is ihe applicable rule since the incident

al issue occurred in 1992

11(11* I V. t V A I B A P f f e V A a
CIU M SS4 P 2d S79 (Utah App 1993)

findings and evidence that fairlv detracts
from them ' Swider, 824 P 2d at 451
f 81 We defer to the Board's assessment
of conflicting evidence We are in no posi
tion to second guess the detailed findings
of the A U which were adopted by the
Board It is not our role to judge the
relative credibility of witnesses "In un
dertaking such a review, this court will not
substitute its judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though
we may have come to a different conclusion
had the case come before us for de novo
review " Grace Drilling, 776 P 2d at 68
"It is the province of the Board, not appel
late courts, to resolve conflicting evidence,
and where inconsistent inferences can be
drawn from the same evidence, it is for the
Board to draw the inferences " Id Ac
cord Logan Regional Hosp v Board of
Review, 723 P2d 427, 428 (Utah 1986),
Buick v Department of
Employment
Sec, 752 P2d 358, 360 (Utah App 1988)
Accepting Fullerton's testimony, as did
the ALJ and the Board, there is substantial
evidence to support a finding the incident
was an accident and Fullerton did not will
fully destroy Albertsons's property Thus,
we find reasonable the Board's determma
tion that Fullerton's conduct did not rise to
the level of culpability required to deny
unemployment benefits
CONCLUSION
We defer to the Board's assessment of
conflicting evidence, and find reasonable
the Board's determination that Albertsons
did not have just cause within the meaning
of the Utah Employment Security Act for
discharging Fullerton Therefore, we af
firm the award of unemployment compen
sation benefits to Fullerton
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ , concur
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No 920225-CA
Court of Appeals of Utah
May 19 1993
Vendors sued purchasers of real estate
for breach of real estate sales contract
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Pat B Brian, J , entered judgment for pur
chasers, and vendors appealed The Court
of Appeals, Greenwood J , held that (1)
material issue of fact as to oral modifica
tion of contract precluded summary judg
ment, and (2) oral modification of real es
tate contract was enforceable
Reversed and remanded
Orme, J , concurred in result
1. Appeal and Error «=»842(2), 934(1)
In considering appeal of grant or deni
al of summary judgment, court reviews
facts and all reasonable inferences from
them in light most favorable to losing par
ty, and legal conclusions reached by trial
court are accorded no deference, but in
stead, are reviewed for correctness Rules
Civ Proc , Rule 56(c)
2. Judgment «=»18I<29)
Material issue of fact as to whether
vendor and purchaser of real estate under
installment contract intended purchaser's
payment of mortgage on land to be applied
to payment due at beginning or at end of
contract term precluded summary judg
ment for purchaser in vendors action for
breach of promise to make installment pay
merits Rules Civ Proc , Rule 56(c)
3 Frauds. Statute of «=>!29(I2), 131(1)
Generally if original agreement was
required to comply with statute of frauds
any material modification of that agree
ment must also conform to statute of
frauds, however transactions for sale of
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May 20, 1977.
PRIOR HISTORY:
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the
Hon. DANIEL A. COVELLI, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed.
COUNSEL: Joseph L. Mack and Samuel L. Bullas, both
of Chicago (Nathan Bennett, of counsel), for appellants.
Winston & Strawn, of Chicago (Calvin Sawyier,
Logan T. Johnston, HI, and R. David Bergonia, of counsel), for appellees.
OPINIONBY: WILSON
OPINION: [*350] [**351] [***190] Mr. JUSTICE
WILSON delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of
Cook County instructing the trustees of seven trusts as
to the proper interpretation of a tax apportionment provision common to the seven trust agreements creating
their trusts. The only issue raised on appeal is whether
the court correctly construed this provision. We affirm.
On December 30, 1933, Geraldine Swift (who subsequently became Mrs. Geraldine Swift Taylor) executed a
trust agreement creating an irrevocable inter vivos trust
(hereinafter Taylor trust A). The sole original trustee
of this trust was Gustavus F. Swift, the settlor's father.
[*351] After his death in 1943, Harris Trust
and Savings Bank (hereinafter Harris) became the sole
successor trustee.
On December 27, 1938, Mrs. Taylor executed a second trust agreement creating another irrevocable inter
vivos trust (hereinafter Taylor trust B). As with the
former trust, the sole original trustee of this trust was

Gustavus F. Swift. In contrast to the former trust, after
the original trustee's death, Harris, Gustavus F. Swift,
Jr., and A. Thomas Taylor (Mrs. Taylor's husband) became successor co-trustees.
Both trust agreements gave the original trustee a discretionary power to accumulate income. These accumulation powers terminated at his death. Thereafter,
income from Taylor trust A became payable to Mrs.
Taylor. On her death, this income will be payable to
her children and per stirpes to their respective lineal descendants if any child of hers has predeceased her or
survives her but dies before the termination of the trust.
Parenthetically, Mrs. Taylor's children are: Thomas
S. Taylor, Geraldine T. McLaughlin, Gustavus F. Taylor
and Richard F. Taylor; and the lineal descendants of these
children are Fiona M. Taylor, Alexandra T. McLaughlin,
Geraldine S. McLaughlin and Peter B. McLaughlin, Jr.,
all of whom are minors. After the death of the last survivor of Mrs. Taylor, her children and their lineal descendants, this income is payable to her siblings and per
stirpes to their respective lineal descendants if any sibling has predeceased this survivor or survives same but
dies before the termination of the trust. Mrs. Taylor's
siblings are Marie S. Spiel, Jane S. Moore and Gustavus
F. Swift, Jr., and the lineal descendants of these siblings are: Robert E. Spiel, Jr.; Richard A. Moore, Jr.;
Elizabeth J. Moore, a minor; Matthew S. Moore; Joseph
F. Moore; Kate L. Moore; Samuel S. Moore, a minor;
Alice S. Reginos; Cynthia Reginos, a minor; Eleanor
S. Glass; George B. F. Glass, a minor; and Gustavus F.
Swift IV. The income disposition provisions of Taylor
trust B differ from those of Taylor trust A in that income
beneficiaries of Taylor trust B must exercise a power of
withdrawal before income payments are made and any
income not distributed is accumulated and added to the
trust's principal. In all other respects, the income dispo-
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sition provisions of the two trusts are virtually identical.
When each trust terminates, the principal of each trust
is to be distributed to the beneficiaries then entitled to
income in the same proportion as that in which income
would be distributable.
In 1974, Harris filed a complaint for instructions as to
the proper interpretation of certain provisions, including
a tax apportionment clause, of the trust agreement creating Taylor trust A. In the same complaint, the successor
trustees of Taylor trust B petitioned for instructions as to
the proper interpretation of certain provisions, including
a spendthrift clause and a tax apportionment clause, in
the trust agreement creating Taylor [*352] trust B. After
the settlor and the other adult defendants filed separate
answers to this complaint, the court appointed guardians
ad litem for all minor defendants.
[**352] [***191] Prior to the filing of this complaint, Mrs. Taylor had informed the successor trustees
of Taylor trust B of her intention to relinquish all of her
retained interests, rights, powers and privileges in and
with respect to Taylor trust B. The successor trustees
of Taylor trust B questioned whether such a voluntary
alienation was possible in light of the terms of the trust's
spendthrift clause. After the guardians filed separate answers to the aforementioned complaint, the court found
that such an alienation was possible in an order disposing
of this question only. Thereafter, Mrs. Taylor executed
a release, renunciation and relinquishment of all rights,
titles and interests in and with respect to that trust.
After Mrs. Taylor executed this release, plaintiffs and
all adult defendants including the settlor filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Memoranda of law were
filed by the various parties including one of the guardians
and the settlor's siblings thereafter petitioned for entry
of a supplementary decree adjudging that the court's rulings are equally applicable and binding in respect to six
other trusts they created. In their petition the siblings
stated that Marie S. Spiel executed a trust agreement on
December 30, 1933, which is identical to the trust agreement executed the same day by Mrs. Taylor, and thereby
created an A trust which is identical to Taylor trust A.
The petition further stated: (1) that Jane S. Moore executed a trust agreement on December 23, 1938, which
is substantially identical to the trust agreement creating
Taylor trust A, and thereby created a trust (hereinafter
Moore trust A) which is substantially identical to Taylor
trust A; (2) that Gustavus F. Swift, Jr., executed a trust
agreement that same day which is identical to the one
executed by Jane S. Moore, and thereby created an A
trust which is identical to Moore trust A; and (3) that on
December 27, 1938, each of the three siblings executed
a trust agreement identical to the one executed that day

LEXSEE

by Mrs. Taylor, and thereby created trusts (hereinafter
respectively Spiel trust B, Moore trust B and Swift trust
B) identical to Taylor trust B. The siblings then requested
instructions as to the proper interpretation of those provisions of the trust agreements they executed having Taylor
trust counterparts which the court had been asked to construe. One of these provisions is the tax apportionment
clause of the trust agreements executed by the siblings.
In response to the foregoing, the court entered an order in which it concluded that all eight trusts contained
the following tax apportionment provision:
If any estate, inheritance or other succession taxes or
duties or
[*353] transfer charges are assessed in connection
with any distribution of income or principal hereunder,
they shall be paid by the trustee or successor trustee out
of the principal of the trust estate.
The court went on to find as a matter of law that upon
the death of a settlor, if trust assets are included in his
gross estate for estate or inheritance tax purposes, then
there should be apportionment of such taxes and the trust
is obligated to pay its proportionate share out of the principal of the trust estate. The court also found as a matter
of law that such apportionment between nonprobate or
trust assets taxed in the settlor's estate and the settlor's
probate assets is fair, equitable and called for by the
settlor's express language. The court concluded that the
apportionment of taxes between the trusts and the estates
of the settlors should be on the basis of the value of the
trust assets included in the taxable estates compared to
the value of all assets included in the taxable estates. The
court additionally concluded that Mrs. Taylor's execution of a release, renunciation and relinquishment of all
rights, titles and interests in and with respect to Taylor
trust B nullified anyrightMrs. Taylor had under the tax
apportionment clause of that trust. The court then instructed the trustees of the four A trusts and of Spiel trust
B, Moore trust B and Swift trust B that: (1) if any trust
assets are included in a settlor's gross estate for estate
or inheritance tax purposes upon the death of a settlor
of any of these seven trusts, the estate of the deceased
settlor has the right to require the [**353] [***192]
trust to contribute its proportionate share of the estate or
inheritance taxes providing such right was not released
or relinquished by the settlor; (2) the amount of the contribution by the trust shall be determined on the basis of
the value of the trust assets included in the gross estate
compared to the value of the total gross estate; and (3)
the tax contribution is payable out of principal and not
out of income. The court reserved jurisdiction over the
remaining issues and directed the guardians to appeal
from this order. This appeal followed. Opinion
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The guardians ad litem urge that the tax apportionment
provision in question neither authorizes nor requires
payment of a proportionate share of estate or inheritance
taxes upon inclusion of trust assets in the settlor's gross
estate. In support of this contention they offer three arguments which merit discussion. The first begins with
the assertion that the trust instruments were drawn by experienced counsel and the observation that the settlor's
death taxes are not expressly referred to in the tax apportionment clause in question. The guardians submit that
if it had been the settlor' s intent to have the trust pay such
taxes, the draftsman would have been instructed to expressly state that the settlor's death taxes were chargeable
to the trust and, if so instructed, the draftsman would
[*354] have so stated. The guardians conclude that the
absence of such an express direction clearly indicates
that the settlor never instructed the draftsman to provide
for payment of such taxes out of trust funds and clearly
indicates a lack of intent to have such a payment made.
Evidently the guardians failed to perceive that the tax apportionment clause in question also does not expressly
refer to beneficiaries' death taxes. If the absence of an
express direction to pay the settlor's death taxes indicates a lack of intent to have such a payment made, then
it follows that the lack of an express direction to pay beneficiaries' death taxes indicates a lack of intent to have
the trust pay the beneficiaries' death taxes. Taking the
guardians' position and its logical extension together, it
follows that the tax apportionment clause in question is
a nullity and indicates a lack of intent to have the trust
pay any death taxes. We believe that the very presence
of the tax provision indicates an intention to have the
trust pay some death taxes on some occasion. Since the
guardians' position leads to the opposite conclusion, we
find it unpersuasive.
The guardians' second argument pertains to the word
if at the beginning of the tax apportionment clause in
question. They point out that if indicates uncertainty
and that there is no uncertainty regarding death and payment of death taxes by the settlor's estate. They argue
that the draftsman knew that the settlor must eventually die and that estate taxes would thereafter have to
be paid by settlor's estate, and since the taxes referred
to following the preposition 'if make no reference to
the settlor's death taxes or the settlor's death, it follows ineluctably that only beneficiaries' death taxes are
included among those referred to in the tax apportionment clause in question. We disagree. If the draftsman
is chargeable with the knowledge that the settlor must
eventually die, then he is equally chargeable with knowledge that the beneficiaries must eventually die. Despite
the certainty of both the settlor's eventual death and the
eventual demise of all beneficiaries, neither the settlor
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nor the beneficiaries are expressly referred to in the tax
provision. It follows ineluctably that the tax provision
refers to neither the settlor's nor the beneficiaries' death
taxes. If the provision refers to neither the settlor's nor
the beneficiaries' death taxes, then it is a nullity. If
the provision is a nullity, then why do we find it in the
trust instrument? Would an experienced draftsman draft
a null and void tax apportionment provision? We think
not. Moreover, as used in the provision in question, if is
a subordinating conjunction which introduces a subjunctive clause and means in the event that. (Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 1124 (unabr. ed. 1976);
The American Heritage [**354] [***193] Dictionary
654 (1970).) So used, the uncertainty if indicates pertains to the occurrence of the assessment mentioned in
the following subjunctive clause. As used in this subjunctive clause, the any which follows if is an adjective
[*355] which modifies estate taxes, inheritance taxes,
other succession taxes, duties and transfer charges which
are assessed in the manner described by the remainder of
the clause. The guardians' second argument fails to persuade us that this use of any does not bring the settlor's
death taxes within the parameters of the tax provision in
question.
The guardians' third argument pertains to the last portion of the subjunctive clause in the tax apportionment
provision. The guardians argue that since the settlor's
right to income terminates upon death and since the settlor retains no right to receive any principal, upon settlor's death there is no distribution of income or principal
under the trust which would cause a death tax assessment, therefore only successor beneficiaries can be covered by: assessed in connection with any distribution of
income or principal hereunder. We disagree. Not only
the settlor's income interest, but also all successor income beneficiaries' income interests appear to terminate
upon their respective deaths. Following the guardians'
reasoning, it would seem that only holders of principal
interests can be covered by this passage. If this was
the settlor's intention, then why does the term income
appear in this passage? We believe that this argument,
like its predecessors, proves too much. One of its other
flaws is that it overlooks the redistribution of income interest upon settlor's death. Furthermore, a court's first
concern in the construction of a trust is to ascertain the
intent of its creator and give effect to that intent if it
does not conflict with the law or public policy of the
State. (See 2416 Corp. v. First National Bank (1976),
64 III. 2d 364, at 371-72, 356 N.E.2d 20.) This intent
must be gathered from the entire instrument evidencing
the trust and if the language used therein, in its ordinary
sense, is plain and its meaning is clear, and if the settlor's actual intent can be ascertained therefrom without
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reference to rules of construction which are used to affix
a presumed intent, we must construe the trust so as to
give effect to the actual intent expressed by the trust instrument's language. (See 2416 Corp. v. First National
Bank; Storkan v. Ziska (1950), 406 III 259, 263-64,
94 N.E.2d 185; Continental Illinois National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Griffin (1970), 124 Hi App. 2d 334, 337,
260 N.E.2d 281.) We believe that the language used
in the tax apportionment provision in question, taken in
its ordinary sense, is clear and unambiguous and that
the settlor's intent can be ascertained therefrom without
reference to rules of construction. We further believe
that the court below correctly interpreted this language.
There is more than one way to express an intention to
have death tax burdens apportioned (compare Lipic v.
Wheeler (1951), 362 Mo. 499, 242 S.W.2d 43, with
Union Trust Co. v. Watson (1949), 76 R.I. 223, 68
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A. 2d 916), and this language expresses such an intention on its face.
The other contentions submitted by the guardians involve either rules [*356] of construction used to affix
presumed intention in the absence of an expression of
actual intention, or rules of law which operate in the
same context such as the doctrine of equitable apportionment discussed in In re Estate of \an Duser (1974),
19 m. App. 3d 1022, 313 N.E.2d 228, and In re Estate
of Phillips (1971), 1 III App. 3d 813, 275 N.E.2d
685. Our conclusions render these contentions inapposite. Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Cook County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
LORENZ and MEJDA, JI, concur.
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the imposition of use taxes under the Code,
as the Controller and the district court concluded
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.

The sales or use lax is imposed on the pur
chase price paid or charged or (oi any consid
eralion for the furnishing of tangible personal
properly, together with the services of an op
eiaior thereof, foi any pcison, shall be lax
able hcreundei as a rental of such personal
pioju'ily, irrespective o/ (he fait that during
all limes that the said piopcrly is so fur

code to impose a use tax upon that proper-

The city defines "retail sale" or "purchased at retail" as: "Any sale, purchase,
lease, rental or grant of license to use
tangible personal property, or taxable services within the City except a wholesale
sate or purchase for taxable resale*' City
Code § 7-2-104 (emphasis added). The
code then defines wholesale sale as:
A sale by wholesalers or retailers to retail merchants, jobbers, dealers, vendors
or other wholesalers for taxable resale.
It does not include a sale by a wholesaler
or retailer to users, consumers, purchasers or customers not for taxable resale,
which sales shall be deemed retail sales
and subject to the prwrisfens of this Arti
v
cle.

II
The imposition of a UBe tax on the purchase of hotel room furnishings in addition
to the imposition of a sales tax when a
furnished room is rented is inapposite to
both the code, and Colorado case law.
City Code § 7-2-103(0(2) provides:
The sales tax and use tax complement
each other in the City revenue plan, and
together provide a uniform tax of two
and one half percent (27*%) upon either
the sale, purchase, use, storage, distribution or consumption of all tangible personal property and specific taxable services purchased, leased or rented at retail, as herein defined.
(Emphasis added.) The purpose of a use
tax is to supplement the sales tax, and
therefore should not apply to property subject to sales tax. State Dep't of Rev. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 724 P.2d 1341, 1344
(Colo. 1986). The imposition of a use tax on
personal property purchased to furnish a
private guest room, in addition to a sales
tax on the rental of that room is, therefore,
improper as double taxation. See IBM v.
Charnes, 198 Colo. 374, 376, 601 P.2d 622,
625 (1979) (exemption of intermediate sales
from use tax is designed to avoid multiple
taxation, the goal being to impose the sales
or use tax on the final consumptive transaction).

nished, the control of the operation of the
same remains in the person so providing the
said property.
City Code § 7-2-310.
2.

The sales or use lax is imposed on the entireprice paid or charged on the liansaciion of
furnishing rooms or other accommodations to
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extent of use, storage, or distribution of
that property.

EKICKSON, J , dissents.
Justice EKICKSON dissenting:
I would affirm the court of appeals. Investment Hotel Properties, Ltd. v. City of
Colorado Springs, 781 P.2d 113 (Colo.App.
1989). The court of appeals, in my view,
properly concluded thut Investment Proper
ties' purchase of tangible personal property
for the exclusive purpose of furnishing private guest rooms in a hotel owned and
operated by Investment Properties was not
taxable under the Colorado Springs Sales
and Use Tax Ordinance.
City Code
§ 7-2-101 to -1302. The issue in this case
is whether property purchased at wholesale
City Code § 7-2-104 (emphasis added).
and used to furnish hotel guest rooms is
Under the code, if an item of tangible
exempt from use tax under the purchase
personal property is purchased for the purfor taxable resale exception.
pose of taxable resale, then it is a wholesale purchase and not subject to the use
I
Lax. Although the code does not specifics I
The Colorado Springs city code declares
ly articulate a definition of taxable resale,
that
the provisions of the code provide ample
every person who stores, uses, distribguidance regarding the legislative intent of
utes or consumes in the City any article
the city.
of tangible personal property, or taxable
A "sale" is defined by City Code
services purchased, leased or rented at
retail, as herein defined, is exercising a § 7-2-104 to include all sales, leases and,
taxable privilege.
rentals of personal property. A resale
City Code § 7-2-102(A) (emphasis added). would therefore occur when the purchaser
The city may therefore levy a use tax on of the property sells, leases, or rents that
"the privilege of using, storing, distribut- property to another party or individualing or otherwise consuming tangible per- City Code § 7-2-310 provides that the fursonal property and taxable services in the nishing of tangible personal property is a
City . ." City Code § 7-2-103(B).
taxable event,' and City Code § 7-2-311
The authority to impose a use tax is provides that the furnishing of rooms in a
dependent on the threshold question wheth- hotel is also a taxable event.2 The rental
er the item of personal property is pur- of a room and accompanying personal propchased at retail. If the item of personal erty is thus a taxable resale. Because Inproperty is not purchased at retail, then vestment Properties purchased the personColorado Springs does not have the author- al property for taxable resale, Colorado
ity to impose a use tax regardless of the Springs does not have authority under the
I.
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Ill
The majority applies the primary purpose
test and accompanying factors that were
articulated in Regional
Transportation
District v. Martin Marietta Corp., 805
P.2d 1102 (Colo.1991), and A.B Hirschfeld
Press, Inc. v. City and County of Denver,
806 P.2d 917 (Colo.1991). This court need
not apply the four-factor analysis since the
primary purpose of Investment Properties'
purchase is clear.
According to the majority, a purchase is
a
purchase for resale, and not a taxable
purchase at retail, if the primary purpose
any person who for a consideration uses, possesses or has the right to use or possess, any
room or rooms in any hotel, apartment hoiel,
guest house, guest ranch, motel, mobile home,

of the transaction is the acquisition of
tangible personal property for resale in an
unaltered and basically unused condition.
Investment Properties purchased the personal property at issue for no other reason
than to furnish private guest rooms, which
it intended to rent (resell) te its patrons
The personal property was then rented to
Investment Properties' patrons in an unal
tered and unused condition.
Thus, even applying the primary purpose
test, I would hold that the personal proper
ty purchased by Investment Properties foi
the purpose of furnishing private guesl
rooms should not be subject te a use tax b>
the City of Colorado Springs.
£ !(IVNUMMimTIM>

Jon Chris JENSEN and Robert Roome,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
The CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, i
municipal corporation; The City Coun
cil, City and County of Denver, and al
members thereof; Federico Pena, May
or of the City and County of Denver
Colfax on the Hill Business Improve
ment District, and Marty Amble, th«
Executive Director thereof; The Boarc
of Directors of Colfax on the Hill Bust
ness Improvement District, and Jacl
Robinson, Tom Man ley, James Beatty
Joseph Figueroa, and David Atkinson
the Directors thereof; and The State ol
Colorado, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 90SA51.
Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
Feb 25, 1991.
Appeal was taken from an order of tht
District Court for the City and C/Ounty ol
aulo camp, trailer court or park, under an)
concession, permit right or access, license tc
use or other agreement, or otherwise
City Code § 7 2-311.
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Denver, Edward E. Carelli, J., which rejected challenge to creation of business improvement district. The Supreme Court,
Mullarkey, J., held that: (1) Business Improvement District Act did not violate uniformity clause of Colorado Constitution,
and (2) city council substantially complied
with statutory requirements in creating
proposed district.
Affirmed.

1. Taxation «=>42( 1)
That taxing provisions of Business Improvement District Act exempted apartment rental properties and boarding and
rooming houses used on long term basis
from property tax imposed on commercial
property did not violate uniformity clause
of Colorado Constitution. West's C.R.S.A.
§§ 31-25-1213 to 31-25-1218; West's C.R.
S.A. Const. Art. 10, § 3(lKa).
2. Taxation <s=*42( I)
Uniformity clause of Colorado Constitution applies only to ad valorem taxes and
requires burden of such taxation to be uniform on same class of property within jurisdiction of authority levying tax. West's
C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 10, § 3.
3. Taxation <*=»42(!)
Uniformity of taxation is required
within class, not between or among different classes. West's C.R.S.A. Const. Art.
10, § 3.
4. Evidence *=>83(1)
Presumption of validity and regularity
supported official acts of public officials
and, in absence of clear contrary evidence,
court would presume that they had properly discharged their official duties.
5. Municipal Corporations *»450(4)
City council, when verifying signatures
of property owners petitioning for formation of business improvement district, was
I. This court has jurisdiction because this case is
an appeal from the final judgment of a district
court in which one issue involves the constitu-

not required to verify property ownership
as of date of hearing on creation of district.
West's C.R.S.A. § 31-25-1207.
6. Municipal Corporations *=>450(4)
Validity of petitions requesting formation of business improvement district was
not dependent upon presence of operating
plan and budget and, thus, subsequent submission of amended operating plan and
budget did not invalidate petitions that had
been circulated with different operating
plan and budget attached. West's C.R.S.A.
§ 31-25-1211.

Nancy P. Bigbee apd Sally S. Townshend, Denver, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Patricia L. Wells, Denver City Atty.,
John L. Stoffel, Jr., Asst. City Atty., Denver, for defendants-appellees City and
County of Denver, The City Council, City
and County of Denver, and all members
thereof, and Federico Pefia, Mayor of the
City and County of Denver.
Susan E. Burch, Denver, for defendantsappellees Colfax on the Hill Business Improvement Dist, Amble, and the Bd. of
Directors of Colfax on the Hill Business
Improvement Dist.
Justice MULLARKEY delivered the
Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal' from a Denver District
Court decision holding that the Denver City
Council did not abuse its discretion or exceed its jurisdiction when it created the
Colfax on the Hill Business Improvement
District pursuant to the Business Improvement District Act, §§ 31-25-1201 to -1228,
12B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.) (the "BID Act").
In reaching its decision, the district court
held that the BID Act did not violate the
Uniformity Clause of the Colorado Constitution, Article X, Section 3(lHa). We affirm on both issues.
lionality of a statute. See § 13-4-102( l>(b), 6A
C.R.S. (1987).
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I.
In 1988, the legislature enacted the BID
Act which allows municipalities to create
Business Improvement Districts (BIDs)
within their boundaries. Under section 3125-1205, a municipality may form a BID if
it receives a petition signed by persons who
own real or personal property equal to at
least fifty percent of both the assessed
valuation of the service area and the total
acreage in the proposed district.2 The
"service area," defined in section 31-251203(10), is the area within the boundaries
of the district. The district consists of all
commercial property located in the service
area and includes property in the service
area which later is changed from residential or agricultural property to commercial property. Id. Pursuant to section 3125-1213, the BID may raise revenue by
levying an ad valorem tax upon all commercial property in the district. The parties stipulated that residential property, including single family residence, boarding/rooming houses and apartment rental
properties are not taxed under the BID
Act.
See § 31-25-1203(10) (residential
property within service area may not be
taxed).
In March 1989, the BID organizers filed
petitions with the City and County of Denver seeking the creation of the Colfax on
the Hill BID.1 Although not required by
the BID Act, the petitioners attached copies of a proposed operating plan with specified tax rate and budget. The plaintiffs
(collectively referred to as "Jensen") are
owners of commercial property located
within the boundaries of the BID who oppose the creation of the proposed district.
Following the issuance of a public notice,
the Denver City Council held a public hearing on June 19, 1989 pursuant to section
31-25-1206 of the BID Act. At the hear2. Section 31-25-1205 contains additional re
quirements that are not at issue in this case.
3. The service area boundaries are Sixteenth Avenue on the north, the alley east of Josephine

ing, Jensen submitted petitions in opposition to the proposed district and alleged
that the petitions submitted in favor of the
proposed district should be dismissed because the petitions were deficient. Among
the deficiencies Jensen alleged were that:
(1) certain property owners who had signed
the petition had since sold their property,
(2) certain property owners who originally
signed the petition in favor of the proposed
district later signed a petition against the
proposed district, (3) the verification of
property ownership was not current as of
the date of the hearing, and (4) the proponents submitted an amended version of the
operating plan and budget at the hearing
that contained different terms from the
operating plan and budget attached to the
petition. The City Council subsequently
postponed voting on the proposed district
until June 26, 1989 so that the administra
tion (i.e., the City Attorney's office and the
Department of Public Works) could investi
gate the protests.
In the ensuing investigation, the city administration determined that some of the
signatures supporting creation of the BID
were indeed not valid because the signatories either no longer owned property in the
BID or had signed a later petition opposing
the proposed BID. The administration
then recomputed the relevant percentages
and reported to the City Council that creation of the BID was supported by the
owners of 52.76% of the total assessed valuation in the service area and 52.361% of
the total acreage in the district. In verifying that the signatures belonged to property owners within the service area, the administration used information that was current as of March 1989. The administration's report also concluded that the BID
organizers were authorized by virtue of the
petition to submit the amended operating
plan and budget at the hearing.
Street on the east, Fourteenth Avenue on the
south, and Grant Street (south of Colfax Ave
nue) and the alley between Sherman and Grant
Streets (north of Colfax Avenue) on the west.
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On June 20, 1989, after receiving the
administration's report, the City Council enacted an ordinance creating the proposed
BID and adopting the amended operating
plan and budget. Subsequently Jensen
filed a complaint requesting judicial review
of the City Council's action pursuant to
C.R.C.P. 10b'(a)(4), declaratory relief pursuant to C.R.C.P. 57 and injunctive relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court
held that the City Council acted within its
discretion and jurisdiction in creating the
district. It also held that the BID Act did
not violate Article X, Section 3(1 Ma), of the
Colorado Constitution Jensen now brings
this appeal.

JENSEN v. CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER
Che a . 806 P 2d M l (Colo

cial Serv. v. Board of County
697 P.2d at ll. 4

Comm'rs,

Under section 31-25-1213 of the challenged BID Act, the BID "has the power to
levy and collect ad valorem taxes on and
against all taxable commercial property, as
defined in section 31-25-1203(2), within the
boundaries of the district." By defining
"commercial property" in section 31-251203(2) as "any taxable real or personal
property which is not classified for property tax purposes as either residential or
agricultural," the BID Act incorporates the
definitions already used in the general tax
statutes. See§ 39-1-102(5.5), (14.3), (14.4),
(14.5), 16B C.R.S. (1990 Supp). These definitions correspond to Article X, Section
3(1 Mb) of the Colorado Constitution which
has defined the classification "residential
II.
real property" since the section was amend[ 1 ] We address first Jensen's claim that ed in 1982 as "all residential dwelling units
and the land, as defined by law, on which
the BID Act's taxing provisions, sections
such units are located, and mobile home
31-25-1213 to -1218, violate Article X, Secparks, but shall not include hotels and motion 3(1 Ma), of the Colorado Constitution. t e l s . . . . "
At the outset, we note that statutes are
Jensen claims that the BID Act, insofar
presumed to be constitutional and that Jensen, as the moving party, must establish as it exempts apartment rental properties
that the BID Act is unconstitutional be- and boarding/rooming houses used on a
yond a reasonable doubt. See Colorado long-term basis, violates the Uniformity
Dep't of Social Serv. v. Board of County Clause. Jensen asserts that these properties benefit from the improvements funded
Comm'rs, 697 P.2d 1, 10 (Colo.1985).
by the BID Act and thus properly should
be taxed as commercial property. Since
121 Article X, Section 3(1 )(a), the Unisuch properties are treated as residential
formity Clause, states:
under the BID Act, Jensen concludes that
Each property tax levy shall be uniform the tax classification adopted by the legisupon all real and personal property not lature results in unequal treatment of two
exempt from taxation under this article types of property belonging in the same
located within the territorial limits of the classification. We do not agree.
authority levying the tax.
(3) We have construed Article X, SecAs we have noted in the past, this section tion 3, to allow the legislature to make
applies only to ad valorem taxes and re- reasonable classifications for tax purposes.
quires the "burden of such taxation to be See Senior Corp. v. Board of Assessment
Appeals, 702 P.2d 732, 738 (Colo.1985);
uniform on the same class of property
American Mobile Home Ass'n, Inc. v. Dowithin the jurisdiction of the authority
Ian, 191 Colo. 433, 438, 553 P.2d 758, 762
levying the tax." Colorado Dep't of So- (1976); District 50 Metro. Recreation Dist.
4.

In 1982, Article X, Section 3 was amended to
change the way actual value of property is de
termined in order to achieve uniformity in
property tax determination for the different
classes of taxable property. The new amend
men) provided thai the valuation for assessment

of residential real properly would be set at a
lower percentage than other taxable property.
See legislative
Council of Colorado, An Analysis
of 1982 Ballot Proposals, Research Publ. No
269, 1-9 (1982).

167 Colo. 425, 431, 448 P.2d
v. Bumside,
788, 790-91 (1968). Uniformity of taxation
is required within a class, not between or
among different classes.
In this instance, the legislature enacted
the BID Act primarily to "promote the
continued vitality of commercial business
areas
within
municipalities."
§ 31-25-1202(1). To achieve this aim, the
legislature provided that a BID would have
the power to impose an ad valorem tax on
"commercial property" rather than on "residential property." Incorporated into the
BID Act are the definitions of residential
property from the general property tax
definitions that correspond to the definition
of residential property contained in Article
X, Section 3(1 Mb). By this constitutional
provision, hotels and motels are excluded
from the residential property. "Hotels and
motels" are defined to include lodging
which is "predominantly used on an overnight or weekly basis." § 39-1-102(5.5),
16B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). Apartments and
boarding/rooming houses used on a long
term basis do not come within the definitions of hotel and motel and properly are
included within the definition of residential
property.
The distinction that Jensen attacks thus
has its origins in Article X, Section 3(1 )(b),
which is a companion constitutional provision to the Uniformity Clause; it directly
follows and modifies subsection (l)(a), the
subsection containing the Uniformity
Clause. Both provisions were adopted by
the voters in the 1982 general election.
H.R.J. Res. 1005, 54th Leg., 1983 Colo.Sess.
Laws 1675, 1682. Clearly then, a classification based on Article X, Section 3(1 )(b), is
reasonable and does not violate the Uniformity Clause found in the exact same
section. Moreover, we do not view the
legislature's adoption of the classification
3.

We need not reach Jensen's third claim for
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since
we find the BID Act to be constitutional.

*.

C.R.C.P. 106(a). 7A C.R.S. (1990), provides in
relevant part: "In the following cases relief may
be obtained in the district court by appropriate
action under the pi at lice prescribed in the Colo
rado Rules of Civil Procedure:
(4) Where
any governmental body 01 officei or any lower
B06P2d
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as unreasonable given the purpose of the
BID Act. Accordingly, Jensen has failed
to prove that the BID Act is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt and we affirm the trial court ruling.5
HI.
| 4 | We now address Jensen's second
claim challenging the trial court's decision
that the Denver City Council substantially
complied with the statutory requirements
in creating the proposed BID. Jensen
brings this action under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4).'
The standard of review under this provision
is whether the government body exercising
judicial or quasi judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. We have construed this rule to mean
that the district court should affirm the
governing body where there is "any competent evidence" to support its decision. See
Bauer v. City of Wheat Ridge, 182 Colo.
324, 327, 513 P.2d 203, 204-205 (1973).
To determine whether the City Council
abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction, we must examine the dictates of
the BID Act. Section 31-25-1207 outlines
the procedure that the City Council must
follow. First, on the date of the hearing,
the City Council "shall ascertain, from the
tax rolls of the county or counties in which
the district is located, the total valuation
for assessment of the taxable real and personal property in the service area and the
classification of taxable property." Second, "|i|f it appears that said petition is not
signed in conformity with this part 12, the
governing body shall dismiss the petition. . . . " If, however, "it appears that an
organization petition has been duly signed
and presented in conformity with this part
12 and that the allegations of the organization petition are true, the governing body
judicial body exercising judicial o^ quasi judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion, and there is no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy otherwise piovid
ed by law: (1) Review shall be limited to a
determination of whether the body or olficer
has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused Us dis
cietion, based on the evidence in the record
be!ore (he defendant body or officer."

ovw ™ v , i r i i . KuriJKTKK, 2d SERIES
. . . may, in its sole discretion, declare the
district organized,
"

further evidence that the petitions were
deficient, we must presume that the City
Council properly made its determination
that the signatures represented the requisite amount of property owners. A "presumption of [validity and] regularity supports the official acts of public officials and
in absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties."
United States v. Chemical Foundation,
272 U.S. 1, 14-15, 47 S.Ct. 1, 6, 71 L.Ed.
131 (1926); City of Colorado Springs v.
District Court, 184 Colo. 177, 181, 519 P.2d
325, 327 (1974). Thus, once the City Council adopted the administration's revised percentage determinations made in response
to protests raised at the hearing, we find
that the City Council complied with the
statute.

Section 31-25-1205 sets out the requirements with which the organizers must comply when submitting the petitions. Jensen
contends that the City Council did not properly determine that the requirement found
in subsection (2) was followed. This section provides:
The petition shall be signed by persons
who own real or persona) property in the
service area of the proposed district having a valuation for assessment of not
less than fifty percent, or such greater
amount as the governing body may provide by ordinance, of the valuation for
assessment of all real and personal property in the service area of the proposed
district and who own at least fifty percent, or such greater amount as the governing body may provide by ordinance, of
the acreage in the proposed district.
15] Jensen argues, however, that the
§ 31-25-1205(2). The record indicates that, City Council misinterpreted the requireprior to the hearing, the city administration ments of section 31-2S-1207 of the BID
verified that the BID petitions were signed Act when it verified the signatures. He
by property owners of at least fifty percent construes this provision to require the City
of the assessed valuation of real and per- Council to determine the percentage of
sonal property in the service area and fifty property owners represented with respect
percent of the total acreage in the proposed to value and acreage as of the date of the
district as of March 1989. As discussed hearing. He asserts that because the inabove, Jensen challenged the city adminis- formation used to verify the property owntration's calculations and the City Council ership was current as of March 1989 inpostponed consideration of the BID peti- stead of June 26, 1989, the date of the
tions until the alleged deficiencies could be hearing, the petition was deficient and
investigated.
Once the investigation should have been dismissed. Jensen's arshowed that some of the signatures sup- gument must fail.
porting the creation of the proposed district
Section 81-25-1207(1) specifically states
were invalid, the city administration recalculated the relevant percentages to reflect that the total valuation for assessment and
the classification of taxable property shall
the lower representation.
be ascertained from the tax rolls of the
Even after the recalculations, however, county. Because the tax rolls are prepared
the signatures still represented more than yearly by the assessor,7 it is evident that
fifty percent of the assessed valuation in the legislature did not contemplate the
the service area of the proposed district time-consuming and costly up-to-the-minute
and total acreage of the district. Absent title searches that would be required by
7. Section 39-5-123(1). 16B C.R.S. (1990 Supp),
provides: "(T]he assessor shall complete the assessment roll of all taxable property within his
county, and no later than August 25 in each
year he shall prepare therefrom two copies of
the abstract of assessment, and in person, and
not by deputy, shall subscribe his name, under
oath, to the following statement, which shall be
a part of such abstract: i,
, the

MARTIN v. FEUFI.K
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assessor of
county, Colorado, do solemnly swear that in the assessment roll of such
county I have listed and valued all taxable property located therein and that such property has
been assessed for the current year in the man
ner prescribed by law and that the foregoing
abstract of assessment is a true and correct
compilation of each schedule.'"

Jensen's theory. Due to the date when the
hearing occurred, the tax rolls last certified
would have been current up to mid-1988.
Since the Denver City Council used data
current as of March 1989, it more than
satisfied the property ownership verification requirements.

Accordingly, we agree with the trial
court's determination that the City Council
complied with the statute* and neither
abused its discretion nor exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared the proposed district organized.

161 Last, we address Jensen's claim
that the subsequent submission of the
amended operating plan and budget invalidated the petitions since the petitions had
been circulated with a different operating
plan and budget attached. Jensen does not
contend that the amendments were substantial or that those who signed the petition were misled because of the changes
later made.8

Judgment affirmed.

|
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Sherry Denise MARTIN, Petitioner,
v.
The PEOPLE of the State of
Colorado, Respondent.

Section 31-25-1211 provides, "No district
created under the provisions of this part 12
No. 90SC747.
shall issue bonds, levy taxes, fees, or assessments, or provide improvements or serSupreme Court of Colorado,
vices unless a municipality has approved an
En Banc.
operating plan and budget for the district."
March 11, 1991.
There is no requirement in the statute that
the operating plan and budget be circulated
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Apwith the petition. Although the record inpeals, 88CA1130, Pitkin County District
dicates that prior to filing the petition, the
Court, 88CR5.
organizers may submit the operating plan
and budget for approval by the City PlanDavid F. Vela, Colorado State Public Dening Office, they are not required to do so. fender, Jaydee K. Bachman, Deputy State
This practice is designed to insure against Public Defender, Greeley, for petitioner.
delays later in the organizing process.
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Timothy M.
Furthermore,
section
31-25-1205(2Kd)
Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Robert M. Russel,
makes explicit that the organizers listed on
First Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for responthe petition have "the power to enter into
agreements relating to the organization of dent.
Prior report: Colo.App., 806 P.2d 393.
the district" which indicates that they are
authorized to change the operating plan
and budget. Thus, it is apparent that the
ORDER OF COURT AND MANDATE
validity of the petitions is not dependent
Upon consideration of the Record on Apupon the presence of an operating plan and
peal, together with briefs filed herein,
budget.
*• The amended plan was the same as the operating plan and budget circulated with the petitions except for three changes. The mill levy
was raised from 5.77 to 5.8 mills in response to
• decrease in the total valuation of commercialuse property in the district. Two restrictive
provisions, a $175,000 per year budget cap and
a
three-year sunset provision for the new district, were added in response to comments from
Property owners who had signed the petitions.

9. The trial court properly did not make any
determination regarding the genuineness of the
signatures since section 31-25-1207(2) provides
that, "(Tlhc findings of the governing body upon
the question of the genuineness of the signatures and all matters of fact incident to such
determination shall be final and conclusive."
See People ex rel. Setters v. Lee, 72 Colo. 598,
604. 213 P 583. 587 (1923); Kaiser v. City of
Ukewood, 33 Colo.App. 239. 244, 517 P 2d 471.
474 (1973).
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SANDERS BRINE SHRIMP. Petitioner,
v.
AUDIT DIVISION OF the UTAH STATE
TAX COMMISSION, Respondent
No. 910106.

shrimp cyst operation qualified for sales
tax exemption for purchase of harvesting
and processing equipment where Commission made no express finding on whether
operator's activities were included in statutory code classification system. U.C.A
1953, 69-12-104(16) (1^90).

Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 28, 1993.
State Tax Commission held that brine
shrimp cyst operator did not qualify for
sales tax exemptions as manufacturer.
Taxpayer petitioned for judicial review. In
original proceeding, the Supreme Court,
Zimmerman, J , held that: (1) administrative rule improperly restricted definition of
manufacturer and was invalid, and (2) express finding was required on whether operator complied with requirement* for exemption permitted by statute.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Taxation *=>1245
State Tax Commission sales tax exemption rule requiring that manufacturer
produce tangible personal property to qualify for exemption as manufacturer was invalid in that rule improperly restricted
manufacturing sales tax exemption contained in statute. U.C.A.1953, 69-12104(16) (1990).
2. Administrative Law and Procedure
•=•386
Administrative agency's rules must be
consistent with its governing statutes.
3. Administrative LAW and Procedure
«=»386
Administrative rule that is out of harmony with governing statute is invalid.
4. Taxation e=>1319
Remand to State Tax Commission was
required to determine whether brine
I.

The sales lax exemption statute, section 5 9 - 1 2 104, has been amended several limes in the pasl
few years The subparts cited in the text have
h*^ll l/>r /WMKWI UC (IK\

-.r^J O h

.-.„-^....-l..

R, Paul Van Dam, Mark E. Wainwright,
Salt Lake City, for Utah Stat* Tax Com'n.
Richard C. Cahoojo/ $ak Lake City, for
Sanders Brine S h ^ p ^
Kent B. Linebaugb, Joa* N. Brems, Salt
Lake City, for airiei Water $ Power Technology, Inc., and Ifount Olytnpua Waters,
Inc.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Sanders Brine Shrimp, a Utah partnership, seeks review of a February 13, 1991,
final order of the Utah State Tax Commission. The Commission held that Sanders
did not qualify for the sales tax exemptions
provided for either manufacturers or farmers under subpart* (16) and (22), respective
ly, of section 69-12-104 of the Code. Utah
Code Ann. ft 5^-12-104(16), (22) (Supp.
1988) (amended 1989, 1991, and 1992).1
Sanders argues, inter alia, that in ruling
that its brine shrimp operation did not qualify as a manufacturer under subpart (16),
the Commission relied upon an administrative rule that impermissibly narrowed the
availability of the exemptions. We agree
and reverse the order of the Commission,
but we remand the case for a factual deter
ruination regarding Sanders' compliance
with the remaining statutory requirements
for the sales tax exemption.
Sanders harvests and processes brine
Bhrimp cysts, or eggs, from the Great Salt
of this statute as they were codified at the end
of the auditing period. The relevant subparts of
the sales tax exemption statute have remained

Lake and sells them as a source of food for
tropical fish and prawns. Purchasers
hatch the cysts, raise the resulting brine
shrimp, and use them as feed. During the
audit period (July 1, 1985, to June 30, 1988),
Sanders spent $319,260.97 on equipment
and machinery to use in harvesting and
processing the brine shrimp cysts. Relying
on the sales tax exemptions for manufacturers and farmers found in subparts (16)
and (22) of section 59-12-104, Sanders did
not pay sales tax on these purchases. The
equipment and machinery expanded Sanders' production capacity by 1500 percent.
Sanders' operation consists of two phases. First, the brine shrimp cyste are harvested from the Great Salt Lake. Second,
the cysts are transported to Sanders' Riverdale facility, where they are processed.
Until Sanders processes the brine shrimp
cysts, they have little or no commercial
value. The harvesting and processing
phases are both necessary to Sanders' business, and the new equipment and machinery were purchased for use in both phases.
On March 27, 1989, the Commission's
Auditing Division assessed a sales tax deficiency based on Sanders' failure to pay
sales tax on the equipment and machinery
purchased during the audit period. Sanders petitioned for redetermination.
The Commission held a formal hearing
during which evidence was presented. The
Commission issued its decision on June 7,
1990, finding that Sanders was neither a
manufacturer nor a "farming operation"
and therefore did not qualify for either of
the claimed sales tax exemptions. The
Commission found that Sanders was not a
manufacturer because it could not satisfy
the criteria set forth in rule R865-85S1(A)(4). Utah Admin.Code R865-85S2.

The version of the relevant administrative rule
in place at the end of the auditing period is
substantially the same as the current version.

3.

Olher issues have been briefed and argued by
the names, including whether Sanders' harvest-

1(AK4) (1987-88) (recodified as amended
Utah
Admin.Code
R865-1&-86S(AX4)
(1992)).2 Specifically, the Commission determined that Sanders did not satisfy rule
R865-85S-l(AK4)'s requirement that a
"manufacturer . . . produce[ ] a new, reconditioned, or remanufactured product, article, substance or commodity from raw,
semifinished, or used material." Id.
R865-85S-l(AK4Kb).
Sanders filed a request for reconsideration, which the Commission granted. At
the Commission's reconsideration hearing,
Sanders argued, inter alia, that rule R86585S-1(AH4) impermissibly narrowed the
availability of the manufacturer's exemption in subpart (16) of section 59-12-104.
By an order dated February 13, 1991, the
Commission rejected Sanders' arguments
and affirmed its previous order.
On appeal, the dispositive issue is whether the Commission applied a rule that improperly restricts the statutory definition
of "manufacturer."3 Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-12-104(16)
(Supp. 1988) (amended
1989, 1991, and 1992). Questions of statutory construction are matters of law, and
we give no deference to an administrative
agency's interpretation of a statute absent
certain circumstances, none of which exist
here. Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 513-14
(Utah 1990).
[1] The relevant part of the sales tax
exemption statute states:
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by this
chapter:
(16) sales or leases of machinery
and equipment purchased or leased
by a manufacturer for use in new or
ing of brine shrimp cysls constitutes a farming
operation under subpart (22) of section 5 9 - 1 2 104. Because the subpart (16) issue is disposi
live, we do not address the other issues.

expanding operations (excluding normal operating replacements, which includes replacement machinery and
equipment even though they may increase plant production or capacity, as
determined by the commission) in any
manufacturing
facility
in Utah.
Normal operating replacement shall include replacement machinery and
equipment which increases plant production or capacity.
Manufacturing
facility means an establishment described in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of
the Standard Industrial Classification
Manual 1972, of the federal Executive
Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget. For purposes of
this subsection, the commission shall
by rule define "new or expanding operations" and "establishment."
...
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) (Supp.
1988) (emphasis added) (amended 1989,
1991, and 1992).
Rule R865-85S-1 (A)(4), which was apparently promulgated by the Commission to
implement section 59-12-104(16), states:
"Manufacturer" means a person who:
(a) functions within the activities included in SIC code classification 2000-3999;
(b) produces a new, reconditioned, or remanufactured product, article, substance, or commodity from raw, semifinished, or used material; and
(c) in the normal course of business produces products for sale as tangible personal property.
Utah Admin.Code R865-85S-1(A)(4) (198788) (recodified as amended Utah Admin.Code R865-19-«5S(AK4) (1992)). Under this rule, one purchasing equipment for
use in any "manufacturing facility" is entitled to the exemption provided in section
59-12-104(16) only if he or she meets the
criteria for being a manufacturer set forth
in subparts (a), (b), and (c) of the rule.
While the requirement in subpart (a) mirrors the statute, i.e., the business must fall
within SIC code descriptions, the require

ments in subparts (b) and (c) have no statutory counterparts. Nothing in the statute
requires the qualifying facility to produce
"a new, reconditioned or remanufactured
product, article, substance, or commodity"
that is for sale "in the normal course of
business . . . as tangible personal property"
Thus, under the Commission's rule, one
might operate a manufacturing facility as
defined by the statute and not be a manufacturer as defined by the rule. We find
no obvious source for the Commission's
narrowing of the exemption's availability.
Section 59-12-104(16) authorizes the Commission to define by rule the terms "new or
expanding operation" and "establishment."
However, it does nq^AH^o^ize the Commission to define the tenjn "manufacturer,"
nor does it authorise tjbe Commission to
otherwise limit the availability of the exemption as it has done in subparts (b) and
(c) of rule R865-86S-KAK4).
[2,3] It is a long-standing principle of
administrative law that an agency's rules
must be consistent with its governing statutes. See, e.g., Merrill Bean Chevrolet,
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 549 P.2d 443,
445 (Utah 1976); Robert H. Hinckley, Inc.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 70, 77,
404 P.2d 662, 668 (1965). Thus, a rule that
is out of harmony with a governing statute
is invalid. See, e.g., Manhattan Gen.
Equip. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 297 U.S. 129, 134, 56 S.Ct. 397,
399, 80 L.Ed. 528 (1936).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that
the Commission's rule defining "manufacturer" is invalid because it improperly restricts the manufacturing sales tax exemption set forth in section 59-12-104(16).
Therefore, we reverse the Commission's denial based on noncompliance with its definition of "manufacturer."
(41 Sanders argues that we should order the Commission to grant the exemption. However, the invalidity of the Conn-
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mission's rule defining "manufacturer"
does not necessarily mean Sanders qualifies for the sales tax exemption. Sanders
contends that the Commission's order implicitly found that Sanders met all the other criteria required by the rule and statute,
specifically that it is in compliance with
subpart (a) of the rule, which follows the
statute and requires that the petitioner be
"functioning] within the activities included
in SIC code classification 2000-3999." We
disagree. The Commission made no express finding on whether Sanders complied
with the first requirement, dealing with
SIC code classifications. Its order suggests that it probably did not reach that
issue because there was no reason to do so
in light of Sanders' failure to meet the
second factor, dealing with new or reconditioned products. We refuse to interpret
the lack of a finding of noncompliance as
the equivalent of an affirmative finding of
compliance. Because the Commission did
not resolve whether Sanders complied with
the remaining statutory requirements of
the sales tax exemption, we remand the
case to the Commission for further proceedings.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.

J U U I

diagnose adenocarcinoma of mother's bow
el until 35 weeks into pregnancy. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Ijeslie A. I>ewis, J.r granted obstetrician's
motion for summary judgment after refusing to consider affidavit from patient's ex
pert witness. Appeal was taken. The Su
preme Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held
that: (1) refusing to consider expert affida
vit as sanction for failing to timely identify
witness was not abuse of discretion, and (2)
undisputed evidence that carcinoma could
not have been treated earlier mandated
finding of no proximate cause.
Affirmed.

1. Pretrial Procedure «=»753
Refusing to consider expert's affidavit
submitted in opposition to motion for summary judgment, on ground that affiant was
not identified as possible witness before
deadline established in scheduling order,
was not abuse of discretion; scheduling
order was made with concurrence of both
counsel and proponent of affidavit did not
request change in trial court's scheduling
order or file designation of witnesses.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 16, 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Evidence <*=»538

(o

| KtV NUMMR iVSHM>

Lorrie Ann ARNOLD, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Dr. Glade B. CURTIS, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 910146.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 29, 1993.
Medical malpractice suit was commenced against obstetrician for failing to

Physicians practicing in one specialty
are not ordinarily competent to testify as
experts on standard of care applicable in
another specialty except when witness is
knowledgeable about standard of care of
another specialty or when standards of different specialties on issue in particular case
are the same.
3. Evidence «=>571(9)
Uncontradicted expert evidence, that
earlier diagnosis of pregnant patient's carcinoma would not have permitted earlier
treatment or surgery, in that baby was
delivered at earliest time that safe delivery
was possible and surgery for carcinoma
followed, established that any negligence in
obstetrician's failure to earlier diagnose
carcinoma was not proximate cause of
mother's damage.
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SAVAGE INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.

UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION, Respondent.
No. 900248.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 3, 1991.
Corporation sought writ of review of
final order of State Tax Commission denying petition for redetermination and upholding finding of auditing division that
subsidiary corporations were not entitled to
carry over their own preacquisition losses
in determining their annual income for
preparation of consolidated returns of parent. The Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., held
that statute prohibiting acquiring corporation from using preacquisition losses of
acquired corporation does not prohibit acquired corporation from taking advantage
of its loss carryovers incurred prior to date
of acquisition in order to offset its own as
opposed to acquiring corporation's income;
deduction may be taken by acquired corporation, whether filing separately or filing
consolidated return as part of affiliated
group.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=>759
Statute* e=»219(l)
Intermediate standard of review is
only to be applied in areas of agency technical expertise or in areas where legislature has specifically granted agency discretion in its decision-making process; for
most questions of basic statutory interpretation or construction of law, court is as
suited to decide issues involved as is agency and therefore will review agency decision for correctness,
2. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=»74l
Section of AdnunietraUve Procedure
Act governing rvvtvw of agvnry decauoiui

made after formal adjudicative hearing and
requiring that "substantial prejudice" be
shown before court may grant relief from
agency action refers to person seeking review and does not modify actual standards
of review nor does it relate to degree of
deference court must give agency decision.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4).
3. Administrative Law and Procedure
*»800
Taxation *=»493.8
Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, state Tax Commission's interpretation
of law in denying corporation's petition for
redetermination and upholding finding of
auditing division that ajibai4iary corporations were not enlft)*4 t* pury over their
own preacquiaitioft tpaif* in determining
their annual income to preparation of consolidated returns of pjwirt corporation
would be reviewed using correction of error standard, giving no deference to Commission's interpretation of law. U.C.A.
1963, 69-7-108<14)<f), 63-46b-16<4), (4Kd).
4. Statutes *»188
Terms of statute should be interpreted
in accord with usually accepted meanings.
5. Statutes *»189
In construing legislative enactments,
reviewer assumes that each term in statute
was used advisedly; thus statutory words
are read literally, unless such reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable.
6. Taxation *=>1041
Statute prohibiting acquiring corporation from using preacquisition losses of
acquired corporation does not prohibit acquired corporation from taking advantage
of loss carryovers incurred prior to date of
acquisition in order to offset its own as
opposed to acquiring corporation's income;
the deduction may be taken by acquired
corporation, whether filing separately or
filing consolidated return as part of affiliated group. U.C.A1963, 59-7-108(14X0
7. Taxation <*=>1041

For purpose of statute prohibiting »c'
quiring corporation from using preacquisi
Uon ioaMNi of acquired corporation, filing <"

consolidated returns by acquiring corporation does not transform deductions by acquired corporations into those of acquiring
corporation. U.C.A.1953, 59-7-108(14X08. Statutes <*=*181(1)
Court's primary responsibility in construing legislative enactments is to give
effect to legislature's underlying intent.
9. Statutes <S»184
In determining legislative intent of
statute, statute should be considered in
light of purpose it was designed to serve
and so applied as to carry out that purpose
if it can be done consistent with its language.
10. Taxation «=>1041
Intent of statute prohibiting acquiring
corporation from using acquisition losses of
acquired corporation is to prevent buying
of loss corporations by high profit corporations solely for use of loss corporation's
previous loss carryover deductions; further
intent may be to limit use of loss carryover
deductions to those corporations which
have previously suffered losses and therefore are entitled to average their low income years with their high income years.
U.C.A.1953, 59-7-108(14Hf).
11. Taxation «=»1041
Statute prohibiting acquiring corporation from using preacquisition losses of
acquired corporation does not, as written,
prevent manipulation of corporate assets
for purpose of accruing tax deductions
based on preacquisition losses. U C A.
1953, 59-7-108O4Kf).
R. Brent Jenkins, Dale R. Kent, Salt
Lake City, for petitioner.
R. Paul Van Dam and Mark E. Wain
wright, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
HALL, Chief Justice:
Savage Industries, Inc., seeks a writ of
review of a final order of the Utah State
Tax Commission ("the Commission") entered on April 20, 1990, which denied Savage Industries' petition for redetermination
and upheld the finding of the auditing divi-

sion that subsidiary corporations of Savage
Industries were not entitled to carry over
their own preacquisition losses in determining their annual income for preparation of
the consolidated returns of Savage Industries.
The facts in the case have been stipulated to by the parties and are supplemented by findings of the Commission in its
redetermination hearing. Prior to April 1,
1982, Kenneth Savage, T. Luke Savage,
and Neal Savage owned the majority of the
stock of fourteen different operating corporations. On April 1, 1982, a stock holding
and management corporation, Savage
Western Industries Corporation ("Savage
Western"), was formed to consolidate the
corporations into a manageable structure.
On April 1, 1982, the stock of Savage Western was entirely owned by the three brothers and members of their families. On
November 28, 1984, Savage Western underwent a statutory merger with Savage Industries, Inc., and Savage Western
changed its name to Savage Industries,
Inc. On December 31, 1986, shares of Savage Industries stock were transferred between the brothers to give each brother an
equal percentage of ownership after the
settlement of divorces.
Prior to April 1, 1982, the stock of KNT
Leasing Corporation ("KNT") was owned
by the brothers, with each owning 33'/»
percent of the stock. On April 1, 1982,
Savage Western acquired 86.7 percent
(2,600 shares) of the stock of KNT in exchange for its own stock. The remaining
13.3 percent (400 shares) was retained by
Neal Savage pending divorce settlements.
Prior to its acquisition by Savage Western,
KNT filed separate Utah corporate franchise tax returns. In order to conform its
tax year to that of Savage Western, KNT
filed a separate corporate franchise tax
return for the partial tax year June 1, 1981,
to March 31, 1982. The return reported a
current year's loss of $74,641 and reported
$61,252 of prior years' losses as being
available for carryover. On November 15,
1984, the name of KNT was changed to
Savage Transportation Corporation. On
January 15, 1985, the remaining 400 shares
of Savage Transportation were acquired by

666

Utah

Savage Industries On March 80, 1987,
Savage Transportation was merged with
Savage Industries
Prior to April 1, 1983, the shares of
Western Rock Products Corporation
("Western Rock") were owned by Kenneth
Savage, T Luke Savage, Charles Black
burn, and Eldon Reese On April 1, 1983,
Savage Western acquired the shares of
Kenneth Savage and T Luke Savage, for a
total of 81 percent ownership of Western
Rock During the next two years, the
shares owned by Blackburn and Reese
were redeemed, giving Savage Western 100
percent ownership in Western Rock For
periods of time prior to the April 1, 1983
acquisition by Savage Western, Western
Rock filed separate corporate franchise tax
returns In order to conform its tax year
to that of Savage Western, Western Rock
filed a separate corporate franchise tax
return for the partial tax year January 1,
1983, to March 31, 1983 The return reported a current year's loss of $648,291
Western Rock's separate return loss was
first carried back to prior Western Rock
separate returns, where $369,685 (as deter
mined by Commission adjustment) was applied to offset income, thus leaving $288,
606 of the loss available to be carried for
ward
Starting with the fiscal year ending
March 31, 1983, Savage Western, and later
Savage Industries, joined with its subsidiar
ies in filing a Utah consolidated corporate
franchise tax return ' In August of 1987,
Savage Industries filed amended consol
idated franchise tax returns for the years
ended March 31, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986
to correct errors made on previously filed
returns In its amended consolidated re
turn for the fiscal year ending March 31,
1983, Savage Western earned over $26,770
of KNT*8 separate return loss and applied
it to offset KNT's income on the consolidat
ed return In its amended consolidated
return for the fiscal year ending March 31,
1985, Savage Industries earned over $290,
I
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Utah Code Ann § 59-7 124 prescribes the re
quirements for filing a consolidated corporate
franchise tax return The ability to file a ton
solidatcd return is described in the statute as a
privilege of corporation* with common stock

332 of Western Rock's separate return logg
and applied it to offset Western Rock's
income on the consolidated return KNT'g
net operating loss was used to offset in
come generated by KNT Western Rock's
net operating loss was used to offset in
come generated by Western Rock Neither
net operating loss was used to offset the
income of any other member of Savage
Industries' consolidated group
In November of 1987, the auditing divi
sion began examining these amended returns and, in an audit report dated Febru
ary 2, 1988, disallowed carryovers of the
losses on the consolidated returns Savage
Industries petitioned the auditing division
for a reconsideration ^| ,iU decision On
March 21, 1988, the auditing division re
sponded to Savage Industries' petition and
reiterated its position
On April 5, 1988, Savage Industries filed
a request for hearing before the Co mm is
sion in order to orally present arguments
pnor to the Commission's rendenng a final
decision on its petition for redetermination
Oral argument was made before the Utah
State Tax Commission on August 17, 1989
The Commission found in favor of the au
diting division and against Savage Indus
tries
I

In determining the standard of review of
agency decisions, the Utah courts have con
gistently followed three basic standards of
review, which were set forth in the case of
Utah Department of Administrative Ser
vices v Public Service Commission * In
that case, Justice Oaks, writing for a unani
mouB court, held that review of administra
tive decisions fell into three distinct catego
nes which required differing standards of
judicial deference to be given to the agen
cy's decision First, agency determinations
of basic fact were to be given great weight
and would only be overturned if they were
not supported by any evidence of substance
whatsoever * Second, agency determina
tions of general law, including interpreta
tion of the state and federal constitutions
and of acts of Congress and of the Utah
Legislature, were to be reviewed giving no
deference to the agency's decision, but re

ownership There is no dispute that Savage
Industries and its subsidiary corporations qua'1
fied to file consolidated returns under this s^

667

viewing it for correctness * Third, in be
tween these two standards, agency deci
sions involving mixed questions of law and
fact or the application of specific factual
situations to the legislative enactments un
d e r which the agency operates were to be
g I v e n deference by the courts and were to
^ up h e ld so long as they fell within the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality 5
Subsequent to Department of Admtnis
trative Services, a large body of case law
has evolved appl> ing and refining the scope
of the three standards • Review of agency
determinations of fact has remained con
sistent, with courts upholding agency find
ings of fact if they were based upon any
evidence of substance 7 Review of agency
determinations of law, however, has been
less clear under Department of Admims
trative SenncesH This is especially so in
1989) cert dented, 781 P 2d 878 (1989) Kline v
Utah Dept of Health 776 P 2d 57 60 (Utah
Ct App 1989) Taylor v Utah State Training
School, 775 P2d 432 433-34 (Utah Ct App
1989) Boyd v Department of Employment Sec,
773 P 2d 398 400 (Utah Ct App 1989) Smith A
tdwards v Industrial Commn 770 P 2d 1016
1017 (Utah Ct App 1989) Stsco Hilte v Industn
al Commn, 766 P 2d 1089 1091 (Utah Ct App
1988)

2. 658 P 2d 601 (Utah 1983)
S

Id at 609

4. id at 608
S

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our first task in this case is to determine
the appropriate standard of review of the
Commission's decision The Commission's
decision to deny Savage's petition for redetermination was based on its interpretation
of Utah Code Ann § 59-7-108 In its con
elusions of law, the Commission stated that
Savage's interpretation of this section was
incorrect and that the plain language of the
statute prohibited the deductions sought by
Savage The Commission's decision was
therefore based purely on its construction
and interpretation of the legislative enact
ment and is purely a question of law

Utah
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*

Id at 610
The degree oi deference extended to [agency
decisions] on these intermediate types of is
sues has been given various expressions but
all are variations of the idea that the (agency)
decisions must fall within the limits of reason
ableness or rationality As used in this con
text, the words 'arbitrary and capricious'
mean no more than this
Id
See, e.g, Telecommunications v Public Serv
Comm'n, 747 P 2d 1029, 1030 (Utah 1987), Toy
lor v Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 743 P 2d 1183,
1186 (Utah 1987), True-Flo Mechanical Sys v
Board of Review, 743 P 2d 1161, 1163 (Utah
1987), Spreader Specialists, Inc v Public Serv
Comm'n, 738 P2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1987),
Smith v Board of Review of Indus Comm'n, 714
P2d 1154, 1155 (Utah 1986), Big K Corp v
Public Serv Comm'n. 689 P 2d 1349, 1353 (Utah
1984), Barney v Department of Employment
Sec, 681 P2d 1273, 1275 (Utah 1984), Benmon
v Utah State Bd of Oil, Gas A Mining, 675 P 2d
1135, 1139 (Utah 1983), Salt Uke City Corp v
Confer, 674 P 2d 632. 636 (Utah 1983) Young A
Sons v Public Serv Comm'n, 672 P 2d 728. 729
(Utah 1983) The court of appeals has also
decided several cases applying the three stan
dards of review of agency determinations See,
*-g. USX Corp v Industrial Comm n 781 P 2d
883 886 (Utah Ct App 1989) Olympus Oil Inc v
Harrison, 778 P 2d 1008. 1010 (Utah Ct App
1989), Capital Gen Corp v Department of Bus
Regulation, 777 P 2d 494. 496 (Utah Ct App

7

There has been a trend in recent case law to
require factual findings of an agency to be
based on substantial evidence See, e g, Bennett
v Industrial Commn 726 P 2d 427 429 (Utah
1986), Big K Corp, 689 P 2d at 1353 This
standard for icviewing agency findings of fact is
incorporated into the Utah Administrative Pro
cedure Act, effective January 1 1988 and found
at Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-l6(4)(g)

8. Compare Bennett 726 P 2d at 429 (defining
"employee under Utah s workers compensation
statute) with Johnson v Department of Employ
ment Sec 782 P 2d 965 968 (Utah Ct App 1989)
(defining just cause under Utah s unemploy
ment statute) The distinction between these
two cases can be clarified by looking at the
organic statutes of the agencies involved The
statute giving the agency power to determine
whether an employee has left emplo>ment for
just cause for purposes of unemployment com
pensation gives the agency wide discretion
based on equity and good conscience
Utah
Code Ann § 35-4-5 The statute determining
the scope of employment for workers compen
sation benefits does not give the Industrial Com
mission such agency discretion Utah Code
Ann § 35-l-43(l)(b)
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cases distinguishing between agency decisions which were granted deference by the
courts and those reviewed for correctness.
Recent decisions of this court have addressed this distinction and have clarified
which agency decisions are granted deferential review and which fit within the "general law" category, to be reviewed using a
correction of error standard.
In Hurley v. Hoard of Review of Industrial Commission,9 this court attempted to
clarify the distinction between cases requiring deference to agency decisions and cases
which would be reviewed using a correction
of error standard. In distinguishing the
two standards, we noted that agency decisions which are granted a more deferential
review are often mixed questions of law
and fact, which require application of specific technical fact situations to the statutes
which an agency is empowered to administer. These are the types of decisions and
applications in which the agency's special
expertise puts it in a better position than
an appellate court to evaluate the circumstances of the case in light of the agency
mission. In contrast, decisions involving
statutory interpretation, issues of basic legislative intent, or construction of ordinary
terms in the organic statute of an agency
involve areas in which an appellate court is
as well suited to decide the legal questions
as is the agency. In cases where the basic
question is what does the law require? the
standard is a correction of error standard.1*
In Chris & Dicks v. Tax Commission,"
we reiterated that correction of error is the
basic standard of review of agency decisions of law. We stated:
In the usual case, questions of statutory
construction are matters of law for the
courts, and we rely on a "correction of
9.

767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988).

10.

See id. at 528.

11.

791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990).

12.

Id. at 513-14 (citations omitted).

13. This standard has evolved through several
Utah cases, beginning p n o i to Department of
Administrative
Services. See, e.g.. Salt l^tke City
Corp. v. Department of Employment
Sec, 657
P.2d 1312. 1316 (Utah 1982). Big A Corp., 689
V 2d at H53 (applying a collection of CIIOI

error" standard of review, according n o
deference to the agency's interpretation
There are a limited number of circum
stances where the agency's interpretation of a statute or rule may be entitled
to some deference, as where construction
of the statute should take into account
the agency's expertise developed from iu
practical, firsthand experience with the
subject matter.1*
Ill This language clarifies that the intermediate standard of review is only to be
applied in areas of agency technical expertise or in areas where the legislature has
specifically granted the agency discretion
in its decision-making process. For most
questions of basic statutory interpretation
or construction of the law, the court is as
suited to decide the issues involved as is
the agency and therefore will review the
agency decision for correctness. 13
The instant case would clearly fit within
the correction of error standard under
Chris & Dicks, Hurley, and their predecessors. The Commission's decision was
based upon its interpretation of ordinary
statutory terms. Its interpretation was not
based upon any technical expertise of the
Commission nor upon application of a complex, technical fact situation to the statute.
The Commission's decision was merely its
interpretation of what the statute prohibits.
The decision is therefore one which this
court is as competent as the Commission to
decide, and a correction of error standard
would be appropriate under our prior case
law.
Because Savage's petition for redetermination was filed after January 1, 1988, the
Utah
Administrative
Procedure Act
("UAPA") M governs our review of the
standard "unless the Commission by virtue *>»
expertise and experience with the regulatory
scheme is in a superior position to give effect «*>
the regulatory objectives to be achieved or inc
terms of the statute make clear that the Com
mission was intended to have broad discretion
in construing those terms"), Bennett, 726 P 2d
at 429.
14. U t a h
(1989).

Code

Ann.

§& 63 4 6 b - 1

ihiough

22

(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Commission's decision denying that petiWe therefore must inquire into what
12) The Commission argues tha^ the
ffect that act has upon the standard of language of section 63~46b-16(4) requires
us to give deference to agency decisions.
eview of the Commission's interpretation
f law. I" ifc* 1987 legislative session, the This argument is based on the language in
Utah Legislature enacted the UAPA for subsection (4) requiring that "substantial
the direction, governance, and review of all prejudice" be shown before a court may
agency action within the state. Specifical- grant relief from agency action. The Comly section 63-46b-16(4) governs appellate mission's position is that this phrase imreview of agency decisions made after a plies that we should give deference to
formal adjudicative hearing. Section 63- agency decisions and that we should uphold
those decisions unless they are "substan46b-l6<4) states.
tially" incorrect.
(4) The appellate court shall grant re
The phrase "substantial prejudice" withlief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seek- in subsection (4) refers to the "person seek
ing judicial review has been substantially ing review." It does not modify the actual
standards of review found within subsecprejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or tion (4). This means that the person seek
rule on which the agency action is based, ing review of an agency action must suffer
is unconstitutional on its face or as ap- substantial prejudice as a result of that
action before a court may grant relief from
plied;
the action. This portion of subsection (4)
(b) the agency has acted beyond the
relates to the damage or harm suffered by
jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
the person seeking review and was written
(c) the agency has not decided all of to ensure that a court will not issue advisothe issues requiring resolution;
ry opinions reviewing agency action when
(d) the agency has erroneously inter- no true controversy has resulted from that
preted or applied the law;
action. The phrase simply does not relate
(e) the agency has engaged in an un- to the degree of deference a court must
lawful procedure or decisionmaking pro- give an agency decision.
cess, or has failed to follow prescribed
In this case, Savage has been substanprocedure;
tially prejudiced by the Commission's deci(f) the persons taking the agency ac
sion denying its petition for redetermination were illegally constituted as a deci- tion. Savage's subsidiaries have been desion-making body or were subject to dis- nied the use of over $300,000 in tax deducqualification;
tions in the form of loss carryovers.
(g) the agency action is based upon a Therefore, the substantial prejudice re
determination of fact, made or implied by quirement of subsection (4) is clearly met.
the agency, that is not supported by sub
| 3 | Under section 63 46b-16(4)(d), a
stanlial evidence when viewed in light of
court may grant relief based upon an agenthe whole record before the court;
cy's erroneous interpretation of law. This
(h) the agency action is:
incorporates the correction of error stan(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated dard previously applied by the Utah courts
to the agency by statute;
in cases involving agency interpretations of
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; law. This incorporation of the correction
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior of error standard is confirmed by looking
practice, unless the agency justifies at the legislative history of the UAPA.
the inconsistency by giving facts and The Utah Administrative Procedure Act
State Ad
reasons that demonstrate a fair and was patterned after the Model
15
Section 63rational basis for the inconsistency; or mimstrative Procedure Act.
• t-'uiiuncnis ol the Utah Administialive l a w
Advisory Coiinnillce, Utah A.I' A. at IS (Code
»M HAJ- 16

Co l a w P u b l i s h e s . Apnl 25. 1988).
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46b-16(4) is in nearly all respects identical
to the Model Act's section 5-116(c). Therefore, helpful information about the intended scope and application of Utah's Act can
be obtained by resort to the comments and
cases concerning the Model Act and its
application in other states. In reviewing
subsection 6-II6(c)(4) of the Model Act (the
equivalent of subsection 63-46b-16(4)(d) of
Utah's Act), the commentators stated:
Paragraph (c)(4) includes two distinct
matters—interpretation and application
of the law. With regard to the agency's
interpretation to [sic] the law, courts
generally give little deference to the
agency, with the result that a court may
decide that the agency has erroneously
interpreted the law if the court merely
disagrees with the agency's interpretation."

17. Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P. 2d 707, 708
(Utah 1985).
18. Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 796
P.2d 1256. 1258 (Utah 1990); Home v. Home,
737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah Ct.App.1987).

Utah
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or stock of another corporation may jw
deduct any net loss of the acquired corpo.
ration incurred prior to the date of acqu^j.
tion."
[4,51 The terms of a statute should be
interpreted in accord with usually accepted
meanings.17 In construing legislative enactments, the reviewer assumes that each
term in the statute was used advisedly;
thus the statutory words are read literally,
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.18

[€] The plain language of section 59-7108(14X0 is specific in its operation and
intent. The section specifically prohibits
the deduction of <*rtftin types of net loss
carryovers, those WfeiJWdf by an acquired
corporation prior* to Ait Mte of its acquisition. Section 69-7-i0fli(i4)i(O »» also specifThis comment confirms that under the
ic as to who is prohibited from deducting
Model Act and therefore under the UAPA,
preacquisition loss carryovers. The section
an agency's interpretation of the law is to
prohibits all "corporations acquiring the asbe reviewed using a correction of error
sets or stock of another corporation" from
standard. It is clear that the Commission's
taking these deductions. All other corporadecision in this case is to be reviewed for
tions or entities are left outside the prohibicorrectness, giving no deference to the
tions of the statute. Therefore, by the
Commission's interpretation of the law.
plain terms of the statute, the acquired
This approach is mandated whether arrived
corporation is not prohibited from deductat under the terms of the UAPA or under
ing its preacquisition losses merely because
the holdings of our prior case law. We will
its stock has been purchased by another
therefore review the Commission's decision
entity.1* The acquired corporation does not
concerning Savage's petition for redetermifit within the statute's specific prohibitions
nation using a correction-of-error standard.
and should be free to deduct the preacquisition losses from its own income.
II. SECTION 59-7-108(14Hf).
Turning now to the merits of the case,
17) The Commission argues that the filthe basic issue presented is the correct
ing of consolidated returns by petitioner
interpretation of
Utah Code Ann. somehow transforms the deductions by the
§ 59-7-108(14X0, which prohibits an ac- acquired corporations into those of Savage
quiring corporation from using preacquisi- Industries, the acquiring corporation.
tion losses of an acquired corporation. While the filing of a consolidated return
Utah Code Ann. $ 59-7-108(14X0 (1987) does create a single taxing unit which inreads: "Corporations acquiring the assets cludes both the acquiring and the acquired
14. Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 5-116
comment, 15 U.L.A. 127-30 (1981).

SAVAGE INDUSTRIES v. STATE TAX COM'N

19. This situation differs from instances where
the acquired corporation is merged into the
acquiring corporation. There, the surviving
corporation is the "acquiring" corporation, and
it appears that the deduction would be prohibit
ed. See generally Golf Digest/Tennis Inc. *
Dubno, 203 Conn. 455. 525 A.2d 106, 110-H
(1987); Beldcrest Milb, Inc. v. Coble, 290 N.C
586, 227 S.E.2d 562, 574 (1976).

-nrporation, the form of the consolidated
return does not change the deduction from
one of the acquired corporation. The consolidated return is not merely the return of
the acquiring or parent corporation. All
deductions taken on the return should not
therefore be considered to be the deductions of the parent corporation. The Commission's own regulations regarding preparation and filing of a consolidated return
make it clear that the corporations filing
such returns maintain their separate identities although a single tax is calculated for
the group. Tax Commission regulation
R865-6-4F(G) states that the parent corporation acts as the agent for the consolidated group. This provision does not state
that the return is considered that of the
parent; indeed, it mandates that the group
must notify the Commission of its new
agent if the parent is contemplating dissolution and is not qualified to file as part of
the consolidated return. Regulation R8656-4F(H) allows the Commission to pursue
individually the subsidiaries that make up
the group if the tax is filed improperly as
separate returns. Therefore, it is clear
that the return is filed for each member of
the affiliated group and is not just that of
the parent corporation.
The form of the return itself also makes
distinctions between the parent corporation
and its individual subsidiaries. Under
R865~6-4F(JX3), separate schedules for
«ach corporate entity listing income and
deductions must be filed with the consolidated return. It is on these separate
schedule*, that the deductions at issue were
taken by the acquired corporations. The
deductions were only taken in years when
**• The prior net losses of Western Rock were
not deducted until 1985. although they were
incurred in 1983. This was because Western
Rock itself did not generate sufficient income to
offset these net losses until 1985. During the
intervening years, however, Savage Industries
had net income sufficient to offset these losses.
The fact that Savage Industries did not seek to
use these losses illustrates the proper application of this statute to the acquiring corporation.
*I. See Milieu v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P 2d 934,
936 (Utah 1980); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake

the specific acquired corporations had sufficient income to offset the previous losses.20 The deductions taken by KNT and
Savage Western were the separate deductions of these acquired corporations. The
fact that they were taken in years when
the acquired corporations filed consolidated
returns does not make them the deductions
of Savage Industries, the acquiring corporation, and does not make the deductions
violations of section 59-7-108.
(8-10] The Commission argues that the
allowance of deductions for preacquisition
losses by an acquired corporation will violate the legislative intent of section 59-7108. This court's primary responsibility in
construing legislative enactments is to give
effect to the legislature's underlying intent.21 "In determining the legislative intent of a statute, 'the statute should be
considered in the light of the purpose it
was designed to serve and so applied as to
carry out that purpose if it can be done
consistent with its language.'" 22 The
Commission cites no legislative record or
other history to ascertain the intent of the
legislature in drafting section 59-7-108.
Therefore, in attempting to determine legislative intent, we should look first to the
plain meaning of the language at issue in
the statute." The words of the statute
indicate an intent to prevent buying of loss
corporations by high profit corporations
solely for the use of the loss corporation's
previous loss carryover deductions. A further intent may be to limit the use of loss
carryover deductions to those corporations
which have previously suffered the losses
and therefore are entitled to average their
low income years with their high income
County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977); Utah
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guar. Ass'n,
564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977).
22. Utah Power A Light v. Municipal Power Sys.,
784 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah 1989) (quoting Johnson
v. State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d
831, 832 (1966))
23. Chris <£ Dick's iMtnber v. Tax Comm'n, 791
P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 1990), Alltsen v. American
Ugton Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah
1988).
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Evaluation of the current case shows
that the allowance of preacquisition losses
by the acquired corporation does not violate this intent. Allowance of the deduction does not encourage high profit corporations to buy loss companies merely for
the purpose of deducting loss carryovers,
as the high profit company is required to
turn around the loss corporation until it
generates profit before any carryover*
may be deducted. This type of turnaround
of loss corporations is not the type of loss
"manipulation" the legislature intended t»
prohibit by the statute. The secondary inr
tent of the statute is also furthered by
allowing acquired corporations to deduct
loss carryovers. The subsidiary or entity
which incurred the loss is the one that later
is able to benefit from the carryover in
averaging its income between high and low
income years. No deduction may be taken
by the acquired corporation or any affiliated group of which it is a member until
that acquired corporation generates
enough income to offset the loss carryover.
[11] The Commission also urges that
the deduction sought by Savage Industries
should not be allowed because it will encourage corporations to manipulate assets
between parent and subsidiaries to wrongfully take advantage of the net loss carryovers by the transfer of profitable operations to the companies with prior net losses. The simple response to this argument
is that the statute must be enforced as it is
written, and as written, it does not prevent
that type of manipulation. Further, there
is no evidence of misuse of assets or of the
feared manipulation in this case. Savage
Industries was formed to consolidate and
manage existing corporations owned by the
Savage brothers. The organization and
corporate ownership of these corporations
remained the same both before and after
the formation of Savage Industries and the
stock purchases by which KNT and Savage
Western became Savage Industries subsidiaries. The entire thrust of these transac24. Set FuUcrtsl, 227 S H 2d at 5*5 (discusuon
of the purpott btftUod allowani* of low carry
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tions appears to have been for organization
and management purposes and not for tax
manipulation.
Even the Commission's interpretation of
the statute would not prevent manipulation
of corporate assets for the purpose of accruing tax deductions based on preacquisition losses. A mere reversal of parent and
subsidiary positions by corporations would
allow the "parent" loss corporation to take
advantage of its losses incurred prior to
the purchase of the profitable "subsidiary."
This type of manipulation, as well as that
feared by the Commission under our interpretation of the statute, is not addressed in
section 59-7-lQg atyd is kptter dealt with
through other m a j ^ s ^ h j a j careful Commission a u d i ^ l J ^ p M t ^ n p ^ B y transfers. The i n ^ g S m ^ ^ statute to
ajjpw acquire^ J'jfJtffPrM^j^ deduct the
prior net losses <tys* ^ p ^ y e n t alternate
means for discoyeruur improper manipulation of assets.
We therefore hold that the statute as
written doe* not prohibit an acq Hired corporation from taking advantage of its loss
carryovers incurred prior to the date of
acquisition in order to offset its pwn as
opposed to the acquiring corporation's income. The deduction may be taken by the
acquired corporation, whether filing separately or filing a consolidated return as
part of an affiliated group. The decision of
the Commission denying Savage's petition
is reversed, and the case is hereby remanded to the Commission for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HOWE, Associate CJ., and STEWART,
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.
f0 iMyNVMMRmilM>
^ 1 —<v*-*t*v-Ar

overs as deductions from corporate franchise
tax)

OLYMPIC STEAMSHIP COMPANY,
INC., Petitioner,
v.
CENTENNIAL INSURANCE COMPANY
and Atlantic Mutual Insurance
Company, Respondents,
and
New York Marine and General Insurance Company and Marsh and
McLennan, Inc., Defendants.
No. 57167-8.
Supreme Court of Washington,
En Banc.
May 23, 1991.
As Changed May 29, 1991.
After insured warehouseman paid
claims of salmon packers for cost of inspecting cans of salmon which they recalled after it was determined that some
had been damaged by the warehouseman,
it sought reimbursement from its general
comprehensive liability insurer. The Superior Court, King County, John M Darrah,
J., granted relief and insurer appealed.
The Court of Appeals, 57 Wash.App. 517,
789 P.2d 309, reversed. The Supreme
Court, Dore, C.J., held that: (1) Bistership
clause does not apply when product is withdrawn by third party; (2) cans of salmon
were not the insured's product for purposes of the sistership clause; and (3) insured was entitled to recover attorney fees.
Affirmed.
1. Judgntent 4=181(2, 3)
Summary judgment motion can be
granted only when there is no genuine isBue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I. Insurance <t=M3S.24(2), 513
Exclusion from comprehensive general
liability policy for damages claimed for the
withdrawal, inspection, or loss of use of the
named insured's products form if they are
withdrawn from the market or from use
because of any known or suspected defect

or deficiency therein is a "sistership
clause."
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Insurance «=513*
Intent of sistership exclusion from liability policy is to exclude the cost of preventing defects of failures in the insurance
goods or property.
4. Insurance «=»513
Under sistership clause, general liability insurer is not liable for costs of preventative or curative action taken by its insured.
5. Insurance *=>435.24(2)
Sistership clause in comprehensive
general liability policy issued to warehouseman did not exclude coverage for warehouseman's liability following salmon packers' withdrawal from the market of cans of
salmon because it was determined that machinery used by the warehousemen U> place
label on the cans had caused damage to a
small percentage of then), as it was not the
insured warehouseman which withdrew the
product from the market.
6. Insurance <*=>435.24(2)
For purposes of sistership exclusion
from general liability policy, the term "insured's product" refers to goods or products in which the insured trades or deals,
including goods created or manufactured
by the insured.
7. Insurance «=435.24(2)
Cans of salmon which packers sent to
insured warehouseman for labeling, casing,
and shipping, were not the "insured's product" for purposes of sistership exclusion,
so that insured was entitled to coverage for
its liability to the packers after they withdrew the cans of salmon from the market
because some had been damaged during
labeling.
8. Insurance e»435.24(2)
Term "handle" as used in sistership
exclusion from general comprehensive liability policy means to buy, sell, distribute,
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the district court first granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Bank on the
claim for punitive damages. The district
court later dismissed the plaintiffs petition
for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, basing its decision
on K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-218(a), the compulsory counterclaim statute, and the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Everett Loving timely appeals.
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of answer, if they arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject of
the plaintiffs claim, is mandatory. Failure to assert results in an estoppel or
bar.

"... The test, so far as the mandatory
requirement is concerned, depends on
whether the counterclaim or setoff arises
out of the same transaction." 1 Card's
[1] The first issue is whether the disKansas C.Civ.Proc. ft 60-218(a), pp. 77trict court erred in relying upon K.S.A.1987
78 (1979).
Supp. 60-218(a) in dismissing the tort
[2] It is well established in Kansas that
claims. The statute reads:
the failure to assert a compulsory counter"(a) Compulsory counterclaims.
A claim prevents a party from bringing a
pleading shall state as a counterclaim later independent action on that claim. It
any claim which at the time of serving is clear that the claims asserted in the
the pleading the pleader has against any present action should have been asserted in
opposing party, if it arises out of the the earlier foreclosure action. In that actransaction or occurrence that is the tion Everett E. Loving testified at length
subject matter of the opposing party's as to his negotiations with Regalado and
claim and does not require for its adjudi- the Bank. In fact, in his testimony he
cation the presence of third parties of raised the issue of the $20,000 and asserted
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdic- they were entitled to a credit or setoff of
tion
" (Emphasis added.)
that amount in the foreclosure action.
While the statute itself does not explicitly That contention was determined adversely
provide that failure to plead a compulsory to the Lovings by the court. The same
counterclaim precludes the pleader from $20,000 was also the subject matter of the
asserting it in a subsequent action, this federal court action. The issue of the right
court has consistently applied the statute in to the $20,000 paid by Regalado to the
that fashion. See Mohr v. State Bank of F LB. has been litigated on at least two
Stanley, 241 Kan. 42, 51, 734 P.2d 1071 prior occasions.
(1987); Haysville State Bank v. Hauser[3] Appellant makes several arguments
man, 226 Kan. 671, 673, 694 P.2d 172 in support of his position that his claims in
(1979); Stock v. Nordhus, 216 Kan. 779, this action are different from those in the
781, 533 P.2d 1324 (1975) (citing 6 Wright & foreclosure action and are not compulsory
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: counterclaims under K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60Civil} 1417 [1971]). K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60- 213(a). However, his principal argument
213(a) is virtually identical to Federal Rule seems to be that because the mortgage
of Civil Procedure 13(a). The Advisory foreclosure action was an equitable action,
Committee's Note to Rule 13 explicitly the present claims, which sound in tort,
states:
could not be the subject of a compulsory
"If the action proceeds to judgment with- counterclaim. The argument has no merit
out the interposition of a counterclaim as Numerous foreclosure actions have implicrequired by subdivision (a) of this rule, itly recognized that legal counterclaims
the counterclaim is barred."
sounding in tort may be asserted by a
6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and defendant in an equitable action to foreProcedure: Civil § 1417, p. 95 n. 32.
close a mortgage. E.g., Bank of WhitewaJudge Gard explains the Kansas rule as ter v. Decker Investments, Inc., 238 Kan.
308, 314, 710 P.2d 1258 (1985), and cases
follows:
"By the new rule, which is now the cited therein.
same as in the federal courts, the asser[4] As stated by Gard, the essential test
tion of counterclaims and setoffs by way of a mandatory counterclaim depends upon

whether the counterclaim or setoff arises
out of the same transaction. The mortgage foreclosure action arose from the loan
transaction between the Lovings and the
F.L.B., and the subsequent default on the
payments due on the loan. In fact, the
$20,000 asserted in the appellant's conversion claim is the identical $20,000 which
was a part of the litigation between these
same parties in the earlier foreclosure action. It is difficult to imagine a claim that
could more clearly or directly arise out of
the same transaction than a dispute in an
action on a note over the proper crediting
of alleged payments on the note.
Although appellant asserts other arguments in support of his contention that
K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-213(a) does not apply,
we find them to be equally without merit.
We hold that the claims attempted to be
asserted herein were compulsory counterclaims which should have been asserted in
the earlier foreclosure action and are now
barred by K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-213(a). In
view of the decision reached on the first
issue, it is not necessary to address other
issues raised on appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.

244 Kan. 126
W.W. TAYLOR, Mrs. W.W. Taylor or A.
Genevieve Taylor, Michael C. Taylor,
John S. Taylor, David J. Taylor, and
Mark B. Taylor, A Partnership known
as Taylor Family Real Estate Trust,
Appellants,
v.
PERDITION MINERALS GROUP, LTD.,
Henry N. Mulvihlll, Marvin Echols,
Jack Griggs, Charles Harris, Leo Meeker, and Robert E. Fondren, Appellees.
No. 61573.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
Dec. 14, 1988.
Buyers of corporation's securities
brought action against corporation's di-

rectors, among others, to rescind purchase
and recover purchase price based upon violations of registration and misrepresentations under Kansas Securities Act The
Sedgwick District Court, Nicholas W.
Klein, J., entered summary judgment in
favor of directors, and buyers appealed.
The Supreme Court, Six, J., held that strict
liability would be imposed on directors, regardless of whether they materially aided
in sale, unless they proved that they could
not reasonably have had knowledge of
facts by reason of which liability was alleged to exist
Reversed and remanded.

1. Securities Regulation *»256
Pursuant to Kansas Securities Act
strict liability is imposed on partners, officers, and directors to buyers of unregistered securities sold in violation of statute,
regardless of whether partner, officer, or
director materially aided in sale, unless he
or she proves that he or she could not
reasonably have had knowledge of facta by
reason of which liability is alleged to exist
K.S.A. 17-1268(b).
2. Securities Regulation *=»246
"Blue Sky" provisions are to be liberally interpreted in favor of buyers of securities to prevent fraud.
Syllabus by the Court
1. K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) is
substantially similar to § 410(b) of the Uniform Securities Act, 7B U.L.A. 648 (1958).
Strict liability is imposed on partners, officers, and directors to purchasers of unregistered securities sold in violation of the
statute regardless of whether the partner,
officer, or director materially aided in the
sale unless he or she proves that he or she
could not reasonably have had knowledge
of the facts by reason of which liability is
alleged to exist
2. The changes in punctuation and
phrasing effected by the legislature in
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transforming $ 410(b) of the Uniform Securities Act, 7B U.L.A. 648 (1968), into K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) do not insulate directors from strict liability when unregistered securities are sold unless the director
proves the statutory defense.
8. K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) does
not require that a director materially aid in
the illegal sale of securities in order to be
held jointly and severally liable for the sale.
4. The K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b)
critical phrase, "of such a seller who materially aids in the sale," which follows the
word "employee," was intended to modify
only "employee" and was not intended to
reach back further into the language of the
statute and also modify "every partner,
officer, or director."
Donald W. Bostwick, of Adams, Jones,
Robinson & Malone, Chartered, Wichita,
argued the cause, and Cynthia S. Dunne, ot
the same firm, was with him on the brief
for appellants.
H.E. Jones, of Hershberger, Patterson,
Jones & Roth, Wichita, argued the cause,
and Kelly J. Rundell, of the same firm, was
on the brief for appellee Harris.
Tom R. Smith, of Smith & Miles, Chartered, Liberal, argued the cause and was
on the brief for appellees Meeker and
Echols.
SIX, Justice:
This first impression statutory construction case involves the interpretation of K.S.
A. 1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) of the Kansas Securities Act. Must a director have materially aided in the sale of unregistered securities to be liable for their illegal sale?
The plaintiffs, W.W. Taylor, Mrs. W.W.
Taylor or A. Genevieve Taylor, Michael C.
Taylor, John S. Taylor, David J. Taylor, and
Mark B. Taylor, a partnership known as
Taylor Family Real Estate Trust, (Taylors)
appeal from a summary judgment in favor
of the director defendants Charles Harris,
Leo L. Meeker, Marvin Echols, and Jack
Griggs.
The trial court round that, under K 8 A
1907 Supp n-ll6«b>. a director oi a cor-

poration is not liable for the illegal sale of
the corporation's securities unless the
plaintiff can show that the director materially aided in the sale. The trial court ruled
that the four director defendants did not
materially aid in the securities sale to the
Taylors.
We disagree with the trial court's analysis.
The parties by agreement have characterized Harris as a representative director
defendant Rulings as to Harris apply
equally to the other director defendants,
Meeker, Echols, and Griggs.
The questions to be decided are:
(1) Does K.S.A.1987 ^ ^ 7 - 1 2 6 8 0 ) ) require that directors must Materially aid in
the sale of a corporation's securities to be
held liable for the sale?
(2) Did the director defendants materially aid in the securities sale to the plaintiffs?
(8) Did the director defendants show that
they did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, ot
the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability is alleged to exist?
We hold that K.S.A.1987 Supp. 171268(b) is substantially similar to § 410(b)
of the Uniform Securities Act, 7B U.L.A.
643 (1968). Strict liability is imposed on
partners, officers, and directors to purchasers of unregistered securities sold in violation of the statute regardless of whether
the partner, officer, or director materially
aided in the sale unless he or she proves
that he or she could not reasonably have
had knowledge of the facts by reason of
which liability is alleged to exist.
1. The Facts of the Investment
In early November of 1981, W.W. Taylor
discussed an oil and gas exploration investment, Perdition Minerals Group, Ltd., (Perdition) with his neighbor, Donald Schrag.
Taylor became interested and the two men
placed a call to Bob Fondren, a securities
broker, who had previously supplied
Schrag with information on the corpora
tfcm. Taylor spoke with Fondren who told
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him: (1) The stock was worth $1.84 a share
and would be worth more soon; (2) the
company had a lot of oil and gas in Montana; (8) the company was going to do an
audit, and (4) the company was preparing
to go public. Schrag indicated to Taylor
that he was going to buy $200,000 worth of
stock at $.50 a share.
Soon after Taylor's discussions with
Schrag and Fondren, Schrag arranged a
meeting between Taylor and Henry Mulvihill, who was Perdition's chief executive
officer. Taylor was supplied with a financial statement and Mulvihill's personal resume. Mulvihill also described the production and value of the acreage held by Perdition in Montana. Taylor did not ask to see
any drilling reports or geographical information. Mulvihill told Taylor that several
hundred thousand dollars was needed to
meet current drilling and lease expenses.
Mulvihill gave Taylor a list of references,
several of whom Taylor knew, including
defendant Charles Harris. Taylor did not
contact any of the references. Taylor told
Mulvihill that he would purchase 400,000
shares of Perdition for $200,000; $100,000
on behalf of himself and his wife, and
$100,000 on behalf of his children.
Taylor attended a Perdition shareholders'
meeting on November 20, 1981. He met
privately with Mulvihill prior to the meeting. At this private meeting, Mulvihill reassured Taylor that the stock was worth
more than $1.84 a share and that he was
going to do an audit There is no evidence
in the record indicating that any directors
or shareholders of Perdition, other than
Mulvihill, Schrag, and Fondren, made any
representations to Taylor or were in any
way involved with the sale of stock to him.
At the November 20, 1981, shareholders'
meeting, Mulvihill introduced Taylor as a
potential Perdition investor. No one inquired as to the circumstances surrounding
the issuance of the stock. Defendant Harris was present at the meeting and moved
to hire Elmer Fox to audit the company.
Harris said that he made the motion based
on a recommendation by Mulvihill. Taylor
testified at his deposition that prior to the
shareholders' meeting, Mulvihill had never
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given any indication that Harris was Perdition's attorney.
Mulvihill, for tax purposes, had incorporated Perdition in Nevada. Mulvihill and
Harris were close friends. In November of
1981, Harris agreed to purchase 2,500
shares of Perdition. Harris is a Wichita
attorney. He testified at his deposition
that the only legal work he had done on
behalf of Perdition was to draw up an
employment agreement between Perdition
and Milan Ayers. Ayers managed the
Montana properties. Mulvihill retained a
Denver law firm which specializes in securities and oil and gas law to handle the
corporation's other legal matters.
At the time Harris bought his shares,
Mulvihill was the sole director and the parent of Perdition. In January 1981, a shareholders' meeting was held at which defendants Marvin Echols, Jack Griggs, Charles
Harris, Leo Meeker, and Henry Mulvihill
were elected directors. With the exception
of Jack Griggs, all the director defendants
invested money in Perdition and lost their
investment when Perdition became insolvent. The shareholders voted to increase
the authorized common stock from 500,000
shares to 4,000,000 shares and to split the
outstanding 500,000 shares four for one,
into 2,000,000 shares.
Early in 1982, when no audit was forthcoming, Taylor became concerned about his
investment. Mulvihill assured Taylor that
the audit was being done. Taylor then
spoke to a friend who did business with the
Elmer Fox accounting firm and asked him
to check into Perdition. His friend told
him: (1) Fox had no business relationship
with Perdition, (2) the SEC had been investigating the Montana properties, and (3)
Perdition's current financial statements did
not reflect Taylor's $200,000 investment.
The 400,000 shares of stock of Perdition
purchased by the Taylors were never registered in accordance with K.S.A. 17-1256,
-1257, or -1258. The sale of these 400,000
shares of stock of Perdition was not the
sale of an exempt security under K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 17-1261, nor was it an exempt
transaction under K.S.A.1987 Supp. 171262.
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The Taylors filed the instant lawsuit
against Perdition, Mulvihill, Fondren, and
the director defendant* to rescind the purchase and recover the purchase price based
upon violations of registration and misrepresentations under the Kansas Securities
Act The petition alleged that the Perdition stock was not registered pursuant to
Kansas law and that Mulvihill and Fondren
made misleading and false statements upon
which Taylor relied in purchasing the
stock.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the director defendants
Harris, Echols, Meeker, and Griggs, finding that, under K.S.A.1987 Supp. 171268(b), an innocent director must be
shown to have materially aided in the sale
of securities to be liable. The trial court
further found that the facts of the case did
not establish that the four directors materially aided in the sale to Taylor.
The Statute, K.S.A.1987
Supp. 17-1968
K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(a) establishes
the liability of any person who sells a security which is required to be registered
under K.S.A. 17-1265 but is not registered,
or any person who sells a security by
means of untrue statements of material
facts. Such a person may be liable to the
person buying the security for the consideration paid for the security plus interest,
costs, and attorney fees.

of the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability is alleged to exist
There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so liable." (Emphasis added.)
The Taylors contend that the Kansas
statute is a "substantially verbatim" enactment of $ 410(b) of the 1956 Uniform Securities Act as amended in 1958. A comparison of the two reveals minor differences in
punctuation and phrasing. These differences, the director defendants assert, give
the statute a different meaning from the
corresponding section of the Uniform Securities Act Section 410(b) of the Uniform
Act provides:
"Every person who directly or indirectly
controls a seller liable under subsection
(a), every partner, officer, or director of
such a seller, every person occupying a
similar status or performing similar
functions, every employee of such a
seller who materially aids in the sale,
and every broker-dealer or agent who
materially aids in the sale are also liable
jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as the seller, unless the nonseller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
exercise of reasonable care could not
have known, of the existence of the facts
by reason of which the liability is alleged
to exist There is contribution as in
cases of contract among the several persons so liable." (Emphasis added.)

The alleged liability of the director defendants is based on K.S.A.1987 Supp. 171268(b), which provides:
"Every person who directly or indirectly
controls a seller liable under subsection
(a), every partner, officer, or director
(or person occupying a similar status
or performing similar functions) or
employee of such a seller who materially aids in the sale, and every brokerdealer or agent who materially aids in
the sale is also liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as the seller,
unless the nonseller who is BO liable sustains the burden of proof that such nonseller did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known,

K.S.A.1987 Supp. 77-201 establishes
rules for statutory construction and requires that words and phrases be construed
according to the context and approved usage of the language.
The director defendants, in comparing
K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) and ft 410(b)
of the Uniform Act, reason as follows: The
legislature by (1) removing the modifying
phrase "of such a seller" after the word
director; (2) placing the phrase "or person
occupying a similar status or performing
similar functions" in parenthesis, (3) and
adding an "or" before the word employee
intended the phrase "of such a seller who
materially aids in the sale" to modify the
entire clause "every partner, officer, or
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director (or person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions) or employee." We do not agree.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State LAWS approved the
Uniform Securities Act in 1956. In 1957,
Kansas, using the Uniform Act as a model,
enacted the Kansas Securities Act Lovitch, Securities Registration Under the
Kansas Securities Act, 22 Kan.L.Rev. 565,
666 (1974).
The changes in punctuation and phrasing
effected by the legislature in transforming
I 410(b) of the Uniform Act into K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) do not insulate directors from strict liability when unregistered securities are sold.
The states that have passed $ 410(b) of
the Uniform Securities Act have consistent
ly interpreted the statute to impose strict
liability on partners, officers, and directors
unless the statutory defense of lack of
knowledge is proven. See, e.g., Moerman
v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F.Supp. 439, 450 (E.D.N.
Y.1969), affd 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.1969);
Mitchell v. Beard, 256 Ark. 926, 928, 513
S.W.2d 905 (1974); Arnold v. Dirrim, 898
N.E.2d 426, 433-34 (lnd.App.1979); Rzepka
v. Farm Estates Inc., 83 Mich.App. 702,
709, 269 N.W.2d 270 (1978).
We question the trial court's reliance on
Lanza v. Drexel A Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d
Cir.1973). Lanza arose under federal, not
state, securities laws. The plaintiffs in
Lanza sought compensatory and punitive
damages against former officers and directors of a corporation based on violations
of federal securities acts and common-law
fraud. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was construing Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 17
C.F.R. $ 240.10b-6 (1988); and $ 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. $ 78Kb) (1982). The court in Lanza
discussed state "blue sky laws" in a footnote.
"State blue sky laws universally exempt
directors from liability for fraud perpetrated by corporate officers unless the
directors are in some meaningful sense
culpable participants in the fraud." 479
F.2d at 1308 n. 105.

The Lanza court identified two types of
state laws. The first are those modeled
after $ 410(b) of the Uniform Act and the
second are those in which a director is
exempt from liability unless he or she participates in the sale. The Lanza court in
footnote 105 refers to fraud; nevertheless,
the court correctly characterized the Kansas statute as belonging to the first category.
[1,2] K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) does
not require that a director materially aid in
the illegal sale of securities in order to be
held jointly and severally liable for the sale.
Our analysis of legislative intent commences with the observation that "Blue
Sky" provisions are to be liberally interpreted in favor of purchasers to prevent
fraud. Daniels v. Craiglow, 131 Kan. 500,
292 Pac. 771 (1930).
Kansas has required registration of securities since 1911. L.1911, ch. 133.
The first securities statute with teeth
was passed in Kansas. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 8 (2d ed.
1988). According to Professor Ix>uis Loss,
Kansas had been a "stronghold" of populist philosophy. The resulting carryover
today is to be found in the relative strictness of Midwestern securities statutes.
"Indeed, it was in Kansas, apparently, that
the term 'blue sky law' first came into
general use to describe legislation aimed at
promoters who 'would sell building lots in
the blue sky in fee simple.' " I/>BS, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 8.
The drafters comment to $ 410(b) of the
Uniform Securities Act observes, "This section is now in the Kansas act substantially
verbatim, and Virginia has adopted it with
modifications." Loss and Cowett, Blue
Sky Law 393 (1958).
We have in past cases identified rules to
assist in statutory construction:
(1) "The fundamental rule of statutory
construction is that the purpose and intent
of the legislature governs when the intent
can be ascertained from the statute. In
construing statutes, the legislative intention is to be determined from a general
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consideration of the entire act. Effect
must be given, if possible, to the entire act
and every part thereof. To this end, it is
the duty of the court, as far as practicable,
to reconcile the different provisions so as
to make them consistent, harmonious, and
sensible." State v. Adee, 241 Kan. 825,
829, 740 P.2d 611 (1987).

sion of clause immediately preceding it.
The rule is another aid to discovery of
intent or meaning and is not inflexible
and uniformly binding. Where the sense
of the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding or even succeeding sections, the
word or phrase will not be restricted to
its immediate antecedent
"Evidence that a qualifying phrase is
supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it
is separated from the antecedents by a
comma."

(2) "Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and it is the function of the
court to interpret a statute to give it the
effect intended by the legislature. State,
ex rei, v. Unified School District, 218
Kan. 47, 49, 542 P.2d 664 (1975). It is a
fundamental rule of statutory construction
to which all other rules are subordinate
that the intent of the legislature governs No comma was inserted in K.S.A.1987
when that intent can be ascertained. State Supp. 17-1268(b) teptAting the critical
v. Sexton, 282 Kan. 589, 657 P.2d 48 qualifying phrase, "whd Materially aids in
(1988)." Director of Taxation v. Kansas the sale" from the antecedents partner,
Krude Oil Reclaiming Co., 286 Kan. 450, officer, or director or employee.
455, 691 P.2d 1808 (1984).
The Kansas version of the Uniform Act
What did the legislature intend the was adopted in 1957. L.1957, ch. 145. The
phrase, "of such a seller who materially K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) equivalent
aids in the sale" following the word "em- section of the prior law, G.S.1949, 17-1240,
ployee" to modify? Was the phrase intend- was found in the securities section of the
ed to modify only an "employee" of such corporation code. G.S.1949, 17-1240 proseller, or was it intended to reach back vided, in part
further into the language of the statute
"Every sale or contract for sale made in
and also modify "every partner, officer, or
violation of any of the provisions of this
director"? We are persuaded the critical
act shall be voidable at the election of the
phrase modifies only "employee" of such
purchasers; and the person making such
seller.
sale or contract for sale and every director, officer or agent of or for such
If the legislature had intended to make
seller who shall have participated or
directors liable only in the event they had
aided in any way in making such sale
materially aided in the sale, the Kansas
shall be jointly and severally liable to
language could easily have read, "every
such purchaser in an action at law in any
partner, officer, or director of such a seller
who materially aids in the sale.'* (Emcourt of competent jurisdiction
"
phasis added.)
(Emphasis added.)
In our K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) Prior to the adoption of K.S.A.1987 Supp.
search for legislative intent we note 2A 17-1268(b), a director of a seller was liable
Sutherland Statutory Construction ft 47.38 only if he or she "participated or aided in
(4th ed. rev. 1984):
any way in making such sale."
"Referential and qualifying words and
Section 410(b) of the Uniform Act altered
phrases, where no contrary intention ap- a director's liability status. Strict director
pears, refer solely to the last antecedent liability was imposed by ft 410(b) unless the
The last antecedent is 'the last word, statutory defense of lack of knowledge was
phrase, or clause that can be made an proven. If the Kansas Legislature in 1957
antecedent without impairing the mean- had intended to continue to provide the
ing of the sentence.' Thus a proviso "materially aids in the sale" shield to Kanusually is construed to apply to the provi- sas directors it could easily have used the
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G.S.1949, 17-1240 concept that had been in judgment ruling which is the basis of this
appeal.
place since 1929. L.1929, ch. 140.
We remand the case for trial. The Taylors have established a prima facie case.
8. Did the Director Defendants MateriThe statutory defense issue will be deterally Aid in the Sale to the Plaintiffs*
mined by the trier of fact.
Our resolution of the K.S.A.1987 Supp.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
17-1268(b) statutory construction question
disposes of the Taylors' second issue.
MY NtfNM I SttUM >

The trial court found that facts constituting material aid by the director defendants
were not present in the sale to the plaintiffs and granted the defendants summary
judgment on this issue.

244 Kan. 136

Our construction of K.S.A.1987 Supp. 171268(b) reverses the trial court's ruling on
summary judgment and removes the necessity for an analysis of this issue.

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

We need not determine what constitutes
"materia) aid" under K.S.A.1987 Supp. 171268(b).

No. 61678.

4. The K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-126S(b)
Statutory Defense
We have held that K.S.A.1987 Supp. 171268(b) imposes strict liability on directors
as nonselling parties unless the statutory
defense of lack of knowledge is proven.
The statute provides a defense to liability
where the nonseller can show that he or
she "did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of
the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability is alleged to exist"—the
lack of knowledge defense.
As their third issue, the Taylors contend
that this defense is not available to the
director defendants because they have not
met the burden of proof required under
this provision. We need not address this
issue.
In its journal entry granting the director
defendants summary judgment, the trial
court specifically found that there are contested issues relating to the statutory defense, but that these issues were immaterial since the Taylors had not established a
prima facie case. The K.S.A.1987 Supp.
17-1268(b) statutory defense issue was not
determined by the trial court's summary

v.
Gary WADE, Appellant
Supreme Court of Kansas.
Jan. 3, 1989.
Defendant was convicted in the Shawnee District Court, Thomas W. Regan, J.,
of aggravated criminal sodomy, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Six, J., held
that: (1) failure of information to allege
that child victim was not married to offend
er was not fundamental defect rendering
defendant's aggravated criminal sodomy
conviction void by depriving trial court of
jurisdiction; (2) it is legal impossibility for
five-year-old to be married; and (3) lay
testimony of child protection case worker
who investigated alleged sexual abuse was
properly admitted on redirect examination
to describe what case worker looked for
when required to make sexual abuse case
determination judgment call, behavior of
children who told her they had been sexually abused, and conclusion that behavior
was consistent with behavior observed in
child who was alleged victim.
Affirmed.
1. Sodomy «=»1

That child victim is not married to offender is one of the essential elements of
crime of aggravated criminal sodomy,

450

Utah

626 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

826, 827 (1932), "(T]he use by individual
persons in common with the public generally is regarded as permissive, and by such
common use no individual person can acquire a right by prescription as against the
owner of the fee." See also Bertolina v.
Frates, 89 Utah 238, 57 P.2d 346 (1936).
[6] The record in the instant case shows
that the use of the roadway by the individual plaintiffs was not distinguishable from
similar use by the public generally, but it
was relevant to prove that the road was a
public roadway. The determination that
the road had become a public thoroughfare
precluded a ruling in plaintiffs' favor on the
issue of the establishment of a prescriptive
easement
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed as to the establishment of a public
thoroughfare but reversed as to the acquisition by the plaintiffs of prescriptive rights
therein. Costs to respondents.
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HALL and
STEWART, J J., concur.
CROCKETT, J , heard the arguments,
but retired before the opinion was filed.
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WELLS FARGO ARMORED SERVICE
CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, Milly O. Bernard, Chairman,
David R. Irvine and Kenneth Rigtrup,
Commissioners of the Public Service
Commission of Utah, and Brinks, Inc.,
Defendants.
No. 16862.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 11, 1981.
Review was sought from order of the
Public Service Commission granting an ar-

mored car company an exemption from regulation by Commission
The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that restriction in
statute governing exemptions for certain
motor vehicles from regulation by Commission limiting exemption of certain vehicles
to those operating within a 15-mile radius
of limits of any city or town did not apply
to armored cars.
Affirmed.
Hall, J., dissented and filed opinion.

1. Statutes *B»219<1)

While it is always ultimate responsibility of Supreme Court to interpret terms of a
statute to effectuate legislative intent,
some deference is due interpretation of a
statute placed on it by administrative agency which has responsibility for administering that statute.
2. Automobiles e=>78
Restriction in statute governing exemptions of certain motor vehicles from
regulation by Public Service Commission
limiting exemption of certain vehicles to
those operating within a 15-mile radius of
limits of any city or town did not apply to
armored cars. U.C.A.1958, 54~e~12(f).

Mark K. Boyle, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Arthur A.
Allen, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Calvin L. Rampton, Salt Lake City, for Brinks.
James S. Lowrie, Gregg I. Alvord, Salt
Lake City, for defendants.
STEWART, Justice:
This is a review of the Public Service
Commission's order granting Brink's, Inc.,
an exemption from regulation by the Commission. The exemption is claimed pursuant to § 54^-12(f), Utah Code Ann. (1958),
as amended, which provides that the requirements of Chapter 6, Title 54, U.C.A.
1953, do not apply:
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To motor vehicles when especially congtructed for towing, wrecking, maintenance, or repair purposes, and not otherwise used in transporting goods and merchandise for compensation; or when constructed as armored cars and used for the
safe conveyance or delivery of money or
other valuables, or when used as hearses,
ambulances, or licensed taxicabs, operating within a fifteen mile radius of the
limits of any city or town; or to motor
vehicles used as ambulances or hearses by
any person, firm or corporation duly licensed in the state as an embalmer, funeral director, or as a mortuary establishment, provided that use of such motor
vehicles as an ambulance shall be incidental to the use of embalming or funeral
directing.
Brinks, an armored car company, argues
that the subsection is unclear as to the
types of motor vehicles included within the
fifteen mile restriction, but proposes that
rules of statutory and grammatical construction limit the fifteen mile provision to
hearses, ambulances and taxicabs. Plaintiff Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation, which filed with the Commission a
motion to disssiss the application for exemption* argues that the statute is clear
and t^at the restriction applies to armored
cars s * flfell.,, It) -is noteworthy, however,
that W M V t e j had, in an earlier appearance MEM t i t Admission, contended that
the f t * * * * * , unclear.
The Commission in this case reached the
conclusion that the meaning of subsection
(0 was ambiguous. To resolve the ambiguity, the Commission applied the "last antecedent" rule and determined that the fifteen mile restriction applied only to hearses,
ambulances, and taxicabs. Accordingly,
Brinks was granted a statewide exemption.
[1] We certainly do not dispute the
Commission's conclusion that subsection (f)
is ambiguous. The use of the comma directly following the word "valuables" results in a less than clear meaning as to the
restriction under review. Of course it is
always the ultimate responsibility of this
Court to interpret the terms of a statute to

effectuate legislative intent Nevertheless,
some deference is due interpretation of a
statute placed on it by the administrative
agency which has the responsibility for administering that statute. In Colman v.
Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 19,
403 P.2d 781, 784 (1965), this Court stated:
[B]ecause of its experience and presumed
expert knowledge in its field, an administrative interpretation and application of a
statute, although not necessarily controlling, is generally regarded as prima facie
correct and not to be overturned so long
as it is in conformity with the general
objectives the agency is charged with
carrying out, and there is a rational basis
for it in the provisions of law. [Footnote
omitted ]
See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 90 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217 (1973);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S.
867, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969).
This is not to say that this Court will
automatically approve administrative constructions, Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines,
Inc. v. Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 117, 839 P.2d
1011, 1018 (1959). The Court stated in
McPhie v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 567
P.2d 158, 155 (1977):
The time honored rule of law is that
the construction of statutes by governmental agencies charged with their administration should be given considerable
weight—however, if it is made clearly to
appear that a statute has been misconstrued or misapplied it is the duty of the
court to correct the same. [Footnote
omitted.]

*
[2] The words of the statutory provision
and the statutory policy embodied therein
assist in ascertaining that meaning. Resort
to principles of statutory construction provide some guidance in the endeavor. In
reaching its conclusion, the Commission relied on the "last antecedent" rule of statutory construction. The rule provides in
general terms that when there is a modifier
following a series of nouns, the modifier
will apply only to the immediately prior
antecedent, which in this case has the effect
of excluding armored vehicles from regulation. In addition, the Commission concluded that armored cars were not subject to
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regulation because: (1) the operation of an
armored car service is of a fundamentally
different character than that of hearses,
ambulances or taxicabs; (2) the potential
customers of armored car services are in a
strong bargaining position vis-a-vis those
services; and (8) the fifteen mile radius
limitation makes more sense in the case of
hearses, ambulances and taxicabs, as those
carriers are frequently the subject of regulation by local jurisdictions. The result
reached by the Commission is not erroneous.
The order of the Public Service Commission is affirmed.
No costs awarded.
CROCKETT, J.,* and R. L. TUCKETT,
Retired Justice, concur.
MAUGHAN, C. J , does not participate
herein; R. L. TUCKETT, Retired Justice,
sat
WILKINS, J , heard the arguments but
resigned before the opinion was filed.
HALL, Justice: (dissenting).
The statute in question * exempts from
regulation
. . . motor vehicles when specially constructed . . .; or when constructed as armored cars and used for the safe conveyance or delivery of money or other valuables, or when used as hearses, ambulances, or licensed taxicabs, operating within
a fifteen mile radius of any city or town;
I am of the opinion that application of
the so-called "last antecedent" rule to the
foregoing statutory phrase serves to subvert rather than to clarify the Legislature's
intent in its enactment.1

1. U.C.A.I953, 54 & 12(f)
2. The rule has apparently never been applied in
this jurisdiction, but its applicability, under appropriate circumstances, was discussed in Salt
Lake City v. Salt Lake County. Utah. 568 P 2d
738 (1977).
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tween armored cars, hearses, ambulances
and taxicabs, the unalterable fact remains
that the Legislature, whose prerogative it
is, has not seen fit to do so. On the contrary, the statute sets forth the vehicles in
a single phrase, in series, separated only by
commas, and thus categorizes them as a
single class. Had it been the intention of
the Legislature to separately categorize armored cars, its insertion of a semicolon,
rather than a comma, following the recitation thereof would then have conveyed such
an intent
It is not the prerogative of this Court to
presume error in legislative enactments, nor
to distort or defeat the intent of legislation
by altering the punctuation contained
therein. Particularly is this so when, as
here, a reasonable basis exists to interpret
the act as drafted. Yet, the main opinion
presumes such error, and imposes its own
punctuation in order to sustain the Commission's order.1
In addition, it is to be observed that the
Commission is charged with the duty of
regulating all common carriers.4 Consequently, any ambiguity found to exist in
any exempting provisions • are to be reconciled in favor of the general policy it is to
regulate. In the face of ambiguity as to
exemption, it appears the better judicial
course would be to decide in favor of the
expressed mandate of regulation rather
than an unclear exemption.
I would vacate the order of the Commission which grants a statewide exemption to
Brinks, Inc.

(o
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Notwithstanding any distinction the
Commission or this Court might draw be• CROCKETT, J., concurred in this case before
his retirement.

MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE v. FITZGERALD

S. It is of note that such order represents a
complete departure from prior statutory interpretation since at all times prior hereto the
Commission has required the regulation of armored cars, and plaintiff herein is presently so
regulated.
4. U.C.A.1953. 54 fr 2 and 54-6-4.
8. Supra, footnote 1.

MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE, and
Cal Florence, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
Lebnd A. FITZGERALD, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 16746.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 13, 1981.

Broker and sales agent brought action
against purchaser for real estate sales commission. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., entered
judgment in favor of purchaser, and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Harding, District Judge, held that: (1) in case
in which earnest money agreement between
vendor and purchaser provided "Buyer to
be responsible for all real estate commissions/' instruction given by the court fairly
and adequately covered the contentions of
the parties as they were presented to the
court, and there was no error in refusing to
gjve requested instruction on theory that
broker was a third-party beneficiary in earnest money agreement, and (2) issues as to
salsa eommMon claimed by broker and
whether Uiete should have been any sales
coroiaiajupjiial all were for the jury.
Affirmed.

1. Contract! * ~ 187(1)
It is essential for a third-party beneficiary claimant to prove that contract was
intended to benefit him directly; one incidentally benefited by performance of a
promise to a third person may not maintain
an action against the promissor.
2. Contracts •=» 187(1)
Terms of agreement and facts circumstances that surround its making can be
examined to determine whether supposed
third-party beneficiary of contract was in
fact intended to be such.

3. Brokers *=>88(7)
In action against purchaser for r
estate sales commission in case in wh
earnest money agreement between vem
and purchaser provided "Buyer to be
sponsible for all real estate com miss ior
instruction given by the court fairly \
adequately covered the contentions of
parties as they were presented to the coi
and there was no error in refusing to g
requested instruction on theory that bro
was a third-party beneficiary in earr
money agreement.
4. Brokers «=»88(1)
In action by broker and sales ag
against purchaser for real estate sales o
mission, issues as to sales commisi
claimed by broker and whether there she
be any sales commission at all were for
jury.
Robert J. DeBry and Dale F. Gardi
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and ap
lants.
Lawrence E. Corbridge, Salt Lake C
for defendant and respondent.
HARDING, District Judge:
This appeal is from an adverse judgn
on a claim for a real estate sales com
s ion.
Appellants were in the business of sel
real estate. Mel Trimble was a licei
real estate broker, and Cal Florence
employed by Trimble as a sales agent,
appellants will be referred to herein joi
as Florence.
The ranch property involved in this ac
is located in Cedar Valley, Utah, and
under the management and control of }
lace Ohran. Respondent Leland A. Fitz
aid was a rancher.
Two or three years prior to Decern
1977, Florence allegedly obtained an
listing from Ohran to sell the ranch pre
ty. The terms of the oral listing alio
Florence to seek offers, and if any c
was accepted by Ohran, a six percent <
mission would be paid on the sale.
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ter statute because the killing proscribed
under that provision must be "intentional." /</. at 94 (emphasis added). We again
noted that "one cannot be guilty of an
attempt to commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea of the completed crime is
intentional conduct." Id. at 94 n. 1 (emphasis added).6
At bottom, the State seeks to replace the
word "intent" in paragraph (2) of the attempt statute with, as it says, "intent or a
mental state that is equivalent thereto" and
to modify or reject the holdings of Bell,
Norman, and Howell. Although it may
make sense to allow attempt for homicide
offenses that are presumably equal in culpability to intentional murder, we believe
that the most reasonable approach, in light
of the statutory language and our cases, is
to read the word "intent" in paragraph (2)
of the attempt statute as that word is defined in section 76-2-103(1).
Clarity is crucial to a just criminal law
system. Jurors are instructed to apply the
language set forth in our penal statutes to
determine criminal liability. Articulating
the various mental states required for the
various crimes in the Code is difficult
enough without giving multiple meanings
to the word "intent."
We hold that to convict a defendant of
attempted second degree murder, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had
a conscious objective or desire to cause the
death of another. Because the mental
state required for depraved indifference
homicide falls short of that intent, the
crime of attempted depraved indifference
homicide does not exist in Utah.
5. In State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (1982), we
rejected an argument that the Utah attempt statute required a higher level of "intent" than that
required for first degree murder. In so holding,
we interpreted paragraph (1) of the Utah attempt statute as making "clear that regardless of
any requirements which the common law may
impose concerning 'attempt' crimes, Utah law
requires only 'the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the (completed]
offense.'" Id. at 904 (brackets in original)
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1953)).
Alternatively, we wrote that even if the Utah
attempt statute incorporated the common law
requirement of intent, the mental state required

The order of the trial court denying Vigil's motion to dismiss and amend is reversed.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
(o f l(VNUMIt«mTIH>

Larry J. ZIS8I, Petitioner,
v.
STATE TAX COMMISSION

No. wmxn.u,
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct 27, 1902.
Taxpayer sought writ of review of decision of State Tax Commission assessing
$44,000 in penalties and taxes under Illegal
Drug Stamp Tax Act. The Supreme Court,
Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) "dosage
unit," within meaning of Act, means one
tablet or pill, not the dose actually taken by
each different drug user; (2) Act did not
violate Utah's constitutional provision requiring uniform operation of the laws; (3)
to conform to Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination, Act must be
read to preclude prosecutors from using
any information gained as result of stamp
purchaser's compliance with Act to establish link in chain of evidence in subsequent
for first degree murder was sufficient to meet
that requirement. Id. at 905.
The first alternative rationale relied on in
Maestas is clearly inconsistent with our cases in
Bell, Howell, and Norman and with our holding
in the instant case. Thus, that portion of Maestas that conflicts with these cases and today's
holding is incorrect. However, we note thai
Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes
prosecution for attempted aggravated murder
under the intentional or knowing formulation
of section 76-5-202(1) or attempted murder un
der the intentional or knowing formulation of
section 76-5-203(1 )(a).

ZISSI V. STATU • A
C l t « M f t 4 2 P 2 d M S (Utah 1992)

drug prosecution; (4) Act did not inflict
excessive fine or forfeiture in violation of
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment; and (5) amphetamines seized from taxpayer's truck following unconstitutional roadblock stop
were inadmissible.
Reversed.
Howe, Associate C.J., filed opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in
which Hall, CJ., concurred.
1. Administrative Law and Procedure
*=»749
Party appealing from order of administrative agency bears burden of demonstrating that agency's factual determinations
are not supported by substantial evidence,
and thus Supreme Court states facts and
all legitimate inferences drawn therefrom
in light most favorable to agency's findings. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4Xg).
2. Administrative Law and Procedure
*=»791
Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA) requires Supreme Court to uphold
agency's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence based upon
record as a whole. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b16<4Xg).
3. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=»796
On appeal from determination of administrative agency, issues of law are reviewed by Supreme Court for correctness
under Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA). U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d).
4. Taxation *=1319
On review of State Tax Commission's
assessment of $44,000 in penalties and taxes under Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, Supreme Court would not apply standard of
intermediate deference to legal issues,
where there was no explicit delegation of
discretion, and issues were questions of
constitutional law and statutory construction on which Commission's experience and
expertise would be of no real assistance.
U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107.

5. Taxation *»1317
State Tax Commission's factual finding
that amphetamine tablets were sold by the
pill and not by weight was not contrary to
substantial weight of evidence, for purpose
of Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, which establishes different tax rates for drugs sold
by weight and drugs sold by dosage unit.
U.C.A.1953, 59-19-103.
6. Statutes «=»205
General rule of statutory construction
is that statute should be construed as comprehensive whole.
7. Statutes «=>212.6
In construing legislative enactments,
Supreme Court assumes that legislature
used each term in statute advisedly and,
thus, that Court should read statutory
words literally and in accordance with their
usually accepted meanings.
8. Taxation «=»1291
"Dosage unit," within meaning of Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, which imposes
$2,000 tax on each 50 "dosage unite" of
controlled substance that is not sold by
weight or portion thereof, means one tablet
or pill, not the dose actually taken by each
different drug user. U.C.A.1953, 59-19103.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

9. Statutes *=*47
Statute will be found to be unconstitutionally vague on its face only when it is
insufficiently explicit and clear to inform
the ordinary reader of common intelligence
what conduct is proscribed.
10. Statutes *=»47
Test for determining whether statute
is unconstitutionally vague is applied in
light of fact that exactitude of language is
seldom possible.
11. Statutes *=>47
Statute will not be invalidated for
vagueness if any sensible, practical effect
can be given to contested statutory terms.
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12. Taxation «=>!29J
Term "dosage unit," within meaning of
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, which imposes
$2,000 tax on each 50 "dosage units" of
controlled substance that is not sold by
weight or portion thereof, was not unconstitutionally vague on its face, despite lack
of statutory definition. U.C.A.1953, 59-19103; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
13. Constitutional l>aw *=»48(1)
Party challenging constitutionality of
statute bears burden of demonstrating its
invalidity.
14. Taxation *=>42<l)
In tax, as in other areas of purely
economic regulation, Supreme Court grants
broad deference to legislature when scrutinizing reasonableness of legislative classifications and their relationship to legitimate
legislative purposes.
15. Taxation *»1213
Distinctions in Illegal Drug Stamp Tax
Act's definition of "dealer" as anyone who
manufactures, produces, ships, transports,
or imports into Utah or in any manner
acquires or possesses more than 42'/2
grams of marijuana, or seven or more
grams of any controlled substance, or ten
or more dosage units of any controlled
substance which is not sold by weight,
were not patently unreasonable, for purpose of determining whether Act violated
Utah constitutional provision requiring uniform operation of the laws. Const. Art. 1,
ft 24; U.C.A.1953, 59-19-102(2).
16. Taxation *=>1213
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act's classification of dealers depending on types of
drugs they possess was reasonable, for
purpose of determining whether Act violated Utah's constitutional provision requiring
uniform operation of the laws. Const. Art.
1, § 24; U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19107.
17. Taxation •=-1213
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act reasonably taxed tablet amphetamines based
upon dosage unit, while taxing tablets
ground into |>owder form at lower rate for
drugs sold by weight, for purpose of deter-

mining whether Act violated Utah's constitutional provision requiring uniform operation of the laws. Const. Art. 1, § 24;
U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 69-19-107.
18. Taxation <*=»1213
Raising revenue and discouraging illegal drug trafficking were legitimate legislative purposes, for purpose of determining
whether Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violated Utah's constitutional provision requiring
uniform operation of the laws. Const. Art.
1, ft 24; U.C.A.1953, 69-19-101 to 59-19107.
19. Constitutional Law *=>209
Under Utah's constitutional provision
requiring uniform opera^pn of the laws, if
relationship of clasaijfifeajion \Q statutory
objectives is unreasonable, the discrimination is unreasonable. Copflt Art. 1, ft 24.
20. Constitutional Law *-228.5
Taxation «=»1213
Imposing heavy tax on controlled substances was not unreasonable means of
achieving ends of raising revenue and inhibiting drug trafficking, and therefore Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act did not violate
Utah's constitutional provision requiring
uniform operation of the laws. Const. Art.
1, ft 24; U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 69-19107.
21. Constitutional Law «=*228.5
Taxation *=»1213
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act did not
violate Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, despite its distinctions based
upon quantity of drugs possessed by dealers, form of drugs possessed by dealers,
and manner in which those drugs were
sold. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; U.C.A.
1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107.
22. Taxation *»1319
Supreme Court would not address
whether Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violated privileges against self-incrimination
granted in Utah Constitution, where taxpayer failed to argue issue under Utah
Constitution, mentioning it only off-handedly in his brief. Const. Art. 1, § 12; U.C.A.
1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107.

23. Witnesses *=297(8)
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act's provisions violated Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, since purchaser
would reasonably suppose that compliance
would make information available to prosecuting authorities and that information
would provide "link in a chain" of evidence
that would tend to establish purchaser's
guilt of drug-related offenses. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 5; U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to
69-19-107.
24. Constitutional Law <*=48(3)
Supreme Court has power to uphold an
otherwise questionable statute by tailoring
it to conform to Constitution.
25. Constitutional Law «=>48(4)
Taxation «=»1212
To conform to Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, Illegal
Drug Stamp Tax Act had to be read to
preclude prosecutors from using any information gained as result of stamp purchaser's compliance with Act to establish link in
chain of evidence in subsequent drug prosecution. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5; U.C.A.
1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107.
26. Criminal Law *=>1214
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act did not
inflict excessive fine or forfeiture in violation of Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment, where taxpayer failed to demonstrate that penalty is
not commensurate with the social and economic harm caused by illegal drug use,
statute's 100% penalty is not unique in
Utah law, and same taxes and penalties
were imposed in other states. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 8; U.C.A.1953, 69-19-101 to
59-19-107.
27. Taxation «=»1319
Supreme Court would only address
whether Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violated Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and would not
address whether fine or forfeiture imposed
under Act violated State Constitution,
where taxpayer cited no authority and
made no separate cruel and unusual punishment argument under State Constitution. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 8; U.C.A.
1953, 59-19-101 to 59 19-107.

28. Taxation «=*1319
State had burden to justify roadblock
stop once taxpayer challenged its constitutionality in proceeding before State Tax
Commission regarding imposition of penalties and taxes under Illegal Drug Stamp
Tax Act, and therefore State's failure to
justify stop waived State's right to argue
legality of stop, and Supreme Court had to
accept for purposes of appeal that stop was
an unconstitutional seizure that invalidated
subsequent search of taxpayer's vehicle.
U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107.
29. Taxation <£=>1315
In determining penalties and taxes un
der Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, State Tax
Commission improperly admitted into evidence amphetamines that were seized from
taxpayer's truck as result of search following unconstitutional
roadblock stop.
U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107.
30. Taxation e=>1319
State Tax Commission's error in admitting into evidence amphetamines seized
from taxpayer's truck in search following
unconstitutional roadblock stop was clearly
harmful, since Commission premised tax
and penalties under Illegal Drug Stamp
Tax Act on the drugs themselves. U.C.A.
1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107.

David J. Bird, Salt I*ake City, for Zissi.
R. Paul Van Dam, I>eon A. Dever, Salt
Lake City, for Tax Com'n.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Petitioner Larry J. Zissi seeks a writ of
review of a decision of the State Tax Commission. The Commission assessed $44,000
in penalties and taxes against Zissi, finding
that he had failed to pay the taxes that
Utah's Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act ("the
Stamp Act") imposes on the purchase, acquisition, transportation, or importation of
controlled substances. See Utah Code
Ann. ft§ 59-19-101 to -107. Before this
court, Zissi challenges the Commission's
fact finding and its construction of the
Stamp Act, the constitutionality of the
Stamp Act, and the constitutionality of the
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been smoking The officers then searched
his truck and found a shaving bag and a
briefcase behind the seat The shaving
bag contained approximately 550 amphet
amine tablets, and the briefcase contained
$24 440 Zissi pleaded no contest to cnmi
nal charges brought against him as a result
of the roadblock and subsequent search

We hold as follows first, that Zissi has
not shown that the Commission's fact find
ing was against the substantial weight of
the evidence, second, that the Commission
properly construed the Stamp Act, third,
that the Stamp Act survives Zissi's consti
tutional challenges, fourth, that the road
block stop and subsequent search of Zissi's
truck violated the Utah Constitution, and
fifth, that the exclusionary rule barred the
admission of the amphetamine tablets at
the Commission hearing
Because the
Commission should not have admitted the
illegally seized amphetamine tablets in evi
dence, we reverse its decision

After the Utah County Sheriffs office
advised the Commission of the arrest, the
Commission began proceedings against Zis
si for taxes and penalties due under the
Stamp Act The Stamp Act taxes con
trolled substances and requires dealers to
affix official stamps on the controlled substances as evidence of taxes paid ' See
Utah Code Ann § 59-19-104(2) Zissi's
amphetamines did not bear the official
stamp At a hearing before the Commis
sion, Zissi argued that the search of his
truck was unconstitutional and that the
evidence of his amphetamines should be
suppressed Stating that it did not have
the authority to determine the constitution
ahty of the search, the Commission admit
ted the amphetamines in evidence and as
sessed a tax of $22,000 on the drugs and a
penalty of $22,000 for Zissi's failure to pay
the drug taxes and affix the official stamps
to the amphetamines

[11 We first state the facts Because a
party appealing from an order of an admin
istrative agency bears the burden of dem
onstrating that the agency's factual deter
ruinations are not supported by substantial
evidence, see id § 63-46b-16(4)(g), we
state the facts and all legitimate inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favor
able to the agency's findings Cf First
Nat'I Bank of Boston v County Bd of
Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799
P 2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) We state the
facts in this case accordingly
On June 4, 1988, Zissi's pickup truck was
stopped at a roadblock set up by the Utah
County Sheriff on State Road 73 outside
Fairfield, Utah While Zissi was at the
roadblock, one of the officers detected a
strong odor of marijuana coming from the
truck The officers directed Zissi to pull
over to the side of the road They then
inquired whether he had any marijuana in
his vehicle After initially denying that he
did, Zissi produced a small plastic bag of
marijuana and a marijuana cigarette he had
I
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roadblock at which sheriffs deputies found
the controlled substances giving rise to the
taxes and penalties Zissi argues that be
cause the roadblock stop amounted to an
unconstitutional seizure, the exclusionary
rule should have prevented the Commission
from admitting in evidence the approxi
mately 550 amphetamine tablets the depu
ties had seized from his truck

Amphetamines are included within the statu
lory definition of controlled substances See

[2-4] Before discussing Zissi's chal
lenges to the Commission's ruling, we note
the appropriate standard of review The
Utah Administrative Procedures Act
("UAPA"), id §§ 63-46b-l through -22,
governs our review of Commission deci
sions See id § 63-46b-l(l), Savage In
dus, Inc v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811
P2d 664, 668-69 (Utah 1991) Zissi chal
lenges one of the Commission's factual determinations The UAPA requires us to
uphold an agency's factual findings if such
findings are supported by substantial evi
dence based upon the record as a whole
See Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-16(4Mg)
Zissi's remaining claims raise issues of law,
which we review for correctness under the
Utah Code Ann §§ 58-37 2(4) -4(2)

UAPA * See id § 63-46b-16(4Kd), Savage
Indus, Inc, 811 P 2d at 66^-70 We now
turn to the menta
[5J We begin with Zissi's argument that
the Commission erred in making a factual
finding that amphetamine tablets are drugs
that are sold by the pill and not by weight
This finding is significant because the
Stamp Act prescribes different tax rates
for drugs sold by weight and drugs sold by
"dosage unit" s Utah Code Ann § 59-19103
In finding that the drugs in Zissi's pos
session are sold by the pill and not by
weight, the Commission relied on the fol
lowing evidence The Commission heard
testimony by Detective Kendra Hurhn of
the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department
that amphetamines in pill form are sold by
the pill Loni Deland, a defense witness
and a former narcotics agent for the State
of Utah, testified that amphetamines gen
erally are sold as a powder, by weight
However, Deland also testified that he had
not seen amphetamines in pill form sold by
weight After reviewing this testimony,
we cannot say that the Commission's find
ing that amphetamine tablets are sold by
the pill was contrary to the substantial
weight of the evidence, which we have de
2. Our recent decisions recognize that we should
grant intermediate deference to an agency s in
terpretation or application of specific laws
when the legislature has explicitly or implicitly
delegated discretion to the agency to interpret
or apply that law See, eg, Morton Intl, Inc v
Auditing Dtv of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814
P2d 581 589 (Utah 1991), Savage Indus, Inc,
811 P 2d at 668 In the instant case, there is no
explicit delegation of discretion, and the issues
are questions of constitutional law and statutory
construction on which the Commission s expert
ence and expertise will be of no real assistance
See Sandy City v Salt Lake County, 827 P 2d
212, 218 (Utah 1992), Stiver v Auditing Dtv of
State Tax Comm'n, 820 P 2d 912, 914 (Utah
1991) Therefore we do not apply the standard
of intermediate deference to the legal issues in
this case See Stiver, 820 P 2d at 914
3

The Stamp Act states in relevant part
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and
controlled substances as defined in this chap
ter at the following rates
(b) on each gram of a controlled substance
or each portion of a gram $200 and

fined as that quantum of relevant evidence
that would tend to convince a reasonable
person of a conclusion First Nat'l Bank
of Boston, 799 P 2d at 1165, Grace Drill
ing Co v Board of Review, 776 P 2d 63, 68
(Utah Ct App 1989) Consequently, we af
firm the Commission s factual conclusion
We next examine Zissi s argument that
the Commission misconstrued the meaning
of the term "dosage unit, ' as used in the
Stamp Act The Stamp Act itself does not
define this term 4 The Commission con
strued it to mean one tablet or pill, basing
its determination on expert testimony by J
Craig Johnson, director of Pharmacy Ser
vices at LDS Hospital Johnson testified
that "dosage unit" has a distinct meaning
in medical circles, a meaning that differs
from the meaning of the term "dosage "
He said that "dosage unit" means the
amount of a medicine or prescription that is
sold as a unit and relates to how the medi
cine is packaged This differs from, the
dosage a patient takes, which may be one
dosage unit or more than one dosage unit,
depending on the strength of the patient s
prescription
(6,71 Zissi argues that because the ac
tual dosage taken by users of amphet
amines is generally greater than one pill,
(c) on each 50 dosage units of a controlled
substance that is not sold by weight or por
lion thereof $2000
(2) For the purpose of calculating the tax
under this chapter a quantity of marihuana
or other controlled substance is measured by
the weight of the substance whether pure or
impure or dilute or by dosage units when the
substance is not sold by weight in the dealer s
possession
Utah Code Ann § 59 19 103
4

Although the statute contains no definition of
the term dosage unit it does authorize the
Commission to adopt the rules necessaiy to en
force the Stamp Act See Utah Code Ann § 59
19-107(1) However the Commission has never
exercised this rule making power
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the Commission's determination that a dosage unit equals one pill is erroneous. Essentially, Zissi would have this court
equate "dosage" with "dosage unit." This
argument ignores the word "unit" in the
term. A general rule of statutory construction is that a statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole. See Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037,
1045 (Utah 1991); Peay v. Board of Ed. of
Provo City School Dist, 14 Utah 2d 63, 66,
377 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 1962). In construing legislative enactments, we assume that
the legislature used each term in the statute advisedly and, thus, that we should
read the statutory words literally and in
accordance with their usually accepted
meanings. See Pate v. Marathon Steel
Co., 777 P.2d 428, 430 (Utah 1989); Hector,
Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan Ass% 741 P.2d
542, 546 (Utah 1987); Grant v. Utah State
Land Bd., 26 Utah 2d 100, 102, 485 P.2d
1035, 1036 (1971).
While Zissi correctly points out that the
term "dosage" is generally understood to
be the amount of drug a person would
take, he does not address the meaning of
the word "unit" in the term "dosage unit."
"Unit," as defined by WebBter's Dictionary,
means
the first natural number: a number that
is the least whole number and is expressed by the numeral 1: a single thing
(as a magnitude or number) that constitutes an undivided whole . . . : a determinate quantity (as of length, time, heat,
value or housing) adopted as a standard
of measurement for other quantities of
the same kind . . . : a single thing or
person or group that is a constituent
and isolable member of some more inclusive whole: a member of an aggregate that is the least part to have clearly definable separate existence and that
normally forms a basic element of organization within the aggregate
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2500 (1961) (emphasis added).
181 When read in conjunction with "dosage," it is apparent that the word "unit" in
"dosage unit" relates to a single item or
measurement used to determine the pa-

tient's actual dosage. The Commission's
construction of the term "dosage unit"
takes this definition of unit into account in
determining that a dosage unit is one pill.
The language of the statute and the evidence that "dosage unit" has a distinct
meaning in the medical community amply
support the Commission's definition of
"dosage unit" as a unit of the drug. In
this case, that unit is one pill. We therefore affirm the Commission's interpretation
of "dosage unit."
Having rejected Zissi's challenges to the
Commission's fact-finding and statutory
construction, we next turn to his attacks on
the constitutionality of the Stamp Act.
First, Zissi argues that the Sta,mp Act violates Fourteenth Arnendf^e^t due process
guarantees because it ^ uncoiM|titutionally
vague on its face. Specifically, he argues
that the term "dosage unit" in tfye statute
is vague and indefinite and subject to arbitrary enforcement by the Commission and
the prosecuting authorities charged with
enforcing the Stamp Act because the term
does not provide fair notice of what is
required or prohibited and does not protect
against unfettered discretion in enforcement. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 357, 103 S.Ct 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d
903 (1983); State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d
1042, 1049 (Utah 1984); Greaves v. State,
528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974); State v.
Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561, 564
(1962).
19-111 We will find a statute to be unconstitutionally vague on its face only
when it is insufficiently explicit and clear
to inform the ordinary reader of common
intelligence what conduct is proscribed.
See Greenwood v. City of North Salt
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991); Chris
& Dicks Lumber v. Tax Comm'n, 791
P.2d 511, 516 (Utah 1990); Packard, 250
P.2d at 563. We apply this test in light of
the fact that exactitude of language is seldom possible. Consequently, we will not
invalidate a statute for vagueness if any
sensible, practical effect can be given U>
the contested statutory terms. Packard,
250 P.2d at 563; see State v. Musser, 118
Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193, 194 (1950).

(12] With this standard in mind, we examine Zissi's interpretation of the statute.
He argues that the term "dosage unit"
means the number of pills or units of a
drug that a user purchases and uses at one
time and that therefore the statute is
vague and not readily susceptible of equal
enforcement and operation. He claims that
dealers who desire to comply with the statute's mandate that they pay tax on and
purchase stamps for all drugs in their possession are required to make a prior assessment of what the Commission later will
determine makes up a dosage unit.
Zissi's argument cannot survive our holding that "dosage unit" means one tablet or
pill, not the dose actually taken by each
different drug user. Thus interpreted, the
term "dosage unit" within the statute
meets the requirements for specificity and
notice of the required conduct. Dealers
are made aware that they will be required
to buy stamps based upon each pill in their
possession. We reject Zissi's argument
that the Stamp Act is unconstitutionally
vague on its face.
We next address Zissi's contention that
the Stamp Act violates both federal and
state guarantees of equal protection. The
Utah Constitution states, "All laws of a
general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const, art. I, § 24. We have
previously determined that article I, section
24 imposes an analysis of the reasonableness of economic legislation that is at least
as rigorous as the analysis required by the
federal equal protection clause and may
require even stricter scrutiny than does the
federal Constitution. See Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634,
637 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply
Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884,
889 (Utah 1988); see also Malan v. Lewis,
693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). Therefore,
our analysis begins with Utah's constitutional provision requiring uniform operation of the laws. If the tax statute at issue
withstands scrutiny under the Utah Constitution, we need not examine the federal
equal protection question. See Blue Cross,
779 F.2d at 637.

[13,14] As a threshold matter, we note
that our analysis is guided by the wellsettled proposition that the party challenging a statute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. See, e.g., Blue
Cross, 779 P.2d at 637; City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 767
P.2d 530, 537 (Utah 1988); Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1979). In tax,
as in other areas of purely economic regulation, we grant broad deference to the
legislature when scrutinizing the reasonableness of legislative classifications and
their relationship to legitimate legislative
purposes. See Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 637;
City of West Jordan, 767 P.2d at 537.
"That broad deference leads us to sustain a
classification if 'facts can reasonably be
conceived which would justify the distinctions or differences in state policy [expressed by the challenged legislation] as
between different persons.' " Blue Cross,
779 P.2d at 637 (quoting Baker, 607 P.2d at
244).
Bearing in mind this broad deference, we
analyze the Stamp Act to see whether it
violates article I, section 24. "In scrutinizing a legislative measure under article I,
§ 24, we must determine whether the classification is reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and whether there is a reasonable
relationship between the classification and
the legislative purposes." Id. Before
turning to these issues, we must identify
what classifications the legislature has
made in imposing the Drug Stamp Tax.
First, the Stamp Act imposes a tax on
those who deal in illegal drugs. The definition of "dealers" in the Stamp Act is based
upon the quantity of drugs possessed.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-102(2). Second,
the Stamp Act breaks "dealers" into subgroups that are taxed at different rates,
depending on the form of the drugs possessed by the dealer and the manner in
which these drugs are sold. See id. § 5919-103. Hence, the statute distinguishes
between dealers possessing drugs sold by
weight and those possessing drugs not sold
by weight.
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(151 Now that we have identified the
statute's classifications, we analyze their
legitimacy The first question is whether
there is anything inherently unreasonable
in the legislature's classifications of drug
dealers See Blue Cros% 779 P 2d at 640
The statute defines a dealer as anyone who
"manufactures, produces, ships, trans
ports, or imports into Utah or in any man
ner acquires or possesses more than 42'/^
grams of marihuana, or seven or more
grams of any controlled substance, or ten
or more dosage units of any controlled
substance which is not sold by weight"
Utah Code Ann § 59-1^-102(2) On their
face, these distinctions are not patently un
reasonable Indeed, it makes perfect sense
that the legislature would impose the tax
on only those persons who possess a signif
icant quantity of a controlled substance
Unlike casual users, who possess only
small quantities of drugs, such persons are
more likely to be major participants in the
drug trafficking that creates such a drain
on government resources
1161 Moreover, the classification of
dealers depending on the types of drugs
they posse** is also reasonable Controlled
substances are sold in different forms
The classifications are a necessary conces
sion to this fact and do not single out any
member of a particular class for disparate
treatment All drugs sold by weight are
taxed at the same rate
Likewise, all
5

Senator Ivan Matheson who presented the
Stamp Act ( S B 209) to the Senate explained
the bill as follows
Mr President this is an interesting concept
It s a tax on the sale of illegal drugs
Now
Minnesota put this particular mechanism on
and a year ago picked up $6 million in reve
nue
What it does is (require) the Public
Safety Commission f to] prescribcl } stamps
and seals that must be on those drugs if
they re sold
If they come in to get the
stamps and seals they re illegal to start with
and if they don t put them on we can prose
cute them for the tax that they didn t pay
And we also prosecute them by increasing
amounts We can get them for tax evasion on
account that theyve made money on that
they ve never reported There s a number of
processes
set forth in this bill that make it
so if you pick anybody up with this drug
you ve got them one way or another and it s

drugs sold in units are taxed at the same
rate See id § 59 19-103(lKc)
(17| Zissi maintains that because the
tablet amphetamines might well have been
ground into powder form and thus taxed at
the lower rate for drugs sold by weight, he
is being discriminated against unreason
ably However, he fails to address the fact
that an amphetamine sold in powder form
is a distinctly different substance than an
amphetamine sold in tablet form The evi
dence before the Commission distinguished
between amphetamine tablets, which char
actenstically are of an off white, brownish
color, and crystal amphetamine, commonly
called "crystal" or "crank," which is a very
fine white powder Further, the evidence
indicated that amphetamine tablets are sold
not by weight but by number On the
other hand, "crystal," or "crank," is in fact
sold by weight but is much more expensive
Because of these distinctions, we hold that
the classification is reasonable
1181 The second question under our an
alytical model is the legitimacy of the objectives pursued by the legislation See
Blue Cross, 779 P 2d at 640 The legisla
tive history of the Stamp Act reveals two
objectives, namely, to raise revenue and to
discourage illegal drug trafficking s Both
are legitimate legislative purposes
(19,201 The third and final question is
whether the legislature chose a permissible
means to achieve its legitimate ends Id
going to lead to some pretty stiff enforcement
on it
1 ike I mentioned Minnesota picked up $6
million I don t have any idea and the fiscal
note says they don t on this but it will be a
revenue producer It will be a mechanism to
tie down these drug pushers and what not and
nail them to the wall when they sometimes
get away from us The Public Safety Com
missioner thinks it s an idea that II work I
don t know how many of you remember back
to the time when Al Capone was finally con
victed
He was convicted on this very pro
cess This is a mechanism I think we can
reach out and get some of those people If
there s any questions I d be happy to answer
Utah State Senate Record of Third Reading of
S B 209 Feb 23 1988 (recording on file with
the Utah Senate 47th l^g Senate day 44 disk
91 side 1)
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at 641 If the relationship of the classifica
tion to the statutory objectives is unreason
able, the discrimination is unreasonable
See Malan, 693 P 2d at 671, tee also Hul
bert v State, 607 P 2d 1217, 1224 (Utah
1980) Here, a heavy tax on controlled
substances undeniably will have the effects
of raising revenue and inhibiting drug traf
fickmg We cannot say that imposing a
drug tax is an unreasonable means of
achieving these ends

SCt 709 19 I Rd2d W6 (1968), and their
progeny the Stamp Act s provisions violate
the federal Constitution because the pur
chaser would reasonably suppose that com
pliance would make information available
to prosecuting authorities and that the in
formation would provide a ' link in a chain
of evidence that would tend to establish the
individual s guilt of drug related offenses
See Marchettx, 390 U S at 48, 88 S Ct at
703

121) For these reasons, we reject Zissi's
contention that the Stamp Act violates arti
cle I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution
Because of this holding, we also reject Zis
si's contention that the Stamp Act violates
the Fourteenth Amendment See Blue
Cross, 779 P 2d at 645

(24,25) However, although the Stamp
Act is facially unconstitutional, we are
mindful of our power to save a statute
from unconstitutionality by imposing on it
a limiting construction This power per
nuts us to uphold an otherwise questiona
ble statute by tailoring it to conform to the
Constitution, which is what we must pre
sume the legislature intended See In re
Criminal Investigation, 754 P 2d 633,
640-41 (Utah 1988), tee also Greaves, 528
P 2d at 807 The Utah Court of Appeals
suggested such a course for the Stamp Act
in State v Dains, 787 P 2d 517 (Utah Ct
App 1990) We follow the course suggest
ed in Dams, and we hold that the statute
must be read to preclude prosecutors from
using any information gamed as a result of
a stamp purchaser's compliance with the
tax statute to establish a link in the chain
of evidence in a subsequent drug prosecu
tion See xd at 522-23 With such a read
ing, the scope of the resulting immunity is
broad enough to satisfy the requirements
of the Fifth Amendment

Third, Zissi contends that compliance
with the Stamp Act would require him to
provide evidence against himself in viola
tion of the privilege against self incrimina
tion granted in the Fifth Amendment to the
federal Constitution and article I, section
12 of the Utah Constitution Zissi argues
that the Stamp Act requires self incrimina
tion in two ways first, by requiring a
dealer who complies with its terms to provide incriminating information that may be
turned over to the state or local prosecutor,
and second, by providing vital evidence in a
prosecutor's case against a dealer who
complies with the Act and affixes the
stamps to illicit drugs because such acts
show knowledge that the items are con
trolled substances
[22] As a preliminary matter, we note
that Zissi alleges violations of both the
state and federal constitutions However,
because Zissi failed to argue the issue under the state constitution, mentioning it
only off handedly in his brief, we will not
address the state constitutional question
See State v Webb, 779 P 2d 1108, 1111 n 4
(Utah 1989), State v Lafferty, 749 P 2d
1239, 1247 n 5 (Utah 1988)
[23] Turning to the merits of Zissi's
federal constitutional argument, we agree
that under Marchettx v United States, 390
U S 39, 88 S Ct 697, 19 h Ed 2d 889 (1968),
Grosso v Unxted States, 390 U S 62, 88

[26] Zissi's final challenge to the consti
tutionahty of the Stamp Act is his conten
tion that it violates the Eighth Amend
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment because it inflicts an excessive
fine or forfeiture The State responds by
arguing that the United States Supreme
Court has held that the provisions of the
Eighth Amendment apply only to criminal
fines and forfeitures, not to civil punish
ments or penalties
See Ingraham v
Wright, 430 US f>51, 664, 9 7 S C t 1401
1408-09, 51 LEd2d 711 (1977)
The
State's argument founders on the fact that
we have already determined Commission
hearings under the Stamp Act to be quasi
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criminal in nature. See Sims v. Collection
Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 841
P.2d 6, 14 (Utah 1992). Consequently, we
must examine the merits of Zissi's Eighth
Amendment claim.
(27) As a threshold matter, we note
that because Zissi has cited no authority
and made no separate cruel and unusual
argument under the state constitution, we
will address this issue only in the context
of the federal Constitution. This analysis
begins with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Solem v. Helm, 468 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct
3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). In Solem, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the Eighth
Amendment requires that the punishment
imposed on a criminal be proportionate to
the crime he or she committed. Id. at 28688, 103 S.Ct. at 3007-09. The Court held
that to determine the proportionality of the
punishment, a court should rely on "objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the
sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions." Id. at
292, 103 S.Ct. at 3011. See generally State
v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269-72 (Utah
1986). Applying these criteria to the case
before us, we find that the Stamp Act does
not violate the Eighth Amendment.
We begin with the gravity of the offense
and the harshness of the penalty. Zissi
does not seriously contend that his evasion
of the drug tax is a harmless or frivolous
offense. Nor could he. Illegal drug trafficking and abuse are significant problems
in our society. They create an enormous
economic drain on our public funds. We
devote substantial resources to educating
our citizens against drug abuse and apprehending, convicting, and treating or incarcerating those who violate our drug laws.
The legislature has attempted to recoup
some nominal portion of the costs incurred
in fighting drug abuse by imposing a tax
on the very people—the drug dealers—who
benefit so greatly from this usage. Sixty
percent of all monies collected under the
Sump Act am distributed "to the law en
forotm«nt af*ocy coodacimg th* coo-

trolled substance investigation, to be used
and applied by the agency in the continued
enforcement of controlled substance laws."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-l06<6KaKii). This
tax not only provides the state with crucial
resources to combat the ills of drug trafficking, but it may have the additional salutary effect of making drug dealing less
lucrative, thereby lessening the incentive to
purchase and peddle illicit drugs.
By evading the drug tax, Zissi thwarted
these legitimate governmental efforts to
suppress drug use. This grave offense is
in no way disproportionate to the fines the
Commission imposed on Zissi under the
Stamp Act. A monetary fine is the lightest
criminal sanction {ha ajtatje can impose.
See Bishop, 717 p 2 & # J j i ^ Though Zissi
argues that the U O d o penalty greatly
exceeded the actdll street value of the
drug, he makes no attempt id convince us
that the penalty is not commensurate with
the social and economic harm inflicted on
the State of Utah. We hold that under
Solem, the severity of the sanction imposed
on Zissi is not unconstitutionally disproportionate to the gravity of his offense.
Turning to the second element of the
Solem analysis, we examine the comparability of other penalties imposed for similar
offenses. See Bishop, 717 P.2d at 270.
Utah prescribes heavy penalties for tax
evasion. Although the Stamp Act's penalty of 100 percent of the unpaid tax is
among the most severe in Utah law, it is by
no means unique. For instance, Utah imposes a penalty of 100 percent of underpaid
tax when that underpayment is due to
fraud with intent to evade the tax. See
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-401 (8Kd). Consequently, we are unable to say that the
Stamp Act's penalties run afoul of the second element of the Solem test.
Finally, Solem requires us to compare
the penalties imposed under the Stamp Act
with penalties imposed by similar statutes
in other jurisdictions. See Solem, 463 U.S.
at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3010. Although we
have not undertaken a comprehensive investigation into the drug tax statutes in
other states, our research shows that the
penaitMMi possible under the Utah Act do
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not markedly exceed the penalties possible
nationwide. In fact, Alabama, Idaho, Kan
sas, and Minnesota all impose the same
taxes on illegal drugs and penalties for
evasion of those taxes as does Utah. See
Ala.Code §§ 40-17A-8, -9(a) (Supp.1991);
Idaho Code §§ 63-4203, -4207(1) (Supp.
1992); Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 79-5202(a), -5208
(1989 & Supp.1991);
Minn.Stat.Ann.
§§ 297D.08, 297D.09 subd. 1 (1990 & Supp.
1991). Thus, this situation is unlike that in
Solem, where it appeared that the defendant had been treated more severely than
he would have been in any other state. 463
U.S. at 299-300, 103 S.Ct. at 3014-3015.
Because Zissi could have received similar
penalties in these jurisdictions, we cannot
say that the Utah penalty is disproportionate. We reject Zissi's contention that the
Stamp Act violates the Eighth Amendment.
Notwithstanding our rejection of all four
of Zissi's challenges to the constitutionality
of the Stamp Act, our holding that the
Stamp Act survives Zissi's constitutional
challenges does not dispose of this case.
Zissi also attacks the constitutionality of
the search of his truck and the seizure of
his amphetamine tablets and argues that
the exclusionary rule should have prevented the admission of the drugs in evidence
at the Commission's hearing. We agree.
[28J We begin with the constitutionality
of the roadblock and subsequent search.
Before the Commission, both parties
briefed the question of the constitutionality
of the roadblock stop. The Commission
took the position that it had no authority to
rule on that question but did so nonetheless, declaring that the roadblock was not
unconstitutional and admitting the seized
drugs in evidence against Zissi. Before
this court, Zissi raised and briefed the issue
of the roadblock's constitutionality. The
State, in contrast, chose not to address the
constitutionality question in its brief, relying instead on the argument that the exclusionary rule should not apply to a tax proceeding. The State's reliance on the exclusionary rule argument implicitly accepted
the preliminary assumption that the road
block was illegal. At oral argument, neither party addressed the legality of the

roadblock; both parties assumed that the
roadblock was illegal and argued instead
only about the application of the exclusionary rule. There is no question that the
State had the burden to justify the stop
once Zissi challenged its constitutionality.
Because it failed to do so, we hold that the
State has waived its right to argue the
legality of the roadblock stop and accept
for the purposes of this appeal that the
roadblock stop constituted an unconstitutional seizure that invalidated the subsequent search.
(29,30) This brings us to Zissi's final
contention. He argues that because the
roadblock stop was unconstitutional, the
evidence resulting from the stop should,
under the state exclusionary rule, be excluded from the tax proceeding. Our recent opinion in Sims v. Collection Diinsion
of the Utah State Tax Commission, 841
P.2d 6 (Utah 1992), governs this issue. In
Sims, which addressed a similar factual
situation, a plurality of this court held that
the Utah Constitution's exclusionary rule
prevented the Commission from admitting
in evidence the drugs taken from Sims' car.
Id. at 14 (Durham, J , joined by Zimmerman, J). In a separate opinion, Justice
Stewart reached the same conclusion under
the federal exclusionary rule. Id. at 14
(Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
Thus, Sims compels us to conclude that the
Commission likewise erred in admitting in
evidence the amphetamines seized from
Zissi's truck. This error was clearly harm
ful, as the Commission premised the tax
and penalties on the drugs themselves.
Consequently, we reverse the Commission's decision.
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
(concurring and dissenting):
I concur in that part of the majority
opinion which rejects all four of Zissi's
challenges to the constitutionality of the
Stamp Act.
1 dissent from that part which holds thai
the roadblock was illegal. I would nol
reach that issue because it is unnecessar)
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to do so. I would follow the reasoning of
my dissenting opinion in Sims v. Collection
Division of Utah State Tax Commission,
841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992), and hold that, assuming the roadblock was illegal and the
search of the truck and seizure of the tablets was unconstitutional, the exclusionary
rule should not be applied to bar admission
of the drugs in evidence before the Com
mission. My reasoning was that proceed
ings before the Commission to enforce the
Stamp Act are civil in nature and that the
exclusionary rule should only be applied in
criminal proceedings. Also, I pointed out
that imposition of the exclusionary rule
would serve no useful purpose because the
Commission played no part in either setting
up the roadblock or the search and seizure
that followed. The police officers have already been punished by the suppression of
the seized evidence in Sims' criminal prosecution. The same reasons apply in the
instant case.
The majority opinion in Sims, in holding
that proceedings before the Commission
are quasi-criminal in nature, relied heavily
on the fact that a KM) percent penalty is
imposed by the Stamp Act. In my dissenting opinion, I observed that the penalty
was no heavier than is imposed in both
federal and civil tax proceedings on erring
taxpayers. It is interesting that now, in
the instant case, the majority agrees that
the penalty is no heavier than is found in
our income tax code, which admittedly is a
civil, not a quasi-criminal, penalty. States
the majority:
Utah prescribes heavy penalties for [income] tax evasion. Although the Stamp
Act's penalty of 100 percent is among the
most severe in Utah law, it is by no
means unique. For instance, Utah imposes a penalty of 100 percent of underpaid tax when that underpayment is due
to fraud with intent to evade the tax.
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-401(3)(d).
The above statement from the majority
opinion in this case effectively undercuts
one of the chief bases for the majority
opinion in Sims.
I would affirm the Commission.
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HALL, C.J., concurs in the concurring
and dissenting opinion of HOWE, Associate
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Duane WILLETT, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Eldon BARNES. Warden, Utah State
Prison, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 900344.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 28, 1992.
Petitioner who pled guilty to charge of
first-degree murder sought writ of habeas
corpus and leave to withdraw his guilty
plea. The Fourth District Court, Utah
County, Cullen Y. Christensen, J., denied
petitions, and petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that guilty
plea court had failed to establish factual
basis for petitioner's plea.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Habeas Corpus <fc=>475
Petitioner was entitled to habeas corpus relief from plea of guilty to first-degree murder where plea colloquy contained
no recitation of any facts surrounding victim's death, and nothing in record indicated
that adequate factual basis for conviction
existed at time petitioner entered his plea.
2. Habeas Corpus *M75
Habeas petitioner's plea of guilty to
first-degree murder could not be upheld on
basis that petitioner pled guilty pursuant to
plea agreement in which prosecution
agreed not to seek death penalty against
petitioner's son, who allegedly aided petitioner in committing murder in question;
although guilty plea may be held valid
where record of facts shows that defendant

has, for some other legitimate reason, intelligently and voluntarily entered plea, facts
must substantiate prosecution of charge at
trial, rather than merely establish motivation for entering plea.
3. Criminal Law «&=»273.1<4)
Court cannot be satisfied that guilty
plea is knowing and voluntary unless record establishes facts that would place defendant at risk of conviction should matter
proceed to trial.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Salt take City, for
Willett.
R. Paul Van Dam, David F Bryant, Salt
Lake City, for Barnes.
DURHAM, Justice.
Plaintiff Duane Willett sought a writ of
habeas corpus in the Fourth District Court
in Utah County and also sought leave to
withdraw his 1983 guilty plea to a charge
of first degree murder. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Willett's petitions. This appeal followed. We
vacate the district court's ruling and remand for further proceedings.
Ml In 1983, the State charged plaintiff
and his son, Harley Willett, with first degree murder. Following plea negotiations,
the State agreed to charge Harley Willett
with second degree murder in exchange for
Duane Willett's guilty plea on a first degree murder charge. Duane Willett now
challenges the plea proceeding, contending
among other things that the trial court
failed to establish a factual basis for the
plea. Because we grant plaintiff's requested relief on this ground, we do not address
his other claims.
This court's decision in State v. Breclcenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), established
that before accepting a guilty plea, a trial
court must develop a factual basis upon
which to base a conviction of the charged
crime.1 Id. at 443. In Brecken ridge, we
concluded that even though the plea collo
I.

The rules of practice in effect in the Utah
district courts at the time of Willett's plea also
required the court to determine "that there is
factual basis for the plea." Rules of Practice,

quy did include a recitation of the sur
rounding facts, as a matter of law those
facts were insufficient to support the
charge. Id. at 442-44. In this case, the
colloquy contains no recitation of any facts
surrounding the death of the victim. We
therefore conclude that the plea colloquy
failed to develop the factual basis necessary for the court to properly accept Willett's plea.
On appeal, the State contends, however,
as the district court concluded, that the
"record as a whole" established a sufficient
factual basis to accept the guilty plea, even
if the plea hearing did not. Willett's plea
occurred before our decision in State v.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), and
the fire-Gibbons rule required reviewing
courts to uphold guilty pleas as long as the
record as a whole demonstrated "substantial compliance" with constitutional and
procedural requirements. State v. Hoff,
814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991).
Applying the substantial compliance test,
we conclude that the court below erred. In
the entire record, nothing supports a finding that an adequate factual basis existed
at the time Willett entered his plea. The
State has not adverted to any facts regarding the events themselves that could form
the basis of a conviction. The closest any
thing in the record comes to establishing a
factual basis is a brief colloquy, prompted
by Mr. Watson, a deputy county attorney,
during the entry of Harley Willett's guilty
plea on the second degree murder charge:
MR. WATSON: Perhaps the court would
want to inquire whether or not there is a
factual basis from this particular defendant with regard to the entry of this plea
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Suppose you state for the
court briefly Mr. Willett how exactly it
happened on the 20th of November?
MR. HARLEY WILLETT: Well, I aided
and abetted my father.
THE COURT: In doing what?
Utah District and Circuit Courts, Rule 1.6(c)
(now supeisoded by The Code of Judicial Ad
ministration)

Appendix 1

SENATE H.B. 103
46TH LEGISLATURE (DAY 44)
February 26, 1985 (A.M. Session)

Senator
Sandberg

Senator
Barlow

Dave
Adams

133569

I acknowledged that the bill includes new industry coming
into the state as well as expansion of existing in state
businesses and I suggest to you that this bill is on the
track of encouraging outside business to come into Utah
and not giving existing business a fair shake with it.
The businesses that now exist in Utah have paid the full
load on taxes and you're gonna prevent them to get this
break on any expansion which by the minimal or not at all
and I view this as showing favoritism to bring outside
business in at the expense of existing business.

Mr. Adams, I believe this is really a good bill, but
we've had three similar bills. We've had the bill that
we've passed in this body that's gone to the house to get
tax exemption on air pollution equipment. I understand
that bill has been killed by the House. Now that leaves
only two bills left. This bill here, which is an
industrial development bill, then I understand that House
Bill
283
which
passed
the
House
practically
overwhelmingly which now deals with industries of
procurement the rate that we are, that there are over
$3 billion of supplies that are ordered or contracted by
federal agencies in the State of Utah and if we really
got our, the national average, we only get around
4 percent, and the national average is 70, and therefore
that bill would pass the legislature to set up
appropriation about 1.5 or 6 million. But what I'm
wondering is we only have two bills left to consider.
This is one and then the other bill which incidently is
on our calendar and we just got through taking $7.3
million away from our total appropriations by lowering
the mill levy on this school bill. So until we know
exactly how much money is available, do you have any
suggestions? I understand you are for both remaining
bills, is that right?
Well I can only speak at this time to the bill that's
here on the floor. The other matters are, I think, you
know you're talking about Representative Holt's bill. I
would like to just address this one at this point, if we
could. And I am in favor of this particular bill and I
do feel that Senator Sandberg has brought up some very
good points but I think that all of existing businesses
in the state would greatly benefit by having additional

out of the state or within the state. And that although
new businesses that are originated in Utah or existing
businesses that expand, may not have the same benefits,
exactly.
They would have the benefit on their new
equipment, sales tax exemption, plus they'd have the
benefit of a stronger economic base in which to compete
in and I think that this is a important part of this bill
that needs to be understood.
I think the existing
business people of Utah will greatly benefit from the
passage of this particular provision.

